On May 3, 2024, the SEC shut down an audit firm in the most complete way it can: BF Borgers CPA PC and its owner, Benjamin Borgers, were denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as accountants — effective immediately, with no reinstatement provision in the order — and paid a combined $14 million in civil penalties. The Enforcement Director's statement did not reach for neutral language: Borgers and his firm "were responsible for one of the largest wholesale failures by gatekeepers in our financial markets," and his "sham audit mill" had been "permanently shut down."
The coverage that day led, understandably, with the firm's most famous client: Trump Media & Technology Group, which dismissed Borgers by 8-K within days. What nobody mapped — because mapping it requires a corpus of small-issuer filings that news organizations don't keep — is what the firm's collapse meant in the markets where its clients actually lived. BF Borgers was not an auditor of household names. It was an auditor of the small: 369 clients per the SEC's order, most of them microcap companies and exempt-offering issuers, the kind whose filings are read by almost no one.
AltStreet keeps exactly that corpus. Our Regulation A filing database — every Form 1-A family filing across the platforms and issuers we monitor — records BF Borgers as the named auditor for 37 issuers, across 78 filings, from October 2017 to February 2024. The last of those filings named the firm as auditor roughly ten weeks before the SEC barred it from practice. This article publishes that footprint — every name, as filed — and uses it to launch something broader: AltStreet's auditor directory, a reverse index from every audit firm in our corpus to the issuers that named it.
What the SEC Actually Found
The order's mechanics deserve to be read, because they describe the total absence of an audit practice wearing the costume of one. Per the SEC's findings — which the respondents neither admitted nor denied — staff were instructed to copy workpapers from previous engagements as the final workpapers for new ones, updating the balance-sheet date while "all of the other information indicating the substantive work done on the engagement was simply copied." Every engagement file contained documentation of a planning meeting; per the order, "those planning meetings did not occur." Sign-offs from the staff auditor, the engagement partner, and the quality reviewer — three distinct roles that exist to check each other — were, in reality, entered by a single staff member using multiple usernames, "within seconds of each other."
The scale findings: deliberate and systemic failures to comply with PCAOB standards in audits and reviews incorporated in more than 1,500 SEC filings from January 2021 through June 2023; false audit reports in more than 500 public-company filings; at least 1,625 filings and disclosures without the engagement quality review that is a precondition to issuing an audit report at all. The SEC charged the firm itself with fraud — Securities Act 17(a), Exchange Act 10(b) — not merely professional lapses.
One more finding matters for everything that follows: none of this was invisible beforehand. The PCAOB's public inspection reports — freely available on pcaobus.org — had flagged BF Borgers for years. In its 2021 inspection, 10 of 10 sampled audits carried the most serious tier of deficiency; in 2022, 11 of 11. Over the same period the firm's issuer client count roughly doubled. The warning system was public; almost nobody was reading it.
The Footprint in Retail Alternatives
A Regulation A offering statement must include audited financial statements, and the form names the auditor. Read individually, that line is trivia. Indexed across a corpus, it becomes a map. Here is what ours shows for BF Borgers: 37 issuers named the firm as auditor on Reg A filings between October 30, 2017 and February 20, 2024. They include operating companies raising from retail investors, fractional-collectibles vehicles, real-estate and lending issuers, and — most notably for AltStreet readers — StartEngine Crowdfunding, Inc. itself, along with StartEngine Collectibles Fund I and StartEngine Collectibles Fund II. The platform's parent company named Borgers on a 2023 offering statement; its two collectibles funds did so on 2022 filings. (StartEngine's subsequent filings show a successor: Haynie & Company appears as auditor on its September 2024 filing — the succession the SEC's guidance required, visible in the record.)
Other names in the roster will be familiar to anyone who follows the retail-alts space: Jet Token (the aviation company now trading as Jet.AI, whose 2019–2020 Reg A raises carried Borgers audits), Clubhouse Media Group, HUMBL, Longaberger Licensing (the revival of the basket brand), and Here Collection (a fractional real-estate issuer). The full 37-issuer roster, with each issuer's filing dates and links to its complete EDGAR record, lives on the BF Borgers page of the auditor directory.
The timeline detail worth sitting with: the latest Borgers-named filing in our corpus is dated February 20, 2024 — a real-estate fund amendment carrying the firm's audit work into EDGAR about ten weeks before the SEC declared the practice a sham. There is no suggestion the issuer knew anything was wrong; that is precisely the point. The entire premise of an audit requirement is that investors and issuers alike get to rely on the gatekeeper. When the gatekeeper is fabricating workpapers, the requirement is satisfied on paper and empty in fact — for everyone downstream, simultaneously.
What the Bar Meant for Small Issuers
The SEC staff's same-day guidance had a section most coverage skipped, addressed specifically to Regulation A: issuers with pending offering statements containing Borgers-audited financials would need to file a pre-qualification amendment with financials audited by a new, qualified, independent accountant — staff would not qualify the offerings otherwise. For a microcap issuer, that is not paperwork; it is a re-audit, at real cost, on an offering that may have been budgeted to the dollar.
Two precision points, because this is where sloppy versions of this story overreach. First, the SEC's charged conduct concerned PCAOB-standard engagements — public-company audits, registration statements, broker-dealer filings. Regulation A financials may be audited under either PCAOB or AICPA standards depending on the issuer's circumstances, so this article does not claim any specific Reg A audit in our corpus was within the charged conduct. What the record supports is narrower and still significant: these 37 issuers named, as their independent auditor, a firm the SEC found had fabricated its audit practice at industrial scale during an overlapping period. Second, the action did not automatically deem any client's financial statements misstated, and the staff did not require blanket amendment of previously filed reports. The harm is subtler: where an audit was not performed to applicable standards, the assurance function fails regardless of whether the underlying numbers happen to be correct.
What happened to the 37 afterward? Our corpus answers for the issuers that kept filing offering statements: three show a successor auditor on later Reg A filings (StartEngine to Haynie & Company; two smaller issuers to regional firms). The other 34 show no subsequent auditor-naming filing in our corpus — which mostly means their offerings simply concluded, not that they remain Borgers clients; the firm has no clients now. For investors holding any of these issuers' securities, the practical question is what the issuer's most recent annual report says on the auditor line — checkable in minutes on the issuer's EDGAR page.
The Concentration Problem This Reveals
BF Borgers was not an outlier in structure — only in outcome. The economics that made a $14 million audit mill possible are the economics of the small-issuer market generally: a Regulation A issuer raising a few million dollars cannot pay national-firm audit fees, so a specialized ecosystem of small shops audits enormous numbers of small issuers at low price points. Our corpus makes the concentration visible for the first time: the five largest audit firms by issuer count in AltStreet's Reg A universe together cover more than 240 issuers. One Denver-area firm covers 81 by itself.
Concentration itself is not evidence of misconduct — many specialized firms operate legitimately, and specialization is how small-issuer audits stay affordable at all. But concentration means correlated exposure: when one firm fails, its failure propagates to dozens or hundreds of issuers at once, exactly as the Borgers bar did. And it means the PCAOB's public inspection reports — the documents that graded Borgers 10-for-10 deficient years before the enforcement action — are among the highest-leverage reading a small-issuer investor can do, precisely because each report covers so many issuers at once.
The Auditor Directory
This is why we built the AltStreet auditor directory. Every Regulation A offering statement in our corpus names its auditor; we normalized those names — 540 distinct firms — and published a page for every firm with a meaningful footprint: the issuers that named it, as filed, each linking to the issuer's full EDGAR record and, where applicable, its platform's AltStreet review. Issuer pages link back through an "Auditor of Record" entry. The reverse index — from firm to client roster — is the view the filings themselves never provide, and the one that would have made the Borgers footprint visible in one query at any point since 2017.
The workflow it enables, for any issuer you hold or evaluate:
- Find the issuer's AltStreet entity page (or EDGAR record) and read the auditor of record.
- Click through to the firm's directory page: how many issuers does it cover in our corpus, over what period, and who are they?
- Check the firm's public PCAOB inspection history — the directory links each firm's PCAOB lookup — and review recent deficiency rates in context, including the number and type of audits inspected.
- If the issuer's auditor has changed, ask why. Successions are visible in the filing record, and auditor resignations in particular are worth understanding before investing.
The Borgers episode ended with the strongest medicine securities regulation has for a gatekeeper. But the lesson underneath it is about reading order: the public record contained everything an investor needed — inspection reports, client concentrations, engagement histories — years before the enforcement action arrived to summarize it. The data was never secret. It was just never indexed. Now it is.
Sources: SEC Press Release 2024-51 and Order Rel. No. 33-11283 (May 3, 2024); SEC Division of Corporation Finance and Office of the Chief Accountant Staff Statement (May 3, 2024); SEC Press Release 2024-61 (May 20, 2024); PCAOB inspection reports for BF Borgers CPA PC (2021, 2022); Trump Media & Technology Group Form 8-K (May 6, 2024); AltStreet Regulation A filing corpus (auditor designations as filed, October 2017 – February 2024). The SEC's findings were made in a settled order that respondents neither admitted nor denied. Nothing in this article is investment advice, and no issuer named here is accused of wrongdoing — clients of a failed gatekeeper are, precisely, the parties the audit requirement exists to protect.

