CrowdStreet vs Willow Wealth 2026
Two retail private markets platforms. Both grew aggressively in 2020–2022. Both experienced documented losses on deals they had marketed. Both restructured away from their original direct-investment models. The differentiator is how each platform treated investor information during the restructuring period. CrowdStreet preserved its 216-deal track record publicly and maintained its brand. Willow Wealth rebranded from Yieldstreet in October 2025 and removed approximately a decade of historical performance data from its website.
Guide Thesis
Two distressed platforms, two transparency responses.
CrowdStreet: 216-deal track record preserved publicly, brand maintained, pivoted to institutional fund distribution. Willow Wealth: rebranded from Yieldstreet (October 2025), historical data removed, $208M CNBC-documented losses, flagship fund sale pending. The transparency response is the most important governance signal investors can use.
This is the comparison most platform reviews do not make directly. Coverage tends to treat each platform separately rather than analyzing the structural parallel.
The parallel between CrowdStreet and Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth is one of the most important patterns in retail alternatives. The transparency response is where they differ.
The thesis in one table
Same era, similar problems, different distress response
| Platform | Distress response |
|---|---|
| CrowdStreet | Brand maintained since 2013; 216-deal realized track record preserved publicly (including disclosure of 24 total-loss deals); pivoted to institutional fund distribution under existing brand and domain. |
| Willow Wealth | Rebranded from Yieldstreet October 2025; approximately a decade of historical performance data removed from public website during rebrand; flagship Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX pending shareholder vote. |

The Core Comparison
Same era, similar problems, different responses.
Both CrowdStreet (founded 2013) and Yieldstreet (founded 2015) built retail private markets businesses during the 2014–2022 period and grew aggressively in 2020–2022. Both saw concentrated losses tied to specific underwriting and gatekeeping events — CrowdStreet's Nightingale-related events ($77.5M / 1,279 investors; DOJ indictment October 2023) and Yieldstreet's marine finance losses ($89M, with the Lakhanis adjudicated fraudulent by the British High Court October 2020) and additional real estate losses ($119M per CNBC). Both pivoted from their original direct-investment models toward institutional fund distribution partnerships. The differentiating axis is how each platform treated historical disclosure during the restructuring: CrowdStreet preserved the 216-deal realized track record on its public website and maintained the same brand; Yieldstreet rebranded to Willow Wealth in October 2025 and removed approximately a decade of historical performance data including a chart previously showing -2% annualized real estate returns 2015–2025.
Historical Disclosure
CrowdStreet
216-deal realized track record remains publicly accessible. Willow Wealth removed historical performance data during October 2025 rebrand.
Documented Losses
Both
CrowdStreet: ~$77.5M Nightingale-related (1,279 investors; DOJ alleged fraud October 2023). Willow Wealth: $208M CNBC-documented (Aug-Dec 2025).
Brand Continuity
CrowdStreet
Same brand since 2013. Willow Wealth rebranded from Yieldstreet October 22, 2025 — alongside historical data removal.
Best fit at a glance
Which scenario fits which investor
The fastest read of this comparison. Each row represents a specific investor situation and what the data suggests.
| Investor situation | What the data suggests |
|---|---|
| Existing CrowdStreet investor | Review the publicly available 216-deal realized track record. Request status on your specific deals (vintage and category determine outcome more than platform-wide statistics). |
| Existing Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth investor | Verify your Short Term Notes series status (29 of 194 unredeemed as of December 2024). Review the proxy materials on the Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX. Request deal-specific status on watchlist positions. |
| New retail investor evaluating capital allocation | Look beyond both platforms first. Both have moved away from their original retail-accessible products. Evaluate alternatives with preserved historical disclosure and cleaner regulatory records before considering either. |
| Accredited investor seeking institutional fund access | Evaluate Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, SPRING, Carlyle TPC, or Goldman Sachs Real Estate Diversified Income Fund on the underlying funds' own merits — not on either platform's historical track record. |
| Researcher / due diligence analyst | Both are essential case studies. The parallel growth trajectories and divergent transparency responses are the foundational dataset for evaluating retail private markets platform governance. |
TL;DR
The structural comparison in three paragraphs
CrowdStreet built an $4.4B+ direct CRE marketplace across 800+ deals from 345 sponsors. The platform's 216-deal realized track record document — disclosing 11.2% aggregate IRR, 3.1% mean IRR, 16.3% median IRR, 24 total losses (11.2%), and 49 negative-IRR deals (22.7%) — remains publicly accessible as of May 2026. The Nightingale event ($77.5M raised from ~1,279 investors across three SPVs; DOJ indictment of sponsor's principal October 2023) cleared CrowdStreet's diligence review and is excluded from the published track record as 'non-standard exits.' CrowdStreet maintained its brand through restructuring and pivoted to institutional fund distribution (Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, SPRING) — accredited only, with no direct CRE deals listed as of May 2026.
Yieldstreet (founded 2015) became Willow Wealth on October 22, 2025. AltStreet's EDGAR analysis confirms $1.56B raised across 83 Reg D entities from 28,440 verified investors. CNBC's three-part investigative series (August–December 2025) documented $208M in investor losses: $89M marine finance, $78M real estate, $41M additional real estate. The platform's $926.8M Short Term Notes program (ALTNOTES I: 12,503 investors at $0 minimum; ALTNOTES II: 3,483 investors at $5K minimum; ST NOTES LLC: 1,867 investors) — 59% of all EDGAR-verified capital — was explicitly excluded from the platform's 9.4-9.8% IRR calculation. The October 2025 rebrand was accompanied by removal of approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website, including a chart that previously showed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The flagship Alternative Income Fund ($100M+) was announced for sale to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX in March 2026, pending shareholder vote.
The platforms are structurally similar in growth period (2014–2022 era), growth phase (aggressive 2020–2022 vintage origination), gatekeeping events (Nightingale at CrowdStreet, marine finance at Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth), and current product positioning (institutional fund distribution to accredited investors). They differ on the dimension that is most important for category-wide governance evaluation: how each platform treated historical disclosure during the restructuring period. CrowdStreet preserved uncomfortable data; Willow Wealth removed it.
If you read nothing else: scroll to the head-to-head comparison sections →
CrowdStreet's governance signals
- → Same brand and domain maintained through CEO transition
- → 216-deal track record preserved publicly (including 24 total losses)
- → Methodology disclosed (Nightingale excluded as 'non-standard exit')
- → No SEC enforcement action publicly disclosed
- → Civil litigation from Nightingale investors ongoing
Willow Wealth's governance signals
- → Rebranded from Yieldstreet October 2025
- → Approximately a decade of historical data removed during rebrand
- → $1.9M SEC settlement (2023) for marine finance disclosure failures
- → $9M federal class action settled (2025)
- → Flagship Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX pending
Disclosure quality is not absolution.
CrowdStreet's preservation of the 216-deal realized track record is a meaningful governance signal — but the data itself reflects real losses borne by real investors. 24 of 216 deals (11.2%) produced total losses. 49 of 216 (22.7%) produced negative IRR. The 2024 vintage produced -29.9% mean IRR with a 54% loss rate. The Nightingale event ($77.5M / ~1,279 investors) cleared CrowdStreet's diligence review. The transparency response is the right framing axis, but it does not change the underlying experience for the investors who lost capital on deals that should not have cleared diligence.
The Lakhanis committed fraud — Yieldstreet was the defrauded party.
The $89M marine finance loss involved actual fraud by the Lakhani family of borrowers — ruled by the British High Court in October 2020. Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth was the defrauded party, not the perpetrator. The $1.9M SEC enforcement settlement (September 2023) was for failure to disclose known collateral risks to investors after the fraud was discovered, not for the fraud itself. The 2020 FBI/SEC investigation resulted in no criminal charges against the company or executives. The institutional fund partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman, StepStone) and SEC-registered broker-dealer/RIA status are real regulatory infrastructure. The criticism in this guide concerns disclosure choices during restructuring, not allegations of fraud against the platform.
Quick decision
If you're
an existing investor
→ Monitor your positions
Both platforms have existing investor obligations. Verify Short Term Notes status (Willow Wealth) or deal-level updates (CrowdStreet) directly.
If you want
new private markets exposure
→ Look beyond both first
Both platforms have moved away from their original retail-accessible products. Evaluate platforms with preserved historical disclosure and cleaner records before considering either.
If you want
institutional fund access
→ Direct, not via platform
Churchill, StepStone, Carlyle, Goldman institutional funds are available through other distributors. Evaluate on fund-level merits, not platform marketing.
Final read
Bottom Line Up Front
The CrowdStreet vs Willow Wealth (formerly Yieldstreet) comparison is not about which platform is currently a better investment — neither is currently offering its original retail-accessible direct-investment product. The comparison matters because the two platforms grew alongside each other during 2014-2022 as the two highest-profile retail private markets brands, experienced parallel growth and concentrated losses, and made meaningfully different choices about historical disclosure during the restructuring period. CrowdStreet's 216-deal realized track record remains publicly accessible — including disclosure of 24 total-loss deals and 49 negative-IRR deals. Willow Wealth's historical performance data was removed during the October 2025 rebrand. The transparency response is the most important governance signal investors can use to evaluate retail platforms during distress.
For new investment capital, neither platform offers a clean entry point as of May 2026. For existing investors, the practical differences are: CrowdStreet positions are typically illiquid direct CRE deals being managed to resolution; Willow Wealth positions span Short Term Notes (29 of 194 series outstanding), Alternative Income Fund (pending sale to Mount Logan SOFIX), and direct deals on the platform's internal watchlist. For evaluating any future retail private markets platform, the lesson from this comparison is structural: a platform's willingness to preserve uncomfortable historical performance data through periods of distress is more important than the headline returns it markets during periods of growth.
CrowdStreet's structural position
Brand maintained; 216-deal realized track record preserved publicly; pivoted to institutional fund distribution; no SEC enforcement action publicly disclosed; civil litigation from Nightingale investors ongoing. Disclosure response during restructuring was structurally aligned with the public's information interest, though the underlying losses borne by investors remain real.
Willow Wealth's structural position
Rebranded from Yieldstreet (October 2025); historical performance data removed during rebrand; $1.9M SEC settlement and $9M class action settled; flagship Alternative Income Fund pending sale to Mount Logan SOFIX; new institutional product partnerships launched concurrent with CNBC investigation. Multiple structural signals point toward restructuring rather than business-as-usual operation.
Comparison hub
Head-to-head decision map
Five dimensions on which the parallel growth and divergent transparency responses become structurally clear.
Each section isolates one comparison axis with primary-source data. Read the Transparency Response section last — it is the editorial axis on which the platforms most clearly differ.
Both platforms restructured — different paths forward
Current Product Status
Neither platform is currently offering its original retail-accessible direct-investment product. CrowdStreet's direct commercial real estate marketplace, which built an $4.4B+ historical track record across 800+ deals from 345 sponsors, has no direct CRE deals listed as of May 2026; the platform pivoted to distributing four institutional fund products (Churchill PCAP, StepStone CRDEX, SPRIM, SPRING). Willow Wealth's flagship Alternative Income Fund ($100M+) agreed to be sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX in March 2026, pending shareholder vote — the platform's primary multi-asset deal marketplace is operating in a restructuring-like posture, with new product launches (Willow 360 managed portfolios, August 2025; institutional fund partnerships with Carlyle/Goldman/StepStone, December 2025) that are unproven under the rebranded entity. The comparison is not between two competing active products — it is between two platforms whose original models are no longer being offered.
Practical answer
Both platforms have moved away from their original retail-accessible direct-investment models. CrowdStreet's pivot maintained brand continuity and preserved historical disclosure; Willow Wealth's restructuring involved a rebrand and removal of historical performance data. The current products on both platforms should be evaluated on their own merits, not on the original marketplace track records.
| Decision factor | What changes |
|---|---|
| Original product status | CrowdStreet: no direct CRE deals listed as of May 2026 — direct marketplace not currently active. Willow Wealth: multi-asset deal marketplace effectively restructured; flagship Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX pending shareholder vote (March 2026). |
| Current offerings | CrowdStreet: Churchill PCAP (private credit), StepStone CRDEX (private markets), SPRIM (private real estate income), SPRING (private real assets) — four institutional fund products. Willow Wealth: Willow 360 managed portfolios (Wilshire Associates partnership, August 2025), institutional fund partnerships with Carlyle/Goldman/StepStone (announced December 2025), Short Term Notes program (29 of 194 series outstanding as of December 2024). |
| Brand & continuity | CrowdStreet: same brand since 2013; same domain crowdstreet.com; CEO transition to John Imbriglia. Willow Wealth: rebranded from Yieldstreet October 22, 2025; yieldstreet.com now redirects to willowwealth.com; same underlying corporate entities (Willow Wealth Markets LLC, Willow Asset Management LLC). |
| Active member base | CrowdStreet: 300,000+ members per platform statement (most acquired during direct marketplace era). Willow Wealth: 500,000+ members per platform statement (most acquired during Yieldstreet era); AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms 28,440 verified investors across 75 active offerings. |
| What you can actually buy today | CrowdStreet: LP interests in third-party institutional funds (Churchill, StepStone) distributed through CrowdStreet Capital LLC as broker-dealer. Willow Wealth: Willow 360 managed portfolios, Short Term Notes program (still active), institutional fund partnerships — through Willow Wealth Markets LLC as broker-dealer. |
Preserved 216-deal data vs removed decade of performance
Track Record Disclosure
This is the most important single difference between the two platforms as of May 2026. CrowdStreet's 216-deal realized track record document remains publicly accessible — 11.2% aggregate IRR, 3.1% mean IRR, 16.3% median IRR, with 24 of 216 deals producing total losses (11.2% rate) and 49 producing negative IRR (22.7%). Category and vintage breakdowns are included: Hospitality -62.7% mean across 16 deals; Industrial +26.4% mean across 25 deals; 2018 vintage +31.6% mean / 2024 vintage -29.9% mean. The Nightingale SPVs are excluded as 'non-standard exits' — a disclosed methodology choice. Willow Wealth removed approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website during the October 2025 rebrand, including a chart that previously showed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The 9.4-9.8% net realized IRR the platform marketed applied only to matured investments and explicitly excluded the $926.8M Short Term Notes program (~16,000 investors). For investors evaluating disclosure quality, CrowdStreet's preserved track record is materially more verifiable than Willow Wealth's removed data.
Practical answer
CrowdStreet's track record is uncomfortable to read in places — but it remains readable. Willow Wealth's track record was removed during the rebrand. For category-wide disclosure standards, the difference between preserving uncomfortable data and removing it is the most important governance signal investors can use.
| Decision factor | What changes |
|---|---|
| Historical performance data availability | CrowdStreet: 216-deal realized track record PDF publicly accessible (Wayback Machine archived 3/7/2025 confirms continuous availability). Willow Wealth: approximately a decade of historical performance data removed from public website during October 2025 rebrand. |
| Headline return | CrowdStreet: 11.2% aggregate IRR across 216 realized deals; mean 3.1%; median 16.3%. Willow Wealth: 9.4-9.8% net realized IRR (matured investments only; excludes Short Term Notes, Structured Notes, active investments, defaults). |
| Total losses and negative outcomes | CrowdStreet: 24 of 216 deals produced total losses (11.2%); 49 of 216 produced negative IRR (22.7%). Disclosed publicly. Willow Wealth: 16 of 597 investments in default (2.7% platform-stated); CNBC found 9 of 30 reviewed real estate deals in default (30% sample rate); 23 of 30 on internal watchlist. |
| Category-level disclosure | CrowdStreet: Hospitality -62.7% mean / Industrial +26.4% mean / Multifamily +11.4% mean / Senior Housing -51.8% mean — full category breakdown public. Willow Wealth: previously disclosed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025 (chart now removed); $89M marine finance loss / $78M + $41M real estate losses per CNBC. |
| Vintage trajectory disclosure | CrowdStreet: 2018 +31.6% / 2021 +13.8% / 2022 +12.7% / 2023 -17.2% / 2024 -29.9% — vintage-year mean IRR publicly disclosed. Willow Wealth: 2021-2022 vintage concentration evident from EDGAR filing dates; no platform-published vintage performance breakdown. |
Nightingale-related events vs adjudicated marine fraud — different scale, similar failure mode
Documented Losses & Gatekeeping
Both platforms experienced gatekeeping failures on third-party deals they had marketed and listed. The Nightingale event at CrowdStreet involved approximately $77.5M raised from approximately 1,279 investors across three SPVs (200 West Jackson, ONH AFC, ONH 1601) that cleared CrowdStreet's diligence review; the DOJ indicted Nightingale's principal for wire fraud in October 2023. Civil litigation by investors against CrowdStreet is ongoing. Willow Wealth's marine finance losses involved approximately $89M lost across multiple marine finance offerings sponsored by the Lakhani family; a British High Court ruled in October 2020 that the Lakhanis committed fraud — Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth was the defrauded party. CNBC documented an additional $78M in real estate losses (August 2025) and $41M in further real estate losses (December 2025), bringing total CNBC-documented losses at Willow Wealth to $208M. The structural similarity: both platforms presented diligence as a meaningful gatekeeping function and both had deals clear that process and produce major losses.
Practical answer
The Nightingale event at CrowdStreet is the more concentrated single-event failure ($77.5M in three SPVs). The Willow Wealth losses are broader in scope ($208M documented across marine finance and multiple real estate offerings, over multiple years). Both are gatekeeping failures, and both should make investors skeptical of platforms that market diligence rigor without producing public methodology and outcome data to support that marketing.
| Decision factor | What changes |
|---|---|
| Largest documented loss event | CrowdStreet: Nightingale-related events — approximately $77.5M raised from approximately 1,279 investors across three SPVs (200 West Jackson, ONH AFC, ONH 1601); DOJ indicted Nightingale's principal on wire fraud charges in October 2023 and alleged investor funds were diverted; civil litigation against CrowdStreet ongoing. Willow Wealth: marine finance — approximately $89M lost across Lakhani-sponsored offerings; British High Court ruled Lakhanis committed fraud (October 2020, adjudicated); Yieldstreet was the defrauded party. |
| Total documented losses | CrowdStreet: $77.5M Nightingale; 24 total-loss deals across 216 realized non-Nightingale deals (excluded from headline 11.2% IRR as 'non-standard exits'). Willow Wealth: $208M CNBC-documented (Aug-Dec 2025): $89M marine + $78M real estate + $41M real estate. |
| Regulatory & criminal proceedings | CrowdStreet: DOJ indicted Nightingale's principal for wire fraud (October 2023); no SEC enforcement action against CrowdStreet publicly disclosed; ongoing civil litigation by investors. Willow Wealth: $1.9M SEC enforcement settlement (September 2023, no admission of wrongdoing); 2020 FBI/SEC investigation reported by WSJ/Bloomberg Law (no criminal charges filed against company or executives); $9M federal class action settlement (2025); British High Court fraud ruling on Lakhanis (October 2020). |
| Platform role | CrowdStreet: marketplace intermediary — diligenced deals before listing but did not manage capital. Willow Wealth: marketplace intermediary plus pooled fund manager — diligenced deals before listing and also operated pooled vehicles (Alternative Income Fund) that invested across the platform. |
| Public response | CrowdStreet: maintained brand; published 216-deal track record (excluding Nightingale as 'non-standard exits'); continued operations through CEO transition. Willow Wealth: rebranded from Yieldstreet (October 2025); removed historical performance data; announced sale of flagship fund (March 2026); pivoted toward managed portfolios and institutional partnerships. |
Accredited-only vs limited non-accredited access
Investor Access & Eligibility
CrowdStreet has always required accredited investor status — historical direct CRE marketplace at $25,000 minimum and current institutional fund distribution at undisclosed minimums but accredited-only by structure. There is no non-accredited access path on CrowdStreet at any minimum. Willow Wealth historically offered limited non-accredited access through the Alternative Income Fund ($10,000 minimum, available to retail investors via the fund's interval fund structure) — this was an unusual feature in the retail alternatives category. The fund's pending sale to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX may change the future of non-accredited access on Willow Wealth. Most other Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth products (direct deals, Short Term Notes) were Regulation D Rule 506(c) — accredited investors only, with general solicitation permitted. AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms 28,440 verified Willow Wealth investors across 75 active offerings, with the Short Term Notes program (12,503 ALTNOTES I investors at $0 minimum) representing the largest single concentration of small-check retail accredited capital on the platform.
Practical answer
Willow Wealth's Alternative Income Fund was the more retail-accessible product historically. With the fund's pending transfer to Mount Logan SOFIX, that access path is uncertain. For non-accredited retail investors evaluating private markets exposure, neither current platform offers a clean retail entry point — Fundrise remains the standard reference for non-accredited private real estate.
| Decision factor | What changes |
|---|---|
| Investor eligibility | CrowdStreet: accredited only — historical marketplace and current institutional fund distribution. Willow Wealth: predominantly accredited (506(c) for most products); Alternative Income Fund accepted non-accredited investors historically (pending sale to Mount Logan SOFIX). |
| Minimum investment | CrowdStreet: historical marketplace $25,000; current institutional fund minimums not prominently disclosed. Willow Wealth: $10,000 Alternative Income Fund; $0 ALTNOTES I; $5,000 ALTNOTES II (final amendment); $5,000-$10,000 typical for direct deals. |
| Active investor count | CrowdStreet: 300,000+ platform-stated members; 45 EDGAR-verified Form D entities, $468.7M EDGAR-verified capital, 4,214 investors. Willow Wealth: 500,000+ platform-stated members; AltStreet EDGAR analysis confirms 28,440 verified investors across 75 active offerings, $1.56B EDGAR-verified capital. |
| Smallest-check retail exposure | CrowdStreet: $25,000 historical floor protected against the smallest retail investors entering individual CRE deals. Willow Wealth: $0 minimum ALTNOTES I drew 12,503 investors at an average check of approximately $61K — the largest single concentration of smaller-check accredited retail on either platform. |
| Current access path for new investors | CrowdStreet: accredited investors evaluating Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, or SPRING institutional funds. Willow Wealth: accredited investors evaluating Willow 360 managed portfolios or institutional fund partnerships — both unproven under the rebranded entity. |
The differentiating axis: how each platform handled distress
Transparency Response During Restructuring
This is the editorial axis on which these two platforms most clearly differ. Both experienced concentrated losses on deals they had marketed. Both pivoted from their original retail-accessible direct-investment models. Both are distributing institutional funds through SEC-registered broker-dealers. The differentiator is the transparency response during the restructuring period. CrowdStreet maintained its brand, preserved the 216-deal realized track record document publicly (including disclosure of 24 total losses and 49 negative-IRR deals), and continued operations through CEO transition. Willow Wealth rebranded from Yieldstreet on October 22, 2025 — concurrent with CNBC's investigative reporting — and removed approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website, including a chart that had previously shown -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The platform also announced the sale of its flagship Alternative Income Fund in March 2026 and launched new product partnerships (Willow 360, Carlyle/Goldman/StepStone) with reduced minimums. For evaluating retail platform governance during distress, the comparison is structural.
Practical answer
The transparency response is the most important single governance signal investors can use to evaluate retail private markets platforms during distress. CrowdStreet's preservation of uncomfortable historical data is meaningfully different from Willow Wealth's removal of it. Whether the future products on either platform succeed is a separate question — the question of how each platform treated investor information during restructuring is already answered by the public record.
| Decision factor | What changes |
|---|---|
| Brand response | CrowdStreet: maintained same brand and domain since 2013; CEO transition to John Imbriglia. Willow Wealth: rebranded from Yieldstreet October 22, 2025; yieldstreet.com redirects to willowwealth.com; same underlying corporate entities and management. |
| Historical data response | CrowdStreet: 216-deal realized track record document remains publicly accessible — Wayback Machine confirms continuous availability through 3/7/2025. Willow Wealth: approximately a decade of historical performance data removed from public website during October 2025 rebrand. |
| Public methodology disclosure | CrowdStreet: published methodology discloses exclusion of Nightingale SPVs as 'non-standard exits' — disclosed methodology choice that should be evaluated critically. Willow Wealth: 9.4-9.8% IRR explicitly excluded Short Term Notes program ($926.8M / ~16,000 investors); active investments and watchlist positions excluded by 'matured only' methodology. |
| Investor protection actions | CrowdStreet: continued operations under existing regulatory framework; civil litigation from Nightingale investors ongoing. Willow Wealth: $1.9M SEC settlement (2023); $9M class action settlement (2025); Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX (March 2026) gives existing investors a managed transition path subject to shareholder vote. |
| New product launch posture | CrowdStreet: institutional fund distribution (Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, SPRING) launched after pivot — partnerships with established institutional managers. Willow Wealth: Willow 360 managed portfolios launched August 2025 and institutional partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman, StepStone) announced December 2025 — concurrent with rebrand and CNBC investigation. |
Side-by-Side Comparison
CrowdStreet vs Willow Wealth · All key metrics
The structural facts at a glance. Source: CrowdStreet 216-deal realized track record PDF (Wayback Machine archived 3/7/2025), AltStreet EDGAR primary source analysis of 83 Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth Reg D entities, CNBC investigative reporting (August–December 2025), SEC enforcement records, and public court filings.
| Metric | CrowdStreet | Willow Wealth (formerly Yieldstreet) |
|---|---|---|
| Founded | 2013 in Portland, OR by Tore Steen and Darren Powderly | 2015 in New York by Milind Mehere and Michael Weisz (as Yieldstreet) |
| Brand history | Same brand and domain since 2013 | Rebranded Yieldstreet → Willow Wealth October 22, 2025 |
| Asset class | Commercial real estate (historical); institutional funds (current) | Multi-asset (real estate, private credit, legal finance, art, marine finance, venture, structured notes) |
| Platform-stated members | 300,000+ | 500,000+ (Yieldstreet era; carried over to Willow Wealth) |
| EDGAR-verified capital | $468.7M across 45 Form D entities, 4,214 investors | $1.56B across 75 active offerings, 28,440 investors |
| Historical realized track record | 216-deal PDF publicly accessible; 11.2% aggregate IRR, 3.1% mean, 16.3% median | Approximately a decade of historical data removed October 2025; previously marketed 9.4-9.8% net realized IRR |
| Total-loss deals disclosed | 24 of 216 realized deals (11.2%) — publicly disclosed | 16 of 597 platform investments (2.7% platform-stated); CNBC found 9 of 30 reviewed real estate deals in default (30%) |
| Largest gatekeeping event | Nightingale-related events — ~$77.5M from ~1,279 investors; DOJ indictment October 2023 | Marine finance — ~$89M loss; British High Court fraud ruling October 2020 |
| SEC enforcement | None publicly disclosed | $1.9M settlement September 2023 (no admission of wrongdoing) |
| Class action settlements | Ongoing civil litigation from Nightingale investors | $9M federal class action settled 2025 |
| Investor eligibility | Accredited only — historical and current | Predominantly accredited; Alternative Income Fund accepts non-accredited ($10K min, pending sale) |
| Historical minimum | $25,000 marketplace | $0 ALTNOTES I / $5,000-$10,000 typical direct deals |
| Current products | Churchill PCAP, StepStone CRDEX, SPRIM, SPRING | Willow 360 (managed portfolios), Carlyle TPC, Goldman Sachs Real Estate Diversified Income, StepStone Private Markets Fund |
| Tax document | K-1 from 345 sponsor entities (historical) | K-1 for direct deals; 1099 for Short Term Notes |
| Operational status | Active under same brand; institutional fund pivot continuing | Effective restructuring; flagship fund sale pending; new product launches concurrent with rebrand |
The table makes the parallel structure visible: similar founding era, similar growth trajectories, similar gatekeeping events. The divergence appears on the disclosure response dimension — CrowdStreet's preserved track record and brand continuity versus Willow Wealth's rebrand and historical data removal.
Full primary-source analysis in individual reviews: CrowdStreet and Willow Wealth.
Which platform has more transparent historical performance disclosure?
Short answer
CrowdStreet, by a meaningful margin as of May 2026. CrowdStreet's 216-deal realized track record document remains publicly accessible — disclosing 11.2% aggregate IRR, 3.1% mean IRR, 16.3% median IRR, 24 total losses (11.2% loss rate), 49 negative-IRR deals (22.7%), category-level performance (Hospitality: -62.7% mean across 16 deals; Industrial: +26.4% mean), and vintage-year trajectory (2018: +31.6% mean / 2024: -29.9% mean). The track record excludes the Nightingale SPVs as 'non-standard exits' — a disclosed methodology choice that should be evaluated critically. Willow Wealth removed approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website during the October 2025 rebrand, including a chart that previously showed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The 9.4-9.8% IRR the platform marketed historically applied only to matured investments and explicitly excluded the $926.8M Short Term Notes program (~16,000 investors).
What is the $926.8M Short Term Notes exclusion at Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth?
Short answer
AltStreet's primary-source EDGAR analysis confirms Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth raised approximately $926.8M from approximately 16,000 retail investors via three Short Term Notes vehicles — ALTNOTES I ($759.6M from 12,503 investors at $0 minimum), ALTNOTES II ($167.2M from 3,483 investors at $5K minimum), and ST NOTES LLC ($179.6M from 1,867 investors). This represents 59% of all EDGAR-verified capital raised by the platform. Per platform footnote disclosure, the Short Term Notes program was explicitly excluded from the 9.4-9.8% net realized IRR the platform used as its primary marketing claim. The Notes funded the platform's deal pipeline before deals became available to direct investors — so Short Term Note investors were exposed to the same underlying deal risks as direct investors but appeared in neither the IRR calculation nor the default disclosure. ALTNOTES I grew from 6,406 investors in May 2021 to 12,503 in May 2022 — nearly doubling investor count during the period when the underlying deals were generating the losses CNBC later documented. This is original AltStreet primary-source research not previously documented at this scale.
AltStreet Take
What the data actually says
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These platforms are the most important parallel case study in retail private markets.
CrowdStreet and Yieldstreet were the two highest-profile retail private markets brands of the 2014-2022 era. They grew alongside each other, raised aggressively in the 2020-2022 vintage, experienced concentrated losses tied to specific gatekeeping events, and pivoted toward institutional fund distribution as their original models stopped working. Reading them together rather than separately is the correct framework for understanding what happened in retail alternatives in the 2020s. Most coverage treats each platform in isolation; the parallel structural comparison is rarely made directly.
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The transparency response is the most important governance signal investors can use.
Both platforms experienced documented losses on deals they had marketed. Both restructured away from their original products. The question is what each platform did with historical disclosure during the restructuring. CrowdStreet preserved the 216-deal realized track record on its public website — including 24 total-loss deals, 49 negative-IRR deals, and a 2024 vintage at -29.9% mean IRR. Willow Wealth removed approximately a decade of historical performance data during the October 2025 rebrand. This is not the same kind of choice. The first option preserves uncomfortable information that helps investors evaluate the platform; the second option removes it. For category-wide governance evaluation, this distinction matters more than any specific performance number.
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The $926.8M Short Term Notes exclusion is the most important under-reported finding in the Yieldstreet story.
AltStreet's primary-source EDGAR analysis confirms 59% of all Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth capital — approximately $926.8M from approximately 16,000 retail investors — was explicitly excluded from the platform's own IRR calculation. ALTNOTES I had $0 minimum and 12,503 investors at peak; these are the smallest, least sophisticated retail investors on the platform, using the product marketed as a cash alternative. They never appeared in the headline performance metric. The Short Term Notes program nearly doubled in investor count in its final 12 months (6,406 to 12,503 between May 2021 and May 2022) while the underlying deal pipeline was generating the losses CNBC later documented. The structural exclusion is the most important investor-protection failure in the Yieldstreet case, and it has not been adequately documented elsewhere.
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CrowdStreet's preserved disclosure is uncomfortable to read — and that is the point.
The 216-deal realized track record discloses outcomes that most retail-facing coverage does not highlight: 22.7% of deals produced negative IRR; 11.2% produced total losses; Hospitality at -62.7% mean across 16 deals; Senior Housing at -51.8% mean across 5 deals; 2024 vintage at -29.9% mean with 54% loss rate. These are facts CrowdStreet chose to keep accessible publicly during a period when removing them would have been operationally easier. The methodology choice to exclude Nightingale as a 'non-standard exit' should be evaluated critically — but the underlying disclosure quality of the rest of the track record is higher than most retail private markets platforms have ever provided.
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The Lakhani marine fraud was real fraud — Yieldstreet was the defrauded party.
Important framing: the $89M marine finance loss at Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth involved actual fraud by the Lakhani family of borrowers, ruled by the British High Court in October 2020. Yieldstreet was the defrauded party, not the perpetrator. The $1.9M SEC enforcement settlement (September 2023) was for failure to disclose known collateral risks to investors after the fraud was discovered. The 2020 FBI/SEC investigation resulted in no criminal charges against the company or executives. The criticism in this comparison concerns disclosure choices during the restructuring period — what the platform did with investor information during distress — not allegations of fraud against the platform. The structural distinction matters for fair characterization.
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Both gatekeeping events should make investors skeptical of platforms that market diligence rigor without producing public methodology.
The Nightingale event at CrowdStreet ($77.5M, ~1,279 investors) cleared the platform's diligence review. The Lakhani marine finance loss at Yieldstreet ($89M) cleared the platform's diligence review. Both platforms marketed diligence as a meaningful gatekeeping function during the period when those deals were listed. The structural lesson is not that one platform's diligence is better than the other's — it is that any platform marketing diligence rigor should produce: (1) public methodology disclosure, (2) audit-level outcome data on previously diligenced deals, and (3) explicit accountability framework when diligenced deals fail. Without these, 'rigorous diligence' is marketing language with no verification mechanism.
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For most retail investors, both platforms warrant looking elsewhere first for new capital.
CrowdStreet's current product is institutional fund distribution to accredited investors — evaluate Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, and SPRING on their own merits, not on CrowdStreet's historical diligence brand. Willow Wealth is undergoing a major platform transition with multiple unresolved variables (Alternative Income Fund sale, Short Term Notes outstanding series, internal watchlist real estate deals). For new private markets capital, retail investors should evaluate platforms with preserved historical disclosure, clean regulatory records, and continuity in their operating model. The 'AltStreet alternatives' framework involves checking what data a platform has preserved through periods of distress — this is the single most reliable forward-looking signal of governance quality available to retail investors.
Which platform is right for which investor situation?
Short answer
Existing CrowdStreet investors should review the publicly available 216-deal realized track record and request status updates on their specific deals. Existing Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth investors should verify Short Term Notes series status (29 of 194 unredeemed as of December 2024), review the proxy materials on the Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX, and request deal-specific status on watchlist positions. New retail investors should look beyond both platforms — neither is currently offering its original retail-accessible product, and both have multiple unresolved variables. Researchers and due diligence professionals should treat both as essential case studies — the parallel growth trajectories and divergent transparency responses are the foundational dataset for evaluating retail private markets platform governance.
If you hold existing positions
- → CrowdStreet: Review the public 216-deal track record for context on your category and vintage. Request specific deal status updates.
- → Willow Wealth Short Term Notes: Verify which of the 29 unredeemed series your position is in (as of December 2024). Request series-specific redemption status.
- → Alternative Income Fund: Review proxy materials for the Mount Logan SOFIX sale. Understand redemption right changes under new management.
- → Direct deal investors (either platform): Request current status on watchlist or active positions — these are not in any public disclosure.
This is not investment advice:
Existing investor monitoring is operational rather than evaluative — both platforms have ongoing obligations that require specific information you have to request.
If you're evaluating new capital allocation
- → Neither platform currently offers its original retail-accessible product
- → CrowdStreet's institutional fund products (Churchill, StepStone) are available through other distributors — evaluate on fund-level merits
- → Willow Wealth's institutional partnerships (Carlyle, Goldman, StepStone) are also available through other distributors
- → For retail-accessible real estate: Fundrise (40 Act funds, $1K minimum, non-accredited eligible) is the standard reference
- → For accredited CRE access: EquityMultiple, RealtyMogul, Cadre are active alternatives with preserved disclosure
Look beyond both:
The category has other platforms with preserved historical disclosure and cleaner regulatory records — your evaluation should not start with either of these two for new capital.
If you're researching the category
- → Both are essential case studies for retail private markets platform governance
- → The parallel 2014-2022 growth trajectory is the foundational pattern
- → The divergent transparency responses (preserved vs removed disclosure) are the most important governance signal
- → The $926.8M Short Term Notes exclusion at Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth is original AltStreet primary-source research not documented elsewhere at scale
- → The Nightingale event at CrowdStreet is the canonical example of marketplace gatekeeping failure with ongoing civil litigation
For full analysis:
See individual reviews for primary-source breakdowns of each platform's EDGAR filings, financial track record, and operational history.
Alternatives
Better-positioned platforms today
If you came to either CrowdStreet or Willow Wealth looking for retail private markets exposure and found neither currently offering its original product, these are the platforms with preserved historical disclosure and cleaner regulatory records that occupy similar ground today.
| Platform | Best for | Key differentiator vs CrowdStreet / Willow Wealth |
|---|---|---|
| Fundrise | Non-accredited retail investors wanting audited fund structure | $1K minimum, 40 Act registered, KPMG-audited, 1099-DIV, open to non-accredited. Only retail-accessible private real estate platform of this regulatory tier currently operating. |
| EquityMultiple | Accredited investors wanting direct CRE deal selection | Lower minimum ($5K vs CrowdStreet's historical $25K), active direct CRE deal pipeline, preserved disclosure across deal history. |
| RealtyMogul | Retail and accredited investors wanting REIT plus direct deal access | $5K minimum (retail eligible for REIT products), commercial real estate REIT structure plus accredited direct deals. Verify current REIT redemption status before investing. |
| Cadre | Accredited investors wanting institutional-grade commercial RE | Higher-minimum institutional-grade CRE deals with technology-driven sourcing. Audience overlaps with CrowdStreet historical accredited base but operates a different deal pipeline. |
| Percent | Accredited investors wanting alternative private credit access | $500 minimum, short-duration private credit deals (asset-backed lending, factoring, trade finance), deal-level transparency. Different asset class but similar accredited retail audience to Yieldstreet's direct deals. |
| Arrived | Retail investors wanting fractional single-family rental real estate | $100 minimum, retail-accessible single-property selection, Reg A+ structure, transparent quarterly performance reporting. Different product than CrowdStreet's commercial-scale deals but retail-accessible RE alternative. |
Each platform above is reviewed independently with the same primary-source methodology applied to CrowdStreet and Willow Wealth. The right alternative depends on whether you valued CrowdStreet's accredited direct CRE access (EquityMultiple, Cadre), Yieldstreet's multi-asset retail accessibility (Fundrise, Percent, Arrived), or the specific institutional fund products both platforms currently distribute (evaluate Churchill PCAP, StepStone CRDEX, SPRIM, SPRING, Carlyle TPC, Goldman Sachs Real Estate Diversified Income on their own merits — they are available through other distributors).
FAQs
CrowdStreet vs Willow Wealth: Common questions
Is Willow Wealth the same company as Yieldstreet?+
Yes. Willow Wealth is the rebrand of Yieldstreet, effective October 22, 2025. The underlying corporate entities (Willow Wealth Markets LLC, the SEC-registered broker-dealer; Willow Asset Management LLC, the SEC-registered investment adviser) are the successor entities to the original Yieldstreet operating companies. The same management team, the same investor portfolio, and the same regulatory record carried over to the rebranded platform. The legacy Yieldstreet website now redirects to willowwealth.com. The October 2025 rebrand coincided with CNBC's three-part investigative series on investor losses and was accompanied by the removal of approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website. Existing positions held with Yieldstreet are now administered under the Willow Wealth name with no change to underlying investor rights or obligations.
Can I still invest in direct commercial real estate on CrowdStreet?+
As of May 2026, CrowdStreet has no direct commercial real estate deals listed on the platform. Following the 2023 Nightingale-related events and marketplace suspension, CrowdStreet pivoted to distributing four institutional fund products: Churchill PCAP (private credit), StepStone CRDEX (private markets), SPRIM (private real estate income), and SPRING (private real assets). Whether CrowdStreet may relaunch direct CRE listings is not publicly stated. The 216-deal realized track record from the historical marketplace remains publicly accessible — this is a meaningful difference from Willow Wealth's October 2025 removal of historical performance data. For investors evaluating either platform today, the direct-access product that built each platform's brand is not currently available on either.
What's the difference between CrowdStreet's Nightingale event and Willow Wealth's marine finance losses?+
Both involve significant investor losses from underwriting and gatekeeping failures, but the scale and platform response differ materially. The Nightingale event at CrowdStreet involved approximately $77.5M raised from approximately 1,279 investors across three SPVs that cleared CrowdStreet's diligence review; the DOJ indicted Nightingale's principal for wire fraud in October 2023 alleging investor funds were diverted. CrowdStreet was the marketplace intermediary, not the investment manager. Civil litigation is ongoing. Willow Wealth's marine finance losses involved $89M lost across multiple marine finance offerings sponsored by the Lakhani family; a British High Court ruled in October 2020 that the Lakhanis committed fraud — Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth was the defrauded party. The SEC fined Yieldstreet $1.9M in September 2023 not for the fraud itself but for failure to disclose known collateral risks to investors. The structural similarity is that both platforms experienced gatekeeping failures on deals they had marketed; the structural difference is the magnitude of total documented losses ($77.5M Nightingale vs $208M CNBC-documented across Willow Wealth) and the platform response (CrowdStreet maintained brand and disclosure; Willow Wealth rebranded and removed historical data).
Which platform has more transparent historical performance data?+
CrowdStreet, by a meaningful margin as of May 2026. CrowdStreet's 216-deal realized track record document remains publicly accessible — disclosing 11.2% aggregate IRR, 3.1% mean IRR, 16.3% median IRR, 24 total losses (11.2% loss rate), 49 negative-IRR deals (22.7%), category-level performance (Hospitality: -62.7% mean across 16 deals; Industrial: +26.4% mean), and vintage-year trajectory (2018: +31.6% mean / 2024: -29.9% mean). The track record excludes the Nightingale SPVs as 'non-standard exits' — a disclosed methodology choice that should be evaluated critically. Willow Wealth removed approximately a decade of historical performance data from the public website during the October 2025 rebrand, including a chart that previously showed -2% annualized real estate returns 2015-2025. The 9.4-9.8% IRR the platform marketed historically applied only to matured investments and explicitly excluded the $926.8M Short Term Notes program (~16,000 investors). For investors comparing the platforms on disclosure quality, CrowdStreet's preserved track record is materially more verifiable than Willow Wealth's removed data.
Are either of these platforms a good investment today?+
Neither platform is currently offering its original retail-accessible direct-investment product. CrowdStreet's current product is institutional fund distribution (Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, SPRING) — accredited investors only, with fund minimums not prominently disclosed. Evaluate these on the underlying fund managers' merits, not on CrowdStreet's historical marketplace track record. Willow Wealth is undergoing a major platform transition — flagship Alternative Income Fund agreed to be sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX in March 2026 (pending shareholder vote), historical performance data removed, and new product launches (Willow 360 managed portfolios, August 2025; institutional fund partnerships, December 2025) are unproven under the rebranded entity. For new investment capital, retail investors seeking private markets exposure should evaluate platforms with preserved historical disclosure and clean regulatory records — Fundrise for retail-accessible real estate, EquityMultiple or RealtyMogul for accredited CRE access, or other platforms in the AltStreet platform reviews directory.
What is the $926.8M Short Term Notes exclusion at Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth?+
AltStreet's primary-source EDGAR analysis confirms that Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth raised approximately $926.8M from approximately 16,000 retail investors via three Short Term Notes vehicles (ALTNOTES I: $759.6M from 12,503 investors at $0 minimum; ALTNOTES II: $167.2M from 3,483 investors at $5K minimum; ST NOTES LLC: $179.6M from 1,867 investors). This represents 59% of all EDGAR-verified capital raised by the platform. Per platform footnote disclosure, the Short Term Notes program was explicitly excluded from the 9.4-9.8% net realized IRR that the platform used as its primary marketing claim. The Notes funded the platform's deal pipeline before deals became available to direct investors — so Short Term Note investors were exposed to the same underlying deal risks as direct investors but appeared in neither the IRR calculation nor the default disclosure. ALTNOTES I grew from 6,406 investors in May 2021 to 12,503 in May 2022 — nearly doubling investor count during the period when the underlying deals were generating the losses CNBC later documented. This is original AltStreet primary-source research not previously documented at this scale.
How do the regulatory records compare?+
Different in character, but both contain documented adverse events. CrowdStreet operates two SEC-registered entities (CrowdStreet Capital LLC FINRA-registered broker-dealer; CrowdStreet Advisors LLC SEC-registered investment adviser); the Nightingale event led to ongoing civil litigation by investors against CrowdStreet — CrowdStreet has not publicly quantified its legal exposure. No SEC enforcement action against CrowdStreet has been publicly disclosed as of May 2026. Willow Wealth (formerly Yieldstreet) operates two SEC-registered entities (Willow Wealth Markets LLC broker-dealer; Willow Asset Management LLC investment adviser); the regulatory and legal record includes: a $1.9M SEC enforcement settlement in September 2023 for failure to disclose marine finance collateral risks (settled without admitting wrongdoing); a $9M federal class action settlement in 2025; a 2020 FBI and SEC investigation into the marine finance offerings (per WSJ/Bloomberg Law reporting; no criminal charges were filed); and the British High Court ruling on the Lakhani marine fraud in October 2020. The volume of adverse regulatory and legal events at Willow Wealth is materially higher than at CrowdStreet.
What is happening to the Yieldstreet Alternative Income Fund?+
In March 2026, Willow Wealth announced an agreement to sell the flagship Alternative Income Fund ($100M+ in assets, launched March 2020) to Mount Logan Capital's SOFIX fund. The transfer is subject to shareholder approval through a proxy vote. The Alternative Income Fund was the platform's primary retail-accessible vehicle (available to non-accredited investors at $10,000 minimum, with quarterly repurchase offers gated at 5-20% of NAV). For existing investors, the transition introduces uncertainty: Mount Logan Capital's investment mandate, fee structure, redemption policies, and workout priorities for distressed positions may differ from the original fund's terms. The fund holds 50+ private market investments that will be inherited by SOFIX. Existing investors should carefully review the proxy materials for tax implications, redemption right changes, and what happens if shareholders vote against the transfer. This is unrelated to CrowdStreet — CrowdStreet's institutional fund distribution products (Churchill, StepStone, SPRIM, SPRING) are not affected by the Mount Logan transaction.
Can non-accredited investors use either platform?+
Different answers for each. CrowdStreet has always required accredited investor status — historical marketplace at $25,000 minimum, current institutional fund distribution at undisclosed minimums but accredited-only by structure. There is no non-accredited access path on CrowdStreet. Willow Wealth historically offered limited non-accredited access through the Alternative Income Fund ($10,000 minimum) — this was an unusual feature in the retail alternatives category. The fund is being sold to Mount Logan Capital SOFIX pending shareholder vote, and the future of non-accredited access on the Willow Wealth platform is not publicly stated. Most other Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth products were 506(c) accredited-only. For non-accredited retail investors evaluating private markets exposure, neither platform offers a current, clean retail access path — Fundrise (40 Act funds, $1K minimum, non-accredited eligible) is the standard reference point for retail-accessible private real estate.
Full Platform Analysis: CrowdStreet and Willow Wealth (Yieldstreet)
Each platform review is sourced from primary records — CrowdStreet's 216-deal realized track record document (publicly accessible, Wayback Machine archived), SEC EDGAR Form D filings for 45 CrowdStreet entities and 83 Yieldstreet/Willow Wealth entities, CNBC investigative reporting (August-December 2025), SEC enforcement actions, and AltStreet original research including the $926.8M Short Term Notes EDGAR analysis not documented elsewhere at this scale.
CrowdStreet Full Review
216-deal track record forensic analysis, vintage and category breakdown, Nightingale-related events documentation, institutional fund distribution pivot, transparency response framework.
Willow Wealth Full Review
$926.8M Short Term Notes EDGAR analysis, CNBC loss documentation, rebrand and data removal timeline, Alternative Income Fund sale to Mount Logan SOFIX, three-layer IRR exclusion framework.
