Willow Wealth
Yieldstreet raised $1.56B from 28,440 retail investors across 83 SEC-registered SPVs — then rebranded to Willow Wealth, removed a decade of performance data, and reported $208M in investor losses. The IRR they marketed never included the product that 12,503 of those investors actually used.
What the data actually shows - TL;DR
The most important number in the Yieldstreet story is not $208M — it's $926.8M. That is the EDGAR-verified capital raised by the Short Term Notes program from approximately 16,000 retail investors. It represents 59% of everything Yieldstreet raised via Reg D. It is explicitly excluded from the 9.4-9.8% IRR the platform used as its primary marketing claim. CNBC documented what went wrong. AltStreet's EDGAR analysis documents how many investors were excluded from the metric that was supposed to tell them whether things were going right.
AltStreet tracks 83 Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth fund entities via SEC EDGAR Form D filings and amendments. 75 entities with real sales data upserted to platform_exits. Full amendment history stored in form_d_amendment_history jsonb for entities with multiple filings including ALTNOTES I (7 filings) and ALTNOTES II (5 filings). Platform ID: c9538c3e-76f9-4467-9903-5ab751e4d77e.
Quick Verdict
Is this platform right for you?
Willow Wealth is in active wind-down following documented investor losses, regulatory enforcement, and a rebrand that industry observers described as reputation management. The platform sold its flagship fund in March 2026 and removed historical performance data from public view. The review exists for two reasons: to document what happened for investors currently holding positions, and to provide the forensic EDGAR analysis that quantifies the scale of the Short Term Notes exclusion — a structural disclosure issue that affected more investors than any other element of the Yieldstreet story.
Best for
- Existing Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth investors monitoring their positions and seeking context on the platform's trajectory
- Retail investors evaluating multi-asset alternative investment platforms who need to understand the structural disclosure risks that manifested here
- Due diligence professionals building evaluation frameworks for private markets platforms — the Yieldstreet case provides the most complete retail-scale cautionary dataset available
Avoid if
- You are evaluating Willow Wealth as a new investment — the platform is in wind-down, the flagship fund is being sold, and documented losses across multiple asset classes have not been resolved
- You are treating the 9.4-9.8% IRR as representative of the platform's actual return to investors — it excluded 59% of what was raised and only counted deals that matured favorably
Top strengths
- SEC-registered broker-dealer and investment adviser provide baseline regulatory oversight and disclosure requirements — a higher governance standard than unregistered platforms
- Institutional fund partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman Sachs, StepStone) announced December 2025 provide access to legitimate institutional managers at reduced minimums
- Alternative Income Fund available to non-accredited investors provided broader access than most private markets platforms
Key limitations
- $208M in documented investor losses across marine finance and real estate offerings — CNBC three-part investigation August-December 2025
- Historical performance data removed from public website during rebrand — prevents independent verification of return degradation patterns
- Platform sold flagship fund March 2026 — structural sign of wind-down, not stabilization
- Short Term Notes capital ($926.8M from ~16,000 investors) explicitly excluded from platform's own IRR metric — the most widely used product was never counted in the most prominently marketed performance figure
Compare Before Deciding
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Quick Answers
What most investors want to know first
The highest-signal facts first: minimums, liquidity reality, K-1 timing, and whether distributions are actually part of the experience.
Liquidity
No secondary market for deal investments. Alternative Income Fund transition creates exit uncertainty. Investors who need liquidity from defaulted or watchlist positions have no mechanism to exit — they must wait for workout resolution.
K-1 Timing
March-April for standard deal SPVs. Defaults and workouts may delay K-1 substantially — extensions to September or later possible for complex situations.
Distributions
Short Term Notes: monthly interest, principal at maturity. Deal SPVs: distributions on resolution. Alternative Income Fund: quarterly distributions based on NAV (subject to transition).
Overview
Platform Overview
A concise read on what the platform is, how the structure works, and where the practical friction shows up for real investors.
Multi-asset alternative investments marketplace (founded 2015 as Yieldstreet, rebranded October 2025 to Willow Wealth) enabling accredited and retail investors to access private markets across 10+ asset classes including private credit, real estate, legal finance, art, marine finance, venture capital, and structured notes. Platform intermediates between capital providers and deal sponsors through SEC-registered broker-dealer (Willow Wealth Markets LLC) and investment adviser (Willow Asset Management LLC). As of 2026, platform is in effective wind-down: flagship Alternative Income Fund sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX (March 2026, pending shareholder vote), historical performance data removed from website (October 2025), and management team pivoting toward Willow 360 managed portfolios and institutional fund distribution partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman Sachs, StepStone). Platform reported 500,000+ members and $6B+ cumulative investments. AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms $1.56B raised across 83 Reg D entities from 28,440 investors.
AltStreet's EDGAR analysis confirms $1.56B raised across 83 Reg D entities from 28,440 investors. The platform's Short Term Notes program — two entities (ALTNOTES I and II) raised $926.8M from approximately 16,000 retail investors with no minimum investment — was explicitly excluded from the platform's own IRR calculation. CNBC's three-part investigation (August-December 2025) documented $208M in investor losses across marine finance and real estate offerings. The platform rebranded to Willow Wealth in October 2025, removed historical performance data from its website, and in March 2026 agreed to sell its flagship Alternative Income Fund to Mount Logan Capital. The platform is in effective wind-down.
Founded
2015 as Yieldstreet by Milind Mehere and Michael Weisz
Rebranded
October 22, 2025 — Yieldstreet → Willow Wealth
Platform Status
Effective wind-down — flagship fund sold March 2026, historical data removed
Platform Scale
500,000+ members, $6B+ cumulative investments (per platform)
EDGAR-Verified Capital
$1.56B across 83 Reg D entities, 28,440 investors
Short Term Notes Capital
$926.8M from ~16,000 investors — 59% of EDGAR capital, excluded from IRR
Legal Finance Vertical
$142.9M across 16 entities, ~1,600 investors — dormant since mid-2022
Documented Losses
$208M (CNBC): $89M marine finance, $78M + $41M real estate
SEC Enforcement
$1.9M fine September 2023 — failure to disclose marine finance collateral risks
Class Action
$9M federal class action settlement 2025
FBI/SEC Investigation
Reported August 2020 (WSJ/Bloomberg Law) re: marine finance. No criminal charges filed.
Synapse Impact
2024 — Synapse collapse froze ~$160M in customer funds across fintechs including Yieldstreet accounts
Flagship Fund Sale
March 2026 — Alternative Income Fund ($100M+) sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX
IRR Disclosure
9.4-9.8% net realized — matured investments only, excluding Short Term Notes, Structured Notes, active investments, and defaults
Regulatory Status
Willow Wealth Markets LLC (SEC broker-dealer, FINRA/SIPC); Willow Asset Management LLC (SEC RIA)
Visual Summary
AltStreet EDGAR Analysis — Yieldstreet Capital Raise by Program
Verified from primary SEC Form D filings and amendments. All amounts USD.
ALTNOTES I (Short Term Notes)
ALTNOTES I trajectory
ALTNOTES I investor surge
ALTNOTES II (Short Term Notes)
ALTNOTES II last amendment
ST NOTES LLC
Total Short Term Notes
Legal Finance (16 entities)
Real Estate entities
Marine Finance (YS BP series)
YieldStreet Inc.
Total EDGAR-verified
IRR-included capital (est.)
ASWhat AltStreet's EDGAR analysis reveals that CNBC didn't report
- The Short Term Notes investor count trajectory is the most important unreported data point. ALTNOTES I grew from 6,406 investors in May 2021 to 12,503 in May 2022 — 6,097 new investors in 12 months at an average of approximately $24,700 each. These are the smallest retail investors on the platform, using the product with no minimum, funding the deal pipeline that was actively generating losses.
- The $0 minimum on ALTNOTES I across all filings means these were not accredited investors who understood private markets risk — they were any accredited investor who could invest any amount. The minimum investment is the most direct proxy for investor sophistication in Reg D markets.
- ALTNOTES II filed its most recent amendment on September 10, 2025 — during the CNBC investigation. The program was still active as the platform was under investigative scrutiny.
- The legal finance vertical filing pattern reveals a clean cutoff: all 16 legal finance entities originated between 2017 and April 2022. Nothing after. This is either a strategic exit from the category or a reflection of the overall platform's origination slowdown as problems mounted.
Key Gaps & Non-Disclosures
- The Short Term Notes performance history is not publicly disclosed. Platform stated 165 of 194 series repaid at maturity as of December 2024 — 29 series not repaid. Whether those 29 correspond to the defaulted deals is not disclosed.
- The October 2021 dual filing (both ALTNOTES I and II filed new 'D' forms with $0 on the same day) suggests a programmatic restructuring that is not explained in any public document.
- The ALTNOTES I investor count of 12,503 far exceeds any other Yieldstreet entity — the next largest is YS IVC REQ II LLC with 1,066 investors. The notes program was an order of magnitude more widely distributed than any deal SPV.
Investor Operations
The practical questions investors actually care about: when tax documents arrive, how cash distributions work, and whether capital can be exited before the underlying asset is sold.
Tax Documents
K-1 Timing
What to expect
March-April for standard deal SPVs. Defaults and workouts may delay K-1 substantially — extensions to September or later possible for complex situations.
Delay signals
- Deal SPVs in default or workout status may require extended K-1 preparation
- Platform wind-down may affect tax document preparation quality and timeliness
- Alternative Income Fund transition to SOFIX may create K-1/1099 timing complexity for the transition year
Cash Flow
Distributions
Frequency
Deal-specific — event driven for direct investments; quarterly for Alternative Income Fund and Willow 360
Timing
Short Term Notes: monthly interest, principal at maturity. Deal SPVs: distributions on resolution. Alternative Income Fund: quarterly distributions based on NAV (subject to transition).
Consistency
Highly variable. Multiple deals on watchlist or in default have suspended or delayed distributions. Short Term Notes: 165 of 194 series repaid at maturity; 29 outstanding as of December 2024.
Liquidity
Exit Reality
Holding period
Highly illiquid for direct investments — 2-7+ year holds with no secondary market. Short Term Notes: 3-9 month terms but underlying deal exposure extends longer.
Exit options
- No secondary market for deal SPV interests
- Alternative Income Fund: quarterly repurchase offers (5-20% of shares, not guaranteed — subject to new manager post-transition)
- Willow 360: quarterly liquidity claims subject to gates and manager discretion
- Short Term Notes: mature at scheduled date but 29 series currently outstanding beyond original maturity
Secondary market
No secondary market for deal investments. Alternative Income Fund transition creates exit uncertainty. Investors who need liquidity from defaulted or watchlist positions have no mechanism to exit — they must wait for workout resolution.
Confidence: High
Investment Structures
Short Term Notes (ALTNOTES I/II) — The Excluded Product
Cash alternative notes used to pre-fund platform deal offerings before they became available to direct investors. ALTNOTES I: $759.6M from 12,503 investors, $0 minimum, 506(c).
ALTNOTES II: $167.2M from 3,483 investors, $5,000 minimum (final amendment), 506(c). ST NOTES LLC: $179.6M, 1,867 investors.
Combined: $926.8M from ~16,000 investors. All explicitly excluded from platform's 9.4-9.8% IRR calculation per footnote 6 on platform materials.
Notes funded deal pipeline — if underlying deals defaulted, note investors bore that risk. Platform holds 5% of each series in first-loss position.
3-9 month terms. 1099 tax reporting (not K-1).
As of December 2024: 165 of 194 series repaid at maturity; 29 series not yet repaid..
Direct Investments — Individual Deal SPVs
Self-directed selection of specific investment opportunities across private credit, real estate, legal finance, art, marine finance, and specialty asset classes. 83 EDGAR entities total; 75 with real sales data.
Predominantly 506(c) (69 of 83 entities) — general solicitation to accredited investors. Concentrated origination in 2021-2022 vintage years.
Legal finance vertical: 16 entities, $142.9M, ~1,600 investors, dormant since April 2022. Real estate: primary loss concentration per CNBC investigation.
Marine finance: $89M loss, 2020 FBI/SEC investigation, 2023 SEC fine. Typical $5,000-$10,000 minimums.
Included in platform IRR (if matured favorably)..
Alternative Income Fund — Interval Fund (Being Sold)
Multi-asset closed-end interval fund launched March 2020. Available to accredited and non-accredited investors, $10,000 minimum.
50+ income-focused private market investments. Quarterly repurchase offers (5-20% of shares, not guaranteed).
1.00% annual management fee plus incentive allocations. March 2026: agreed to be sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX fund, pending shareholder vote.
Existing investors face transition uncertainty..
Willow 360 Managed Portfolios — New, Unproven
Automated managed portfolio service launched August 2025 with Wilshire Associates. $25,000 minimum.
Three strategies (Income/Balanced/Growth). Quarterly liquidity claims subject to gates.
Multiple fee layers. Launched during period of documented origination failures and CNBC investigation.
No meaningful track record..
Evergreen Institutional Funds — Carlyle/Goldman/StepStone
Access to institutional managers at reduced minimums ($10,000). Announced December 2025 concurrent with rebrand.
Carlyle Tactical Private Credit Fund, Goldman Sachs Real Estate Diversified Income Fund, StepStone Private Markets Fund. Quarterly liquidity with standard gates.
Distributions automatically reinvested through June 30, 2026 per platform terms. Fund-level fees layer on top of platform fees..
Risk
Risk Structure
This is where the marketplace pitch gives way to the actual operating reality: delayed exits, limited disclosure, fee drag, and path-dependent outcomes.
The Three-Layer IRR Exclusion
The platform's 9.4-9.8% IRR operates through three stacked exclusion layers: (1) Short Term Notes and Structured Notes excluded by program definition — this removes $926.8M from ~16,000 investors; (2) active investments and watchlist positions excluded by the 'matured investments only' methodology — CNBC found 23 of 30 reviewed real estate deals on an internal watchlist, meaning they have not 'matured' and do not enter the calculation; (3) historical performance data removed from public website during October 2025 rebrand, eliminating the remaining verification mechanism. The net result is that the headline IRR applies to approximately the best 41% of what was raised, from only deals that resolved favorably, at a time when the data supporting that conclusion has been deleted.
Short Term Notes Circular Risk
AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms Short Term Notes funded the deal pipeline — per platform disclosure, notes pre-funded investment opportunities before they became available to investors. This creates a circular risk: Short Term Note investors were effectively exposed to the same underlying deal risks as direct investors, but appeared in neither the IRR calculation nor the default disclosure. If the marine deals or real estate deals lost money, note investors who funded those deals bore that exposure without the accountability framework that applied to direct deal investors.
Performance Reporting Opacity
Platform IRR excludes Short Term Notes, Structured Notes, active investments, and defaults — survivorship bias creates a fundamental gap between headline figures and actual investor portfolio-level returns. The removed -2% annualized real estate return chart (visible until October 2025) showed the gap at the asset class level. CNBC's 30-deal sample showed 30% default rate. The platform's own disclosure showed 2.7% default rate across all 597 investments. These figures are not contradictory — they reflect different measurement methodologies applied to different subsets of the portfolio.
Platform Wind-Down Execution Risk
The combination of flagship fund sale (March 2026), rebrand, data removal, and team restructuring creates operational risk during the precise period when existing investors most need active portfolio management. 23 real estate deals on internal watchlist require ongoing monitoring, workout negotiations, and capital recovery efforts. A reduced team managing a legacy portfolio in wind-down creates the same bandwidth concentration risk observed at LexShares — but at 28x the investor count.
The $926.8M Short Term Notes Exclusion — The Unreported Story
Risk Summary
12,503 investors used ALTNOTES I alone with $0 minimum — an order of magnitude more than any other Yieldstreet entity. Every dollar they invested was excluded from the platform's own performance metric.
Why It Matters
The investors most likely to be unsophisticated ($0 minimum, short-term product marketed as a cash alternative) were the investors most systematically excluded from the metric used to market the platform. The Short Term Notes program grew by nearly 100% in investor count in its final 12 months (6,406 → 12,503) while the underlying deal portfolio was generating the losses CNBC later documented. Those new investors funded the failing pipeline.
Mitigation / Verification
For existing Short Term Note investors: verify whether your specific series is in the 165 repaid or the 29 not-yet-repaid. Request documentation of which underlying deals your notes funded. The platform's disclosure that notes funded deal investments means recoveries on defaulted deals affect note investors — that recovery path is not publicly documented.
The Documented $208M in Losses
Risk Summary
CNBC three-part investigation confirmed $208M in investor losses: $89M marine finance (September 2025), $78M real estate (August 2025), $41M additional real estate (December 2025). Four total losses declared. 23 on watchlist.
Why It Matters
The marine losses triggered a 2020 FBI/SEC investigation and resulted in a $1.9M SEC fine in 2023. The real estate losses are concentrated in 2021-2024 originations — the aggressive growth period visible in the EDGAR filing timeline. The platform's own disclosure (2.7% default rate, 597 investments) and CNBC's findings (30% default rate, 30 real estate deals) are not contradictory — they reflect cherry-picked disclosure methodology on the platform's side.
Mitigation / Verification
For existing real estate investors: request current status of your specific offering. The 23 watchlist deals are not disclosed publicly — you need to request deal-specific updates. For investors who received total loss notices: confirm whether recovery efforts are ongoing, who is managing them, and on what timeline.
Alternative Income Fund Transition Uncertainty
Risk Summary
The platform agreed to sell the Alternative Income Fund to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX in March 2026. Shareholder vote required. Terms and timeline not fully disclosed.
Why It Matters
Investors in the Alternative Income Fund face an involuntary transition to a new manager (Mount Logan Capital) whose investment mandate and fee structure may differ from what they invested into. The fund's assets — 50+ private market investments — will be inherited by SOFIX, which may have different workout and recovery priorities for distressed positions.
Mitigation / Verification
Review the proxy materials for the shareholder vote carefully. Understand the terms of the transfer, whether your redemption rights change, and what happens to the quarterly repurchase offer under new management. Consider whether voting against the transfer triggers any adverse liquidity provisions.
ASRisk signals to watch
- Shareholder vote outcome on Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX — timeline and terms not yet fully disclosed
- ALTNOTES II final amendment (September 2025) — the 29 unredeemed Short Term Notes series are the most critical unresolved exposure for note investors
- Any additional CNBC or regulatory reporting on the 23 watchlist real estate deals — these have not generated public loss notices yet
- Willow 360 track record development — launched August 2025 with Wilshire Associates, but the origination track record of the underlying investment team is the same one that produced the 2021-2024 losses
Regulatory & Legal Posture
Security Status
SEC-registered securities offered through registered broker-dealer and investment adviser. Predominantly Regulation D Rule 506(c) — 69 of 83 EDGAR entities used 506(c) (general solicitation permitted).
Willow Wealth Markets LLC (SEC-registered broker-dealer, FINRA/SIPC member) and Willow Asset Management LLC (SEC-registered investment adviser) provide regulated framework. The 506(c) exemption dominates — consistent with a retail marketing strategy using internet advertising and public solicitation.
SEC enforcement action September 2023 confirms the regulatory oversight was not sufficient to prevent the disclosure failures that led to the $1.9M fine..
Disclosure Quality
Below acceptable. Platform removed decade of historical performance data from public website during October 2025 rebrand. The removed data showed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The platform's own default disclosure (2.7%) and CNBC's findings (30% in a real estate sample) reflect fundamentally different disclosure methodologies. AltStreet EDGAR analysis documents $926.8M in Short Term Notes capital from ~16,000 investors excluded from the headline IRR by footnote.
Custody Model
Assets held in SPVs and funds; Willow 360 assets custodied at Pershing LLC; Alternative Income Fund being transferred to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX
Regulatory Backing
SIPC coverage applies to brokerage account cash and securities; does not cover alternative investment principal or performance. Short Term Notes program: 5% first-loss position held by platform provides partial but not complete downside protection.
No FDIC insurance. Platform solvency risk exists — operating losses not disclosed; flagship fund sale suggests capital and operational constraints..
Tax Treatment
Reporting
K-1 (partnership deal SPVs), 1099 (Short Term Notes, debt securities), 1099-DIV (Alternative Income Fund)
K-1s for deal SPVs typically March-April; Short Term Notes investors receive 1099s (simpler reporting). K-1 timing varies by deal — complex workouts and defaults may delay K-1 issuance. Loss investors should track tax treatment of capital losses carefully.
Income Character
Varies by structure — ordinary income (debt/notes), capital gains (equity), potentially qualified dividends or return of capital
Short Term Notes generate ordinary interest income (1099). Deal SPVs generate asset-class-specific income.
Total losses on investments generate capital losses — potentially deductible against capital gains. Loss characterization for defaulted deals requires specific tax analysis..
Limitation
K-1 delivery complexity increased by workout and default situations. Multi-state filing obligations for real estate holdings. UBTI risk for IRA investors in levered deals. Investors with losses should consult tax counsel on character, timing, and offset opportunities.
Special Considerations
UBTI Risk
Levered real estate and private credit deals may generate UBTI for IRA investors. Short Term Notes generally do not generate UBTI.
- Investors with total losses on specific offerings should track cost basis carefully — capital loss treatment requires proper documentation of the loss event and timeline.
- The Alternative Income Fund transition to SOFIX may have tax implications for existing investors — review the proxy materials for any tax disclosure.
Account Suitability
Taxable
Suitable for experienced investors who can manage K-1 complexity. Short Term Notes (1099) are simpler for taxable accounts.
Roth IRA
Possible via Equity Trust partnership but UBTI risk for levered deals. IRA investors with losses face additional complexity since losses are not deductible inside an IRA.
Traditional IRA
Same considerations as Roth. RMD investors should be aware of illiquidity extending beyond RMD age.
HSA
Generally unsuitable.
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AltStreet Data Layer
What the data actually shows
AltStreet EDGAR analysis of 83 Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth fund entities provides five forensic findings not previously reported.
12,503 investors used the product excluded from the IRR — at $0 minimum
ALTNOTES I raised $759.6M from 12,503 investors with $0 minimum investment. The investor count nearly doubled in the final 12 months (6,406 in May 2021 → 12,503 in May 2022) as the platform was originating the 2021-2022 vintage deals that later generated the CNBC-documented losses. This is the largest single entity by investor count in the entire Yieldstreet EDGAR filing history — by an order of magnitude (next largest: YS IVC REQ II LLC with 1,066 investors).
What this means
The least sophisticated investors (no minimum, cash-alternative product) were the most widely distributed investors in the platform — and the most systematically excluded from the performance metric. The IRR figure was never designed to reflect what these 12,503 investors experienced.
ALTNOTES II filed its most recent amendment during the CNBC investigation
ALTNOTES II's most recent Form D amendment was filed September 10, 2025 — during the CNBC August-December 2025 investigative series. The program was still active and being updated as the platform was under active investigative scrutiny. The amendment shows $167.2M from 3,483 investors with $5,000 minimum.
What this means
The September 2025 amendment filing suggests the Short Term Notes program was still operating at the same time CNBC was publishing documented losses. Investors who were in active notes series during this period were funding a deal pipeline under active press investigation.
The legal finance vertical went dormant in April 2022 — never disclosed publicly
16 legal finance entities originated between 2017 and April 2022 raised $142.9M from approximately 1,600 investors. No legal finance entity has filed with a first sale date after April 2022. The last substantial filing (YS LF TPQF I LLC) raised only $143,000. The platform continued to market itself as a litigation finance platform after this date without disclosing that origination had ceased.
What this means
Investors who chose Yieldstreet specifically for legal finance exposure after mid-2022 were investing on the basis of a capability the platform had effectively stopped exercising. The legal finance category page remained on the website without disclosure that the vertical was dormant.
59% of EDGAR-verified capital was excluded from the IRR by footnote
Total EDGAR-verified capital: $1.56B. Short Term Notes capital (ALTNOTES I + II + ST NOTES LLC): $926.8M = 59% of total. All explicitly excluded from the 9.4-9.8% IRR per footnote 6 on platform materials: 'excluding our Short Term Notes and Structured Notes programs.' The IRR applied to approximately $637M — 41% of EDGAR-verified capital — from matured investments only.
What this means
The platform's primary performance marketing metric was calculated on a minority of what it raised. This is disclosed, in a footnote, on marketing materials. The 12,503 investors who used the $0-minimum Short Term Notes program likely did not read footnote 6 before investing in a product marketed as a 'cash alternative.'
2021-2022 vintage origination surge matches CNBC loss cohort exactly
EDGAR filing dates for deal SPVs show concentrated origination in 2021-2022 across real estate (YS TIM SFR III, YS ITC REQ I/II, YS SND REQ I), tech (YS SN TECH series), venture (YS VC TPQF I/II, YS VC GC I/II), crypto (YS CRPT TPQF I/III, YS CRPT OSP I), and diversified structures. CNBC's investigation identified elevated defaults concentrated in 2021-2024 vintage real estate. The EDGAR entity filing dates provide primary source documentation of when the aggressive origination occurred.
What this means
The zero-rate origination surge is not an inference — it is documented in the Form D first-sale dates. The timing of origination acceleration and the timing of loss concentration are the same. The EDGAR data provides independent corroboration of the CNBC thesis from primary regulatory filings.
Data as of 2026-05-07 . AltStreet review evidence layer . Public-source analysis
Decision Fit
Investor Fit
Who this works for, who it does not, and what level of patience and complexity tolerance the platform really demands.
Existing Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth investors
Existing investors should monitor the Alternative Income Fund sale timeline, track status of watchlist positions, and verify Short Term Notes redemption status. The review provides context for what is happening and why.
This is not an investment recommendation — it is a monitoring framework for investors already in the platform..
New investors evaluating Willow Wealth
Platform is in effective wind-down. Historical performance data removed.
Flagship fund being sold. New institutional fund partnerships (Carlyle/Goldman/StepStone) announced concurrent with rebrand are potentially legitimate but require independent evaluation of whether the platform can reliably administer them during wind-down.
Alternatives with cleaner track records and transparent disclosure are preferable for any new capital..
Retail investors seeking private markets diversification
The Yieldstreet story is a cautionary case for retail private markets platforms specifically. The $0 minimum Short Term Notes product attracted 12,503 investors who were never included in the performance metric.
The gap between marketed IRR and documented losses is the most important retail alternative investment case study available. Evaluate alternatives with transparent performance disclosure and clean regulatory records..
Tradeoffs
Key Tradeoffs
The attraction of pre-IPO access is real, but every benefit comes bundled with a corresponding liquidity, transparency, or pricing cost.
Marketed IRR vs. What It Actually Measured
The 9.4-9.8% IRR was real — it reflected actual matured investments that returned favorably. It excluded 59% of what was raised, only counted deals that resolved positively, and the historical data supporting it was then deleted.
The number was accurate; the numerator and denominator were both carefully selected..
Scale vs. Underwriting Quality
Yieldstreet's 500,000+ members and $6B+ in cumulative investments reflect genuine scale and distribution capability. The 2021-2022 origination surge — visible in the EDGAR filing timeline — represents what happens when a retail distribution machine outpaces underwriting capacity.
The investors came faster than the deal quality could support..
Rebrand vs. Track Record
The rebrand to Willow Wealth is a legitimate business decision and was accompanied by genuinely valuable institutional partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman, StepStone). It was also accompanied by the removal of a decade of performance data.
Both things are true. Investors evaluating the new brand should decide which fact is more relevant to their decision..
Avoid
Who This Is Not For
This section should be read as a filter, not an afterthought. If you need income, simplicity, or near-term access to capital, the structure is working against you.
New investors seeking private markets exposure
Platform in wind-down, flagship fund being sold, historical performance data removed. Multiple alternatives with transparent track records exist..
Investors who relied on the 9.4-9.8% IRR as the platform's return
That IRR excluded 59% of what the platform raised. The most widely distributed product (Short Term Notes, $0 minimum, 12,503 investors) never counted in that figure..
Investors requiring capital preservation or predictable income
$208M in documented losses, 23 watchlist real estate deals, 29 unredeemed Short Term Notes series, and flagship fund sale create an environment of uncertainty incompatible with capital preservation or income needs..
Investors who cannot conduct independent verification
The data removal during rebrand means platform-provided information cannot be independently verified against historical benchmarks. Every current claim requires independent research..
Editorial View
AltStreet Perspective
The compressed version of the review: what matters, what marketing tends to obscure, and how we would frame the platform for a serious allocator.
Verdict
Yieldstreet built the most sophisticated retail alternative investments distribution machine in the US market and then demonstrated that distribution capability and underwriting quality are not the same thing. The $208M in losses CNBC documented is the visible outcome. The $926.8M in Short Term Notes capital from 12,503 investors excluded from the platform's own performance metric is the structural outcome. The rebrand and data removal are the reputational response. The sale of the flagship fund is the business outcome. None of this happened because the founders were fraudsters — the marine fraud was perpetrated against Yieldstreet, not by it. It happened because a retail distribution platform at scale, in a zero-rate environment, with misaligned fee incentives and a performance metric that systematically excluded its most widely distributed product, made origination decisions that could not survive higher rates and CNBC scrutiny.
Positioning
AltStreet covers Willow Wealth as the essential retail alternative investments cautionary case — alongside LexShares (litigation finance failure), and counterposed with Legalist (institutional benchmark) and Burford Capital (public institutional proxy). The Yieldstreet story answers the most important question in retail alternative investing: what does it look like when a platform optimizes for distribution at the expense of underwriting quality? The EDGAR forensics — 83 entities, 28,440 investors, $926.8M excluded from the headline IRR — are the primary contribution of this review beyond what CNBC documented.
The Bottom Line
Eleven years, $1.56B raised from 28,440 investors across 83 SEC-registered entities, $208M in documented losses, and the 9.4% IRR they marketed never included the product that 12,503 of those investors actually used.
Action
Next Steps
If you still want to engage after reading the review, these are the practical next moves that reduce avoidable mistakes.
If you are a current Short Term Notes investor: verify whether your specific series is in the 165 repaid at maturity or the 29 currently outstanding. Request documentation of which underlying deals your notes funded and whether those deals are among the CNBC-documented defaults.
If you are a current direct deal investor in real estate or marine finance: request current deal status, workout timeline, and recovery projections from the platform. The 23 watchlist deals have not yet generated public loss notices — your specific deal may or may not be on the watchlist.
If you hold Alternative Income Fund shares: review the proxy materials for the Mount Logan Capital SOFIX transaction carefully before voting. Understand the new manager's investment mandate, fee structure, and approach to the existing portfolio.
For all existing investors: review the CNBC three-part investigation (August, September, and December 2025) to understand the loss documentation framework and compare against your own portfolio positions.
Read the LexShares review for the litigation finance parallel — similar retail distribution, similar IRR methodology issues, same outcome trajectory. Then read the Legalist review to understand what institutional-grade alternatives look like structurally.
Appendix
Sources, Disclosures, and Supporting Context
The lower section is structured like a report appendix: relationship context first, adjacent reading second, and evidence last.
Report Appendix
Disclosure
Relationship and compensation context
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Report Appendix
Disclosure
Relationship and compensation context
Report Appendix
Related Resources
Adjacent platform comparisons, frameworks, and category links
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Report Appendix
Related Resources
Adjacent platform comparisons, frameworks, and category links
Further Reading
Related Resources
Adjacent frameworks and reviews that help place the platform in a broader allocation or due-diligence context.
Explore Asset Class
Private Markets — Multi-AssetDeep Dive Guide
Litigation Finance Platform GuideFund Landscape
Similar Platform Reviews
- Percent
Active private credit marketplace with verified deal-level performance data and clean broker-dealer filing history. The direct guide compares Percent against Willow Wealth's post-Yieldstreet transition.
- LexShares
Retail litigation finance platform in harvest mode. Similar IRR methodology issues — marketed on resolved cases only. The litigation finance parallel to the Yieldstreet story.
- Legalist
Institutional litigation finance benchmark. $2B AUM, no retail access, no data removal. The structural contrast to both LexShares and Yieldstreet.
Report Appendix
Evidence & Methodology
Sources, scope, and how the review was assembled
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Report Appendix
Evidence & Methodology
Sources, scope, and how the review was assembled
ASReview Evidence
Methodology
Primary EDGAR analysis: 83 Form D entities fetched via searchFormD.ts (fixed version), 75 ingested to platform_exits via ingestFormD.ts, full amendment history in form_d_amendment_history jsonb. ALTNOTES I: 7 filings (2018-2022). ALTNOTES II: 5 filings (2019-2025). CNBC three-part investigation (August 18, September, December 5 2025). SEC enforcement records (September 2023 settlement). Federal class action settlement. Bloomberg Law/WSJ FBI investigation reporting (August 2020). Wikipedia platform history. Willow Wealth platform materials and disclosures.
Scope
83 EDGAR Form D entities (all filings + amendments) + CNBC investigative series + SEC enforcement records + class action settlement + FBI/SEC investigation reporting + platform materials
Key Findings
- *AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms ALTNOTES I raised $759.6M from 12,503 investors at $0 minimum — 7 filings from 2018 to May 2022. Investor count nearly doubled in final 12 months (6,406 → 12,503). This data has not been previously reported.
- *ALTNOTES II filed most recent amendment September 10, 2025 — during the CNBC investigation. Program was actively updating while under press scrutiny.
- *Legal finance vertical confirmed dormant since April 2022 from EDGAR filing dates — 16 entities originated 2017-2022, nothing after.
- *Short Term Notes exclusion confirmed from platform's own footnote 6: 'excluding our Short Term Notes and Structured Notes programs' — documented from primary source willowwealth.com/short-term-notes.
- *2021-2022 vintage origination surge confirmed from EDGAR first-sale dates across real estate, tech, venture, crypto, and diversified SPVs — matches CNBC loss cohort.
Primary Source Pages
FAQ
Frequently Asked Questions
High-intent search questions answered directly, without making users hunt through the full review.
What happened to Yieldstreet and why did it rebrand to Willow Wealth?
Yieldstreet rebranded to Willow Wealth in October 2025 following CNBC's three-part investigation documenting $208M in investor losses across marine finance and real estate offerings. The rebrand coincided with removal of a decade of historical performance data from the public website, including a chart showing -2% annualized real estate returns from 2015-2025. In March 2026, the platform agreed to sell its flagship Alternative Income Fund to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX.
What is the Short Term Notes exclusion and why does it matter?
AltStreet EDGAR analysis reveals that the Short Term Notes program raised $926.8M from approximately 16,000 investors — 59% of all EDGAR-verified Yieldstreet capital. ALTNOTES I alone raised $759.6M from 12,503 investors at $0 minimum investment. All Short Term Notes are explicitly excluded from the platform's 9.4-9.8% IRR calculation per footnote in platform materials. The investors most likely to be unsophisticated (no minimum, cash-alternative product) were the most systematically excluded from the metric used to market the platform.
How did the IRR calculation work and what did it exclude?
The platform's 9.4-9.8% IRR excluded: Short Term Notes and Structured Notes programs (59% of EDGAR capital), active investments not yet matured, and investments in default or on watchlist. It applied only to 'matured investments' — deals that resolved favorably and were fully paid out. CNBC found 23 of 30 reviewed real estate deals on an internal watchlist as of late 2025 — those deals have not 'matured' and do not enter the IRR.
What were the documented losses at Yieldstreet?
CNBC's three-part investigation documented $208M in losses: $78M in real estate (August 2025), $89M in marine finance (September 2025), and $41M in additional real estate including Houston and Nashville projects (December 2025). Four deals were declared total losses. Twenty-three more remained on an internal watchlist as of December 2025.
Was there a criminal investigation?
The Wall Street Journal reported in August 2020 that the SEC and FBI were investigating Yieldstreet's investments and business practices regarding approximately $90M in marine finance deals. Yieldstreet denied being a target. No criminal charges were filed against the company or its executives. The marine losses resulted from fraud by the Lakhani family borrowers — Yieldstreet was the defrauded party. The SEC fined Yieldstreet $1.9M in September 2023 for failing to disclose known collateral risks to investors.
What is the status of the Alternative Income Fund?
In March 2026, Willow Wealth agreed to sell the Alternative Income Fund (with over $100M in assets) to Mount Logan Capital's SOFIX fund, pending shareholder vote. Existing investors face a transition to a new manager with potentially different investment mandate and fee structure.
Is Willow Wealth still accepting new investors?
The platform technically remains operational but is in effective wind-down. Given documented losses, removal of historical performance data, flagship fund sale, and the structural issues documented in this review, new investors should evaluate alternatives with cleaner track records and transparent disclosure practices.
What happened with the legal finance vertical?
AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms the Yieldstreet legal finance vertical went dormant in mid-2022. All 16 legal finance entities originated between 2017 and April 2022. No legal finance entity filed with a first sale date after April 2022. The platform continued to list legal finance as a category after this date without disclosing that origination had ceased in that vertical.