Landa
Landa sold $5 shares in individual rental houses to retail investors through four Regulation A issuers. As of this review the platform is non-operational: monthly distributions stopped after October 16, 2024 without a formal suspension notice; a lender suing over $35 million-plus in defaulted bridge loans obtained a court order on December 12, 2024 stripping Landa of management of 88 property series; the app and website, the sole channel through which investors could see their accounts, have been dark since April 5, 2025; 17 houses were sold at foreclosure on a single day in July 2025; and the series now being dissolved mostly return $0.00 to investors, with one Atlanta building returning $1.39 per share against a $24.20 offering price. AltStreet reconstructed the collapse from all 258 Form 1-U current reports the four issuers filed on EDGAR, because the filings are now the only reporting channel that still works.

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What the data actually shows - TL;DR
Landa raised retail money in $36,000-$64,000 per-house micro-offerings under Regulation A, levered the houses with short-maturity hard-money and affiliate bridge debt, and collapsed when the debt came due: distributions stopped October 2024, a lender suing over $35 million-plus in defaults had Landa removed as manager of 88 series by court order in December 2024, the app went dark April 5, 2025 and has stayed dark 16+ months, 17 homes were foreclosed in one day in July 2025, and the ongoing series dissolutions mostly return $0.00 to investors. The platform is not formally bankrupt and no regulator has acted (scan-scoped, 2026-08-20), but its 258 Form 1-Us now read as a liquidation log, and this review reconstructs it because the app that was supposed to tell investors what happened no longer exists.
The app and website went down April 5, 2025 (blamed on the 'platform's servers provider' in a 1-U signed by the CEO) and remain inaccessible as of August 2026. The site footer still says deposits and trading are 'temporarily paused.'
Property series stripped from Landa's management by New York court order December 12, 2024, in Viola Credit / L Finance's suit over $35M+ in defaulted bridge loans (Index No. 659157/2024). Landa turned over control of 119 properties in February 2025; Anna Phillips serves as independent manager with B. Riley as restructuring adviser.
Most documented dissolutions reviewed returned $0.00 to investors: 1741 Park Lane ($162,000 sale), 593 Country Lane, 729 Winter Lane, 7349 Exeter Court, and others returned nothing; 996 Greenwood returned $1.39/share against a $24.20 offering price, roughly a 95% loss.
The last monthly distribution declarations ever filed. There was never a formal suspension notice: the dividend 1-Us simply stopped, and every subsequent filing is litigation, foreclosure, insider loans, or liquidation.
Landa App LLC and App 2 LLC last filed audited annual reports for FY2022, three consecutive missed annual reports each, while continuing to file 1-U event reports through July 2026. App 3 is delinquent since FY2023, Landa Financing since FY2024.
AltStreet EDGAR census of Landa's four Reg A issuers (422 filings ingested, 39 as-filed financial rows), a complete 258-filing Form 1-U ledger with 75 documents read in full, a 2026-08-20 legal/enforcement scan, and an August 2026 site capture.
AltStreet Weekly
Follow the unwind as it is filed
Landa's four issuers are still filing dissolution and foreclosure reports on EDGAR, the only channel that still works. AltStreet tracks all four CIKs and flags new 1-Us, series dissolutions, and recovery figures as they land.
Free during beta. Filing-grounded data, no platform marketing.
What's Actually Happening
In plain English, here is what actually happened.
- 1Landa let you buy $5 shares of a specific rental house. Each house was its own mini-company (a 'series' of an LLC) that raised roughly $30,000-$64,000 from the app's users and was supposed to pay you a slice of the rent every month.
- 2The houses carried debt: mortgages, then hard-money refinancing at 11.5% interest due in 12 months (December 2023), then bridge loans from an affiliate of Landa's own venture backer. The rent was often thin, and sometimes propped up by reserves while tenants weren't paying: the filed cash-flow record does not show enough property-level cushion to absorb that debt structure across the affected series.
- 3In October 2024 the monthly dividends simply stopped appearing. There was never a formal suspension announcement; the declaration filings just never showed up again.
- 4The lender declared default (Oct 29, 2024), sued (Nov 19, 2024), and a New York court stripped Landa of management of 88 property series (Dec 12, 2024), putting an independent manager and a restructuring firm in charge. Landa turned over control of 119 properties in February 2025.
- 5On April 5, 2025 the app and website went down (Landa blamed its server provider) and they have not come back. The app was the only place investors could see their accounts. It has now been dark for over 16 months while the site says operations are 'temporarily paused.'
- 6Since mid-2025 the houses have been foreclosed or sold one by one (17 in a single day on July 1, 2025) and the series dissolved. In most documented dissolutions, sale proceeds went entirely to lenders and expenses and investors received $0.00.
- 7Landa is not bankrupt and no regulator has filed an enforcement action against it (as of AltStreet's 2026-08-20 scan). It continues to file SEC event reports, which now function as a liquidation log. Those filings, not the dead app, are where investors can find out what happened to their money.
Quick Verdict
Is this platform right for you?
There is no investment decision to make here: Landa accepts no deposits, lists no offerings, and its app has been inaccessible since April 5, 2025. The decision this review supports is an existing investor's: understanding what happened, who now controls the properties, and what the filed record says about recoveries.
Read the full assessmentShow less
That record is stark: distributions stopped without notice in October 2024; a lender's suit stripped Landa of 88 series; foreclosures and dissolutions have run continuously since; and dissolution proceeds have mostly gone entirely to lenders and expenses. The company disputes some foreclosures as wrongful and no enforcement action against it was located as of the 2026-08-20 scan, but on the platform's core promises (monthly income, liquidity via secondary trading, professional management), the filed record documents failure on all three.
Best for
- Existing Landa investors who need to reconstruct what happened to specific series from the SEC filing record
- Investors searching 'is Landa legit' or 'Landa money stuck' who need the documented, primary-sourced timeline rather than forum speculation
- Researchers and diligence analysts studying how per-property micro-offering structures behave under leverage stress
Avoid if
- You are looking for a place to invest: the platform is non-operational and cannot take your money
- You are hoping the 'temporarily paused' language implies a pending reopening: the filed record since October 2024 is exclusively defaults, foreclosures, insider loans, and dissolutions
- You expect the app to come back and display your old balance: the 1-U record, not the app's last state, determines what your series is worth
Top strengths
- The Reg A wrapper worked as a disclosure mechanism of last resort: even in collapse, the issuers kept filing 1-U event reports, which is why this reconstruction is possible
- Series-LLC segregation appears to have held in form: each house's debts and dissolution are handled series by series rather than in one commingled pot
- Landa's own filings disclose adverse events with some candor: court orders, foreclosure prices, and per-share recovery figures appear in the 1-Us, including the $0.00 outcomes
Key limitations
- Non-operational: app and website dark since April 5, 2025; no deposits, withdrawals, trading, or account visibility
- Court-supervised unwind: 88 series removed from Landa's management December 2024; 119 properties ceded February 2025; independent manager and CRO control dispositions of the seized series
- Documented recoveries are catastrophic: most dissolutions return $0.00; the best multifamily outcome documented is roughly a 95% loss
- Audited reporting stopped: all four issuers delinquent on Form 1-K annual reports (two of them since FY2022), so no audited financials exist for the collapse period
Where It Fits
Where Landa fits, and where the money it courted should look instead.
Fractional single-family rentals (this platform)
If you want
Buy $5 shares of individual rental houses and collect monthly rent distributions
Use
Landa: non-operational since April 2025; portfolio in court-supervised unwind; not accepting investment
Fractional single-family rentals (operating)
If you want
The same per-property, low-minimum rental share model from a platform that is functioning
Use
Arrived: Reg A per-property offerings with materially lower property-level leverage
Short-term real estate debt with a published record
If you want
Retail real estate exposure where loan-level performance history is disclosed
Use
Groundfloor: short-term notes with a full repayment and default record published
Diversified real estate funds
If you want
Broad residential exposure without single-house, single-manager concentration
Use
Fundrise: diversified eREIT structures rather than per-house micro-offerings
Compare Before Deciding
How Landa compares
The useful comparisons are with platforms still operating the models Landa attempted. Read them with this record's failure axes in mind: leverage, manager concentration, affiliate services, and reporting channels.
The operating per-property comparable
Arrived
Reg A rental-home shares at low minimums, Landa's model with materially different leverage discipline. The comparison every 'is fractional real estate safe' question actually turns on.
The transparency benchmark
Groundfloor
Short-term real estate debt with a full loan-level repayment and default record published, the outcome disclosure Landa's investors never had, on the senior side of the capital stack Landa's investors sat beneath.
The diversification alternative
Fundrise
Pooled eREIT structures instead of single-house series, the design answer to per-property concentration, with its own liquidity and fee tradeoffs.
Quick Answers
What most investors want to know first
The highest-signal facts first: minimums, liquidity reality, K-1 timing, and whether distributions are actually part of the experience.
Minimum
$5 (share prices from $5; typical series ~$36K-$64K total raise at 10,000 shares)
Liquidity
The advertised in-app secondary market, one of Landa's four headline innovations ('New Modes of Liquidity'), froze with the platform and has been unavailable for the entire unwind, which is precisely when holders would have used it. The site footer states secondary trading is 'temporarily paused.' Practically, Landa shares have had zero liquidity since early 2025.
K-1 Timing
Not a K-1 shop per Landa's own materials: its help center describes Form 1099 reporting. Historical tax documents were delivered in-app; issuance status for 2024-2025 is unknown and the delivery channel has been dark since April 2025.
Distributions
Last monthly distribution declarations filed October 16, 2024 (Landa App LLC, accession 0001815103-24-000023; App 2, -000024) and September 5, 2024 (App 3, 0001886606-24-000036). No declaration has been filed since, and no suspension notice was ever filed; Landa's BBB responses confirm distributions have been suspended since October 2024. Dissolution distributions, where any, are one-time and stated per series in the dissolution 1-Us.
Overview
Platform Overview
A concise read on what the platform is, how the structure works, and where the practical friction shows up for real investors.
Fractional residential real estate investing app, currently non-operational: Landa Holdings, Inc. (founded 2019; formerly New York, now Atlanta) organized individual rental properties as numbered series of four Regulation A issuers, Landa App LLC (CIK 1815103), Landa App 2 LLC (CIK 1875877), Landa App 3 LLC (CIK 1886606), and Landa Financing LLC (CIK 1965132), and sold shares to retail investors from $5, with monthly rent-derived distributions and an in-app secondary market. Landa charged an acquisition fee of up to 6% of property cost, a management fee of up to 8% of gross rent (8% single-family, 5% multifamily), and up to $2 per instant transaction. As of August 2026 the platform accepts no deposits, lists no offerings, and has been inaccessible since April 5, 2025; distributions stopped after October 16, 2024; much of the portfolio is controlled by a court-installed independent manager following lender litigation; and the remaining series are being foreclosed, sold, and dissolved, mostly returning $0.00 to investors.
Landa was a genuine SEC-reporting Regulation A operation, not a fake one: real houses, real filings, real (small) distributions from 2021 through October 2024. It is also, as of this review, a non-operational platform whose portfolio is being unwound substantially under court supervision, whose investors cannot access their accounts, and whose documented dissolutions mostly return nothing. The sections below reconstruct the machine as it was designed (per-house series micro-offerings under four Reg A issuers), the leverage that broke it (an 11.5% hard-money wall and $35M+ in defaulted bridge loans), and the unwind as the 1-U record documents it. Figures are as-filed; where a claim is a litigation allegation or secondhand report, it is labeled as such.
Operational Status
Non-operational: app/website dark since April 5, 2025; no offerings, deposits, or trading; site says 'temporarily paused'
Minimum Investment (historical)
$5 (share prices from $5; typical series ~$36K-$64K total raise at 10,000 shares)
Investor Eligibility (historical)
Retail investors under Regulation A ('qualified purchasers': no accreditation required, subject to Tier 2 investment limits for non-accredited investors)
Issuers
Landa App LLC (CIK 1815103) · Landa App 2 LLC (1875877) · Landa App 3 LLC (1886606) · Landa Financing LLC (1965132), all series LLCs managed by Landa Holdings, Inc. or its affiliate
Portfolio (historical)
Single-family rentals in GA/FL/AL/NC, two Atlanta multifamily properties, three Brooklyn buildings; ~218 properties referenced by mid-2023
Distributions
Monthly, historically a few hundred dollars per series across all holders; last declarations filed Oct 16, 2024 (App 3: Sep 5, 2024); suspended since, per Landa's BBB responses
Fees (per landa.app)
Management up to 8% of gross rent (8% SFR / 5% multifamily) · acquisition up to 6% of property cost · up to $2 per instant transaction
Liquidity
Historically an in-app secondary market; frozen with the platform since April 2025 and 'paused' per the site, practically zero
Litigation
Viola Credit GL I / ALF II / L Finance v. Landa Holdings et al., N.Y. Sup. Ct. Index No. 659157/2024 (open as of Feb 2026) · Allison Lending v. Landa App 3, E.D.N.Y. No. 1:25-cv-01939
Control of Portfolio
88 series removed from Landa's management Dec 12, 2024; 119 properties ceded Feb 4, 2025; Anna Phillips independent manager, B. Riley Financial CRO (John Sordillo)
Reporting Status
1-K annual reports delinquent: App LLC & App 2 since FY2022, App 3 since FY2023, Financing since FY2024; 1-U event reports continue through July 2026
Enforcement History
SEC Division of Enforcement subpoena Dec 2019, investigation closed Nov 2020 with no action recommended; no filed enforcement action located as of 2026-08-20 (scan-scoped)
Complaint Volume
347 BBB complaints in three years (user reports); recent complainants locked out of accounts 'over a year'
Documented Recoveries
Mostly $0.00 per dissolution 1-Us; best multifamily outcome $1.39/share vs $24.20 offering price (~95% loss)
Visual Summary
Landa vs. Operating Fractional Real Estate Alternatives
The comparison a prospective investor would have made in 2023, updated for what the filing record now shows. Landa's column describes a platform that no longer functions.
What you buy
Landa: $5 shares of one levered rental house (frozen) · Arrived: shares of one rental home, typically lightly levered · Groundfloor: short-term real estate debt notes · Fundrise: diversified eREIT funds
Status
Landa: non-operational since Apr 2025, portfolio in unwind · Arrived: operating · Groundfloor: operating · Fundrise: operating
Leverage model
Landa: property-level mortgages + 11.5% hard-money + affiliate bridge loans · Arrived: modest property-level debt, disclosed per deal · Groundfloor: you are the lender · Fundrise: fund-level, disclosed
Performance disclosure
Landa: none from platform; collapse reconstructable only from 1-Us · Arrived: per-property updates · Groundfloor: full loan-level repayment/default record · Fundrise: fund-level returns
Liquidity
Landa: frozen (in-app market dark since Apr 2025) · Arrived: limited/none · Groundfloor: hold to repayment (short terms) · Fundrise: quarterly redemption programs, discretionary
What the collapse tested
Landa: single-manager, single-app, affiliate-levered design failed on all three axes · Others: not similarly tested, which is the point of reading this record before trusting any of them blindly
ASEconomic Positioning: Why This Design Broke
- A $40,000 raise on one house cannot fund a margin of safety. Landa's micro-offering design meant each series' entire capitalization was roughly one year of a Brooklyn parking spot: there was no reserve cushion that could absorb an 11.5% refinancing, a vacancy, and a roof in the same year. The 2022-23 filings show the consequence: distributions paid from reserves while tenants were not paying, disclosed in footnotes.
- The fee structure loaded costs onto thin cash flows: up to 6% of the purchase price at acquisition and up to 8% of gross rent ongoing, plus renovation notes owed to the Manager at 4.5%. On a house renting for $1,200/month, the management fee alone is ~$96/month against distributions that routinely totaled a few hundred dollars across all shareholders.
- The affiliate web deepened as external options narrowed: Landa Financing lending to sibling series at SOFR+3.5% (first affiliate refinance, March 2024) and later at 10% (July 2026 micro-loans); the transfer agent switched from Securitize to affiliated Landa Transfer Agent LLC (April 2024); a September 2024 pivot into short-term rentals; an October 2024 auditor change. Each step is individually explicable; the sequence reads as a group turning inward as third-party capital and services withdrew.
- When the end came, the marginal dollar amounts were tiny: the CEO's rescue loans were $3,000-$21,650 per house; 996 Greenwood's fatal junior note was $140,000; the discounted loan sale raised $604,605.60. The portfolio was lost over sums that would be rounding errors at an institutional SFR operator, which is the clearest possible statement of how little cash the structure ever generated.
Key Gaps & Non-Disclosures
- No audited financials exist for any issuer for the collapse period (FY2023 onward for the two largest issuers).
- No filing states the aggregate amount investors put in versus what dissolutions have returned.
- No filing addresses what happened to uninvested cash balances held on-platform when withdrawals froze.
- Landa Financing's NAV series never discloses impairment methodology against its foreclosed borrower base.
- The manager, Landa Holdings, Inc., is not itself an SEC filer: its own solvency and headcount are invisible.
Platform Intelligence
Landa: From $5 Shares to Court-Supervised Unwind (AltStreet filing-tracked)
Key platform events, regulatory turns, liquidity stress points, and product launches that shape how the review should be read.
Founding, and an SEC subpoena
Landa Holdings founded with a mission of $5-minimum fractional real estate investing. In December 2019 the manager receives an SEC Division of Enforcement subpoena concerning Landa Holdings and Landa Properties LLC.
SEC investigation closed, no action
The SEC's Division of Enforcement writes that it has concluded its investigation and does not intend to recommend enforcement action, disclosed in the Form 1-A (accession 0001213900-20-040323). Reg A qualification work proceeds.
The machine at full speed
Emerges from stealth in August 2022 with $33M in announced funding (Viola among the backers). Landa App LLC reaches 45 series by December; houses raise $36K-$64K each at 10,000 shares; monthly distribution 1-Us flow. Warning signs already in footnotes: reserve-funded distributions while tenants are not paying.
The Kiavi refinancing wall
15 series simultaneously refinance with hard-money lender Kiavi at 11.5%, ~$122K-$171K each, all maturing December 1, 2024 (accession 0001815103-23-000035). Mid-2023 filings had already footnoted widespread vacancy; a third-party analysis put ~125 of 218 properties at zero cash. Co-founder/CTO Amit Assaraf departs.
Distributions stop, silently
Last monthly distribution declarations filed October 16, 2024 (App 3: September 5). No suspension notice then or ever. October 29: bridge lender issues default notice. Also in 2024: affiliate lending begins (March), transfer agent switched to affiliated Landa Transfer Agent LLC (April), auditor change (October).
Court strips Landa of 88 series
Viola Credit/L Finance sue November 19 over $35M+ in defaults (Index No. 659157/2024). A November 26 TRO and December 12 order remove Landa Holdings as manager of 88 borrower series, installing Anna Phillips as interim manager. Three board members resign in one day (December 14).
The app goes dark
February 4: Landa agrees to turn over control of 119 properties; B. Riley engaged with John Sordillo as CRO. April 5: app and website go down, blamed on the 'platform's servers provider' in 1-Us across all four issuers. Investors lose account access. It never comes back. Late January: lenders allege ~$724K drained from property accounts in violation of an injunction (Landa disputes).
17 homes foreclosed in one day
The matured bridge debt takes its collateral: 17 series' houses sold at foreclosure July 1, 2025, after buyer Roots terminated 10 purchase agreements the day before. In June, CEO Cohen had personally lent ~57 series $3,000-$21,650 each at 0% to stave off exactly this. Dissolutions begin returning $0.00 to investors.
The dissolution wave, and a 95% loss benchmark
Bulk sales and dissolutions of dozens of series, mostly at $0.00 to investors. 996 Greenwood, $24.20/share at offering, is lost to a $140K junior note and returns $1.39/share. Brooklyn buildings deeded to lender's affiliate amid contested UCC seizure. All four issuers now delinquent on audited annual reports; filings signed by the COO, error-ridden.
AltStreet reconstruction
AltStreet publishes this review from the complete 258-filing 1-U ledger, a legal/enforcement scan (no enforcement action located, scan-scoped), 422 ingested EDGAR filings, and an August 2026 site capture. The site still reads 'temporarily paused.'
Mental Model
How Landa worked, and how it unwound.
One house, one series, 10,000 shares
Landa Holdings organized each rental house as a numbered series of an issuer LLC (Landa App LLC, then App 2, App 3). A typical single-family series raised $36,000-$64,000 at $5-and-up share prices under Regulation A; App 3 scaled the model to Atlanta multifamily and three Brooklyn buildings at $505,000-$1.75 million per series. Landa took an acquisition fee of up to 6% of the purchase cost and a management fee of up to 8% of gross rent.
Rent in, dividends out, with leverage underneath
Series were supposed to pay monthly distributions from rent, typically a few hundred dollars per house per month across all holders. Underneath sat property-level debt: mortgages, a December 2023 hard-money refinancing of 15 series with Kiavi at 11.5% maturing December 1, 2024, and April 2023 bridge loans from L Finance LLC secured by 88 series' homes. An affiliated fund, Landa Financing LLC, also lent to sibling series: at SOFR+3.5% in 2024, at 10% by 2026.
The debt wall hits and the machine stops
By 2023 the filings show reserve-funded distributions masking non-paying tenants and vacancy footnotes across the portfolio. The last monthly distribution declarations were filed October 16, 2024. The bridge lender issued a default notice October 29, sued November 19 over $35 million-plus in defaults, and by December 12, 2024 a court had removed Landa as manager of the 88 borrower series. Three of Landa Holdings' board members resigned in a single day.
Blackout, foreclosure, dissolution
The app went dark April 5, 2025 and never returned. The CEO personally lent dozens of series $3,000-$21,650 each at 0% to stave off foreclosures; 17 houses were foreclosed anyway on July 1, 2025. Since then the portfolio has been liquidated series by series (foreclosure sales, bulk sales, dissolutions) with proceeds mostly consumed by liabilities. The 1-U filings, signed since March 2026 by the COO rather than the CEO, are the only remaining record.
Investor Operations
The practical questions investors actually care about: when tax documents arrive, how cash distributions work, and whether capital can be exited before the underlying asset is sold.
Tax Documents
K-1 Timing
What to expect
Not a K-1 shop per Landa's own materials: its help center describes Form 1099 reporting. Historical tax documents were delivered in-app; issuance status for 2024-2025 is unknown and the delivery channel has been dark since April 2025.
Cash Flow
Distributions
Frequency
None since October 2024 (historically monthly)
Timing
Last monthly distribution declarations filed October 16, 2024 (Landa App LLC, accession 0001815103-24-000023; App 2, -000024) and September 5, 2024 (App 3, 0001886606-24-000036). No declaration has been filed since, and no suspension notice was ever filed; Landa's BBB responses confirm distributions have been suspended since October 2024. Dissolution distributions, where any, are one-time and stated per series in the dissolution 1-Us.
Consistency
Historically inconsistent beneath the surface: 1-Us from 2022-23 disclose reserve-funded distributions while tenants were not paying, and a third-party filings analysis (REPORTED) put ~125 of 218 properties at zero cash by mid-2023. The monthly cadence was maintained until it stopped entirely.
Liquidity
Exit Reality
Holding period
Effectively total. No deposits, withdrawals, or trading since the platform froze; the in-app secondary market has been inaccessible since April 5, 2025.
Exit options
- Await your series' disposition: foreclosure (no investor proceeds in documented cases), sale-and-dissolution (mostly $0.00; occasionally partial recoveries stated per share), or continued holding under Landa or the independent manager.
- Litigation-contingent outcomes for contested properties (Brooklyn buildings, disputed foreclosures): timeline in years, recovery unknowable.
- No private resale mechanism is known to function: the affiliated transfer agent's process for off-platform transfers, if any, is undocumented while the platform is dark.
Secondary market
The advertised in-app secondary market, one of Landa's four headline innovations ('New Modes of Liquidity'), froze with the platform and has been unavailable for the entire unwind, which is precisely when holders would have used it. The site footer states secondary trading is 'temporarily paused.' Practically, Landa shares have had zero liquidity since early 2025.
Confidence: High
Investment Structures
Single-Family Series Micro-Offerings (Landa App LLC / App 2 LLC): the core, now being dissolved
One rental house per numbered series, 10,000 shares, typically $36,000-$64,000 raised, concentrated in the Atlanta metro (App LLC) and FL/AL/NC (App 2). Investors received monthly distributions when declared (routinely a few hundred dollars per series across all holders) from rents of roughly $800-$2,200/month per house. The structural problem was leverage sitting above that cash flow: property mortgages, the December 2023 Kiavi hard-money refinancing (15 series at 11.5%, ~$122K-$171K each, all maturing 12/1/2024), and April 28, 2023 'Bridge Loans' from L Finance LLC secured by 88 series' homes.
When the bridge loans defaulted, these series lost their manager by court order; when the Kiavi-era debt matured unpaid, they lost the houses, 17 at foreclosure on July 1, 2025 alone. Dissolutions since August 2025 have mostly returned $0.00 per share, with sale proceeds consumed by liabilities 'as required by the settlement.'
Larger Multifamily and Brooklyn Series (Landa App 3 LLC): bigger raises, same fate
App 3 scaled the model: two Atlanta multifamily properties and three Brooklyn buildings at $505,000-$1.75 million raised per series (100,000 shares). The documented outcomes are the starkest in the record. 996 Greenwood, which raised roughly $592,000+ at $24.20/share, took a $140,000 second mortgage from Mazz Georgia LLC at closing-day speed in August 2025 to cure arrears and cancel a foreclosure, then lost the building when Mazz foreclosed on that junior note in June 2026; investors received $1.39/share, an 89% loss counting $1.27/share of lifetime dividends (~95% on capital alone).
The three Brooklyn buildings were all in foreclosure by November 2025, and lender Allison Lending claims it seized the borrower series itself via a UCC sale (E.D.N.Y. No. 1:25-cv-01939) and recorded deeds transferring the buildings to its own affiliate in early 2026, a seizure Landa is contesting, denying it signed the settlement stipulation.
Landa Financing LLC ('Lend'): the affiliated lender with the incongruously calm NAV
A NAV-priced Reg A fund (CIK 1965132) making mortgage loans, which became a lender of last resort to sibling Landa series: a $131,000 refinance at SOFR+3.5% in March 2024, and by July 2026, $3,000-$10,000 micro-loans at 10% to cure senior-lender demands and fund repairs on vacant houses. In November 2024 it sold six intercompany mortgage loans (face ~$671,000) at a discount for $604,605.60 in cash. Its filed NAV series ($7.26 (9/30/24), $6.71 (7/18/25), then back to $7.10 (6/30/26)) shows a placid ~2% round trip across the exact period its borrower base was being foreclosed, with no 1-U ever addressing loan-book impairment. AltStreet flags the incongruity; no independent validation of that NAV exists, and the fund's FY2025 annual report is now delinquent.
The affiliate service web: manager, property manager, transfer agent, lender in one family
Landa Holdings was simultaneously the issuers' manager, the property manager (up to 8% of gross rent), and the acquisition agent (up to 6% of cost); series owed the Manager renovation notes at 4.5%; Landa Management LLC managed the affiliated lender; and in April 2024 the group replaced Securitize LLC (an independent, SEC-registered transfer agent) with affiliated Landa Transfer Agent LLC across all issuers. In March 2024 the Manager also determined property insurance was 'no longer reasonable' for at least one series and let the policy lapse. Every economically significant function an investor might want independently verified (management, valuation, lending, share records, insurance judgment) ran through the same distressed family by 2024.
Risk
Risk Structure
This is where the marketplace pitch gives way to the actual operating reality: delayed exits, limited disclosure, fee drag, and path-dependent outcomes.
Bridge-Loan Leverage on Thin Cash Flow: the central financial stressor visible in the filings
Landa's houses generated a few hundred dollars of distributable cash per month per series, and the filings show even that was partly reserve-funded by 2022-23. Above that cash flow sat: property mortgages; the December 2023 Kiavi refinancing of 15 series at 11.5% with 12-month maturities (~$122K-$171K each); and the April 2023 L Finance bridge loans secured by 88 series' homes, which defaulted at $35 million-plus. Hard-money pricing with one-year fuses on single-family rentals is a structure that requires either a sale, a refinance, or a sponsor with cash: Landa had none of the three by late 2024.
The default notice came October 29, 2024; the lawsuit November 19; the mass foreclosure July 1, 2025. Nothing exotic happened: short-maturity debt met insufficient cash flow, exactly as the instrument's terms provided.
Manager as Single Point of Failure, and the manager failed
Every series depended on Landa Holdings for management, rent collection, distribution declarations, filing compliance, and the app itself. The record shows what that concentration means in practice: when the manager hit distress, distributions stopped without notice (October 2024), a court had to remove it from 88 series (December 2024), three directors resigned in one day, audited reporting stopped entirely, the CEO went publicly silent from spring 2025, and filings degraded into copy-paste errors under a skeleton crew. The court-installed independent manager and CRO now control dispositions of the seized series, an arrangement that exists precisely because the structure had no internal mechanism for investors to replace a failing manager themselves.
Reserve-Funded Distributions Masking Vacancy: the dividend was not information
As early as 2022, 1-Us disclose distributions funded from reserves while tenants were not paying (accession 0001213900-22-062640), and by mid-2023 App 2's master tables footnote widespread vacancy and non-payment across its FL/AL/NC portfolio. A third-party filings analysis (CrowdfundedWealth: REPORTED, secondary source) put roughly 125 of 218 properties at zero cash and no distributions by mid-2023. The monthly dividend, the platform's core retail promise and the thing the app displayed, was therefore a managed output, not a signal of property performance, for a substantial part of the portfolio well before the stop.
No Independent Custody of the Story: one app, then darkness
The app was the sole channel for account balances, transaction history, distributions, and secondary trading; the transfer agent maintaining the share register was, from April 2024, a Landa affiliate. When the app went dark on April 5, 2025 (blamed on the 'platform's servers provider' in 1-Us filed across all four issuers), investors lost their only window into their own holdings, and it has not reopened in 16+ months. The SEC filing record survived because it lives on EDGAR, outside Landa's infrastructure.
Everything an investor could see, Landa hosted; everything that survived, Landa did not host. That asymmetry is the single most generalizable lesson in this record.
Affiliate Self-Dealing Web: conflicts that mattered when stress arrived
Affiliated management, lending, and transfer-agent functions are disclosed and legal, but the record shows how they behave under stress: the affiliated lender (Landa Financing) charged sibling series SOFR+3.5% and later 10% while reporting a serene NAV to its own investors; the Manager decided insurance on a series' property was 'no longer reasonable' and let it lapse; the Manager's renovation notes sat as claims against series assets; and the lenders allege (Landa disputes) that ~$724,000 was moved out of property accounts in violation of an injunction. Where every counterparty is an affiliate, the investor's protection is the manager's solvency and good faith; here the manager had plainly lost the operational and financing capacity needed to perform those functions.
Recovery Risk: Dissolutions Are Returning Zero
The documented base rate for investor recovery in series dissolutions is $0.00 per share; partial recoveries ($0.44-$1.39/share, or ~$22,775 on one series) are the exceptions, and the best multifamily outcome is an 89% loss counting dividends (~95% on capital alone). Since October 2026 the disposition 1-Us attach settlement statements; the statement's cash-to-seller line shows what reached the series at closing, and the 1-U's amount available for distribution shows what is announced for investors.
Why it matters
Sale prices in the dissolution 1-Us ($87,000-$162,000 per house; $252,444.16 for 996 Greenwood against a stated $1.07M senior mortgage) are being consumed by loan balances, arrears, and expenses before shareholders see anything. Holders of not-yet-dissolved series should calibrate to this filed record, not to the purchase price or the app's last displayed value. Some series show lifetime returns far below the offering price even including all dividends ever paid: 9439 Lakeview: $5.67 offering, $1.76 lifetime dividends, $0.00 at dissolution.
Mitigation / verification
Look up your series in the issuer's EDGAR filing index (CIKs 1815103, 1875877, 1886606, 1965132) and read every 1-U naming it. Dissolution filings state sale price, distribution amount, and per-share recovery. For contested properties (Leeward Lane, the Brooklyn buildings), outcomes depend on active litigation and are genuinely unresolved.
Information Blackout: You Cannot See Your Account
The app and website have been inaccessible since April 5, 2025. BBB complainants through July 2026 report being locked out 'over a year' and unable to recover funds. There is no investor portal, statement stream, or support channel that demonstrably functions.
Why it matters
Investors cannot verify holdings, cash balances, or transaction history from the platform. The affiliated transfer agent's records are not independently accessible. Any uninvested cash held on-platform when withdrawals froze is in an undisclosed state: no filing addresses it. Practically, an investor's evidence of ownership is whatever confirmations, statements, and tax documents they saved before April 2025.
Mitigation / verification
Assemble your own record now: account confirmations, distribution emails, tax forms, bank records of deposits. File a complaint with the SEC (sec.gov/tcr), your state securities regulator, and the BBB: complaint records are how enforcement interest accretes. Track the two dockets (N.Y. Index No. 659157/2024; E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939) for any process that reaches shareholders.
Reporting Risk: Nothing Since FY2022/FY2023 Is Audited
All four issuers are delinquent on Form 1-K annual reports, the two largest for three consecutive fiscal years, so no audited financial statements exist covering the collapse. The continuing 1-Us are unaudited event reports produced by a diminished team.
Why it matters
Every number in the unwind (sale prices, payoff amounts, per-share recoveries, the Financing NAV) is management-reported without audit. The 1-U record itself contains internal inconsistencies (the 996 Greenwood senior mortgage is stated as $1.3M in June 2024 and $1.07M in June 2026) and visible drafting errors. Reported secondhand: auditors had raised substantial-doubt going-concern language in earlier filings. AltStreet has not independently verified this against the primary documents, and for the delinquent years there are no audited statements in which it could appear.
Mitigation / verification
Treat as-filed figures as claims, not findings. Where a dissolution figure matters to you (e.g., for a loss deduction), retain the 1-U itself as documentation and note its unaudited character. The 39 as-filed financial rows in AltStreet's database stop where the issuers' audited reporting stopped.
Litigation Risk: Key Outcomes Are Contested in Two Courts
The Viola Credit / L Finance case (N.Y. Index No. 659157/2024) remains open as of a February 2026 docket update, with a Landa countersuit; Allison Lending's UCC seizure of the App 3 Brooklyn series is contested in E.D.N.Y. (1:25-cv-01939), where Landa denies signing the settlement stipulation and seeks vacatur; and Landa characterizes at least one foreclosure (1007 Leeward Lane) as wrongful.
Why it matters
For contested properties, who owns what, including whether a lender validly seized an entire borrower series, is unresolved. Litigation could marginally improve recoveries (unwound foreclosures, damages) or consume remaining value in fees. The lenders' $724,000 account-drain allegation, if ever adjudicated against Landa, would also bear on manager-conduct claims, but as of the scan it is an allegation Landa disputes, nothing more.
Mitigation / verification
Follow the dockets via Trellis/UniCourt (N.Y.) and PACER (E.D.N.Y.). Investors in the specific Brooklyn and contested-foreclosure series have the most at stake in these outcomes; a class or derivative vehicle did not exist as of the 2026-08-20 scan (individual complaints only).
Landa Financing NAV Reliability
The Financing fund's filed NAV moved only ~2% net ($7.26 → $6.71 → $7.10) across a period in which its borrowers, sibling Landa series, were defaulting, being foreclosed, and dissolving, and after the fund sold loans at a discount for cash.
Why it matters
A lender whose borrower base is in documented collapse reporting an essentially flat NAV, with no impairment discussion in any filing and its annual report now delinquent, presents an unvalidated valuation. Financing series holders should not assume the $7.10 reported NAV is equivalent to realizable liquidation value; it is a management mark on affiliate loans to distressed affiliates.
Mitigation / verification
Read the Financing 1-Us (CIK 1965132) directly, including the November 2024 discounted loan sale ($671K face for $604,605.60), and note that the FY2025 1-K that would have carried audited loan-book values was never filed.
Biggest Misconceptions & What Actually Happens
- The platform being 'not shut down' is a legal statement, not an operational one: no bankruptcy, no dissolution of the manager, but also no app, no distributions, no trading, and a portfolio in liquidation.
- 'Receivership' in press coverage is shorthand: formally it is a court-ordered independent manager (Anna Phillips) and CRO (B. Riley / John Sordillo) over the lender-collateral series, per the December 2024 orders and February 2025 agreement.
- The $724,000 account-drain figure is a lender allegation in active litigation that Landa disputes; no court finding on it was located.
- Going-concern audit language is REPORTED at secondary level only (third-party filing reviews); it has not been verified against primary documents in this review.
- The 2019 SEC subpoena investigation was closed in November 2020 with no action recommended: it is part of the record, not part of the collapse.
- No SEC or state enforcement action, delinquent-filer order, or Reg A suspension against any Landa entity was located as of 2026-08-20, despite the confirmed 1-K delinquencies (scan-scoped negative).
Regulatory & Legal Posture
Security Status
Regulation A (Tier 2) Series-LLC Equity Offerings: Four SEC-Reporting Issuers, All Delinquent on Annual Reports, Portfolio Substantially Under Court-Ordered Independent Management
Landa's offerings were made under Regulation A Tier 2, which permits raises of up to $75 million per issuer per year from retail investors ('qualified purchasers' in Reg A's usage: no accreditation required, with investment limits for non-accredited investors), in exchange for an SEC-qualified offering circular (Form 1-A) and ongoing reporting: audited annual reports (Form 1-K), semiannual reports (1-SA), and current event reports (1-U), plus Form 253G supplements to the offering circular, which in Landa's practice were largely the mechanism for adding new properties and series to the shelf. The regime worked as designed on the way up (422 filings across the four issuers sit in AltStreet's database) and half-failed on the way down: as of 2026-08-20, Landa App LLC and App 2 LLC last filed 1-Ks for FY2022 (filed May 2023, three consecutive missed annual reports each), App 3 for FY2023, and Landa Financing for FY2024 with its FY2025 report past due, while all four issuers continued filing 1-Us into September 2026. Enforcement history: the manager received an SEC Division of Enforcement subpoena in December 2019; the SEC closed that investigation in November 2020 stating it did not intend to recommend enforcement action (disclosed in the Form 1-A, accession 0001213900-20-040323).
No filed SEC enforcement action, administrative proceeding, delinquent-filer order, or Reg A suspension against any Landa entity was located as of the 2026-08-20 scan (via SEC enforcement and administrative-proceeding coverage, the issuers' EDGAR histories, and state-regulator search), nor was any bankruptcy petition or investor class action; this is a scan-scoped negative, not a clean bill. The operative legal process is private litigation: Viola Credit GL I, L.P., Viola Credit ALF II, L.P. and L Finance LLC v. Landa Holdings, Inc. et al.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Commercial Division, Index No. 659157/2024, Judge Jennifer G. Schecter, filed Nov 19-20, 2024, alleging defaults on $35M+ in loans), which produced the November 26, 2024 TRO and December 12, 2024 order removing Landa as manager of 88 borrower series, a preliminary injunction, the February 4, 2025 turnover of 119 properties to independent manager Anna Phillips with B. Riley Financial as CRO, a March 2025 denial of Landa's own injunction with ~$100,000 in costs ordered, and a Landa countersuit, the case remaining open as of February 2026.
A second front, Allison Lending, LLC v. Landa App 3 LLC (E.D.N.Y. No. 1:25-cv-01939, filed April 8, 2025), contests the lender's claimed UCC-sale seizure of the Brooklyn borrower series itself, with deeds to the three buildings recorded to the lender's affiliate in early 2026 and Landa seeking vacatur.
Disclosure Quality
Split verdict. The 1-U stream is genuinely informative: court orders, foreclosure dates and prices, insider loan terms, and per-share dissolution recoveries (including the $0.00 outcomes) are disclosed with specificity, which is why this review can exist. Against that: the audited layer is gone (no 1-K from the two largest issuers since FY2022); the platform's own investor-facing channel has been dark since April 2025, so the disclosures that exist are practically unreachable for the $5 retail investors they nominally serve; material events were disclosed by omission rather than statement (distributions stopped with no suspension filing; the secondary-market freeze was never filed at all); adverse facts surface in odd places (a board resignation buried in a dividend 1-U); the filings carry visible errors ('Marcg 3rd, 2026,' misdated signatures, mislabeled tables) and at least one internal inconsistency on a senior loan balance ($1.3M vs $1.07M for the same mortgage); and the live site's 'temporarily paused; we'll share updates as soon as offerings reopen' framing is not reconciled to a filed record that is exclusively liquidation. Disclosure adequate to reconstruct the collapse after the fact is not the same as disclosure that informed investors while it happened.
Custody Model
Affiliated Transfer Agent + Dark Platform + Split Control (Court-Appointed Independent Manager over Seized Series)
Regulatory Backing
Share ownership is recorded by Landa Transfer Agent LLC, an affiliate that replaced Securitize LLC in April 2024, so the register survives the app in principle, but investors have no demonstrated independent access to it while the platform is dark. Property-level control is split: the 88 lender-collateral series (119 properties per the February 2025 agreement) are administered by court-installed independent manager Anna Phillips with B. Riley Advisory Services, who now conduct and distribute proceeds of those dispositions; remaining series are still Landa-managed. Investor cash balances held on-platform when deposits/withdrawals froze are in an undisclosed state: no filing addresses platform cash custody, and BBB complainants report being unable to recover funds. There is no SIPC coverage, no trust between investor and issuer, and no independent custodian anywhere in the structure; a shareholder's claim is an equity interest in a specific series whose assets are, in most documented cases, exhausted by secured debt before equity sees anything.
Tax Treatment
Reporting
Form 1099 per Landa's help-center materials; forms actually issued per series and year not independently verified
Landa's help-center materials describe investor tax reporting through Form 1099: its tax articles are framed around the 1099, not the K-1 (landa.app/help-center, captured August 2026). But AltStreet did not independently verify the exact forms issued to investors for each series or year. Tax documents were delivered through the app, the same channel that has been dark since April 5, 2025. Whether tax documents for 2024 or 2025 were issued at all could not be verified for this review, and no filing addresses it. Investors should retain every historical tax document and distribution record they hold; reconstructing basis and distribution history may otherwise require the issuers' EDGAR record and personal bank statements.
Income Character
Historically: distribution income on series shares; prospectively: capital-loss characterization questions on dissolved and worthless series
During operations (2021-2024), investors received monthly cash distributions declared per series, styled 'dividends' in Landa's filings, plus any gains or losses on in-app secondary trades. The live tax question now runs the other way: most Landa investors' economic event is a loss. Dissolution distributions (mostly $0.00 in the documented record, occasionally partial) close out specific series; a dissolution 1-U stating a final distribution can be important documentary evidence when a tax adviser evaluates whether a loss is recognizable for that tax year, and in what character. For series that are frozen but not yet dissolved, worthlessness determinations are facts-and-circumstances questions that generally look for an identifiable event, which is why tracking your series on EDGAR has direct tax value even before you sit down with an adviser.
Limitation
AltStreet did not independently verify Landa's entity tax classifications or the exact forms issued to investors for each series and year, and platform support is non-functional, so nothing here should substitute for a tax adviser's review of your own documents. Losses on securities of this type may generally be capital in character (useful against capital gains but limited against ordinary income by the annual net capital-loss cap), but treatment depends on the investor's basis, transaction history, and the specific series' final disposition. Investors who cannot retrieve cost-basis records from the dark platform should assemble bank records of deposits and any saved confirmations before filing anything.
Special Considerations
- A series dissolution 1-U stating a final distribution (including $0.00) is documentary support for a loss deduction in that tax year. Retain the filing itself, not just a summary.
- Frozen-but-undissolved series present a worthlessness judgment call; premature claims risk disallowance, late claims risk missing the year. Professional advice is genuinely warranted here.
- Distribution income received 2021-2024 was generally reportable in the years received even though the capital that generated it has since been substantially lost; whether and how the subsequent losses offset anything runs through the loss-recognition rules, not through any retroactive adjustment of prior-year income, a question for an adviser with the investor's own records.
- If tax documents for 2024-2025 were never issued, investors remain responsible for reporting distributions actually received (bank records are the fallback source).
- Any eventual litigation recovery (from the countersuit, wrongful-foreclosure claims, or vacatur of the Brooklyn seizure) would have its own tax character in the year received.
- State filing obligations from multi-state property series (GA/FL/AL/NC/NY) were historically handled at the series level; no current information exists on whether that continues.
Account Suitability
Taxable
The only account type most Landa investors used, and the only context in which the loss documentation above applies. The practical work is evidence assembly: deposits, distributions, confirmations, and the dissolution 1-Us for your series.
Roth IRA
Not applicable in practice: Landa accounts were individual platform accounts, and losses inside an IRA would in any case be non-deductible. Any investor who somehow holds Landa shares in a self-directed IRA faces a custodian-valuation problem (the custodian must value an illiquid, frozen, likely-worthless position annually) and should engage the custodian directly.
Traditional IRA
Same as Roth: not applicable in practice; custodian valuation of a frozen position is the operative issue if such a holding exists.
HSA
Not applicable: no evidence Landa positions were ever accessible to HSA custodians.
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AltStreet Data Layer
What the data actually shows
AltStreet ingested 422 EDGAR filings across Landa's four Reg A issuers, extracted 39 as-filed financial rows, and read the complete 258-filing Form 1-U record. These are the findings that matter, for Landa's investors and for anyone evaluating a per-property platform.
Series dissolutions are mostly returning $0.00 to investors
The dissolution 1-Us state per-series outcomes: 1741 Park Lane sold for $162,000, investors received $0.00; 593 Country Lane ($87,000), 729 Winter Lane ($102,000), and 7349 Exeter Court ($135,000) likewise returned $0.00, with proceeds consumed by liabilities 'as required by the settlement'; the 2026 bulk dissolutions (7 series, then 12) were mostly $0.00. Partial recoveries are the exceptions: $22,774.90 on 1246 Elgin Way ($135,000 sale), $1.20/share on 773 Villa Way, and $3.65-$7.31/share on the Summerwoods homes against ~$3.58-$4.76 offering prices.
What this means
For holders of not-yet-dissolved series, this is the documented base rate. Sale proceeds at these price points ($87,000-$162,000 per house) are exhausted by secured debt and expenses before equity; the offering price and the app's last displayed value have no bearing on recovery. Read your series' own dissolution filing when it appears: it will state your number.
996 Greenwood: $24.20 in, $1.39 out, a ~95% loss, arithmetic included
App 3's Atlanta building raised roughly $592,000+ at $24.20 per share. In August 2025 the series took a $140,000 second mortgage from Mazz Georgia LLC at closing-day speed to cancel a foreclosure; in June 2026 Mazz foreclosed on that junior note, the building sold for $252,444.16 against a stated $1.07M senior mortgage, and investors received a dissolution distribution of $1.39 per share ($11,094.46 total). Lifetime dividends were $1.27 per share. Total return: $2.66 on $24.20, a loss of roughly 89% including dividends, ~95% on capital alone.
What this means
This is the fullest single-series accounting in the record and the honest benchmark for 'what did Landa investors get back': even on a property that avoided the first foreclosure and was among the larger raises, leverage senior to equity consumed nearly everything. Note also the filing inconsistency: the same senior mortgage is stated at $1.3M in June 2024 and $1.07M in June 2026, a reminder that these unaudited figures carry error bars.
The affiliated lender's NAV barely moved while its borrowers were foreclosed
Landa Financing LLC's filed NAV series runs $7.26 (9/30/24) → $6.71 (7/18/25) → $6.81 → $6.87 → $6.98 → $7.10 (6/30/26), a 7.6% peak-to-trough dip that recovers to within ~2% of its start. Its loan book is loans to sibling Landa series, the same series that were defaulting, taking 0% CEO rescue loans, and being foreclosed across that exact period. The fund sold six intercompany mortgages at a discount ($671K face for $604,605.60) in November 2024, and no 1-U ever addresses loan-book impairment. Its FY2025 audited report, the document that would test these marks, is delinquent.
What this means
AltStreet flags this as an unexplained incongruity, not an accounting finding: there may be an explanation (seniority, collateral coverage), but none has been filed. Financing series holders should treat $7.10 as an unvalidated management mark on affiliate loans to distressed affiliates, and the missing audit as the tell.
The as-filed financials were always small, and they stop in 2022-2023
AltStreet's 39 financial-history rows capture the issuers as-filed: for FY2023, Landa App 3's last audited year, its 1-K reports a net loss of $896,287, and its June 2024 offering-circular financials for the same period put total assets at $14.7M; Landa App LLC reported total assets of $5,729,647 in its December 2022 offering-circular financials, and its FY2022 1-K showed revenue of $655,485 with net income of $20,432, roughly break-even at its peak. Its final financial statement of any kind, the H1-2024 semiannual filed late in January 2025, reported revenue of $1,086,116 against a net loss of $1,790,012, losing more than it earned in the half-year before the platform froze. App LLC and App 2 never filed another 1-K after FY2022, App 3 after FY2023. For context, the company announced $33M in venture funding in 2022; the issuers' as-filed asset bases were a fraction of the ambient scale narrative.
What this means
Two lessons: the platform's economic substance was smaller than its press profile, and the audit trail ends before the collapse begins: every number in the 2024-26 unwind is management-reported. When a Reg A issuer's annual reports stop while its event reports continue, the delinquency itself is the signal.
Selective delinquency: the liquidation log continues, the audits stopped
Verified from data.sec.gov submissions (2026-08-20): Landa App LLC last filed a 1-K on 2023-05-10 (FY2022) and App 2 on 2023-05-03 (FY2022), three consecutive missed annual reports each; App 3 last filed 2024-06-03 (FY2023); Landa Financing last filed 2025-05-01 (FY2024), with FY2025 past due since ~April 2026. Meanwhile all four issuers filed 1-U event reports through July 2026 (App LLC's latest: 2026-07-23), and no SEC delinquent-filer order or Reg A suspension was located despite the confirmed delinquencies.
What this means
The issuers retained exactly the reporting that documents the unwind (and costs no audit fee) and dropped the reporting that would have required an auditor to opine on going concern and loan balances. Investors get a chronicle without accounts. The absence of regulatory response to date is a fact worth knowing, not a comfort.
The collapse was visible in filing cadence before any announcement
Dividend declaration 1-Us stop abruptly at 2024-10-16 (App LLC/App 2) and 2024-09-05 (App 3) with no suspension filing. Annual 1-U volume at App LLC falls from 34 (2023) to 19 (2024) to 17 (2025); App 3 filed only 5 in all of 2025, every one adverse. Inter-filing gaps stretch to 131 days (App 2), 142-146 days (Financing). From December 2024 forward, essentially every filing across all four issuers is litigation, foreclosure, insider lending, or dissolution.
What this means
For any Reg A holding: monitor the filing cadence itself, not just filing contents. Distributions that stop appearing, event reports that turn uniformly adverse, and lengthening gaps are the machine-readable signature of distress, visible here a full five months before the app went dark.
The filings themselves degraded into skeleton-crew artifacts
The 2025-26 1-Us contain a foreclosure misdated 'Marcg 3rd, 2026,' wrong series names in loan tables, a 2025 filing signed with a 2024 date, mislabeled property rows, and a $230K internal inconsistency on a senior mortgage balance. Signatures shift from CEO Yishai Cohen (publicly silent since spring 2025) to COO Sammiya Mujtaba from March 2026; the registered office moved to 996 Greenwood Ave NE, Atlanta per the April 2026 cover page.
What this means
Document quality is operational telemetry. The entity producing the only remaining investor disclosure is demonstrably thinly staffed, which bounds how much precision to attribute to any figure in the unwind, and underscores why investors should preserve their own records rather than rely on anyone else's.
Data as of 2026-08-20 . AltStreet review evidence layer . Public-source analysis
Full datasetAltStreet Weekly
This reconstruction runs on AltStreet's filing database
422 filings across four issuer CIKs, 39 as-filed financial rows, and a complete 258-filing 1-U ledger, the same data layer that covers 100+ alternative investment platforms, including the operating comparables to Landa's model.
So What?
What to take from this, whether or not you ever held Landa shares.
What this means
The app was the single point of failure for information, not just for investing
What to do
Landa's app was the sole channel for account balances, distributions, and secondary trading. When it went down, investors lost not just liquidity but visibility. On any platform, know your issuer's SEC CIK and confirm you can reconstruct your position from filings and your own records: if the platform's site is the only place your investment exists, that is a risk in itself.
What this means
Micro-offerings on levered thin-cash-flow houses have no shock absorber
What to do
A series that raised $40,000 against a house with a hard-money loan at 11.5% has no reserves that matter. When distributions are being paid from reserves while tenants are not paying (which Landa's own 2022-23 filings footnote), the dividend is telling you nothing about the asset. Read where distributions actually come from, not whether they arrive.
What this means
Affiliate structures multiplied points of conflict at exactly the wrong time
What to do
Landa's manager, property manager, lender (Landa Financing), and, from April 2024, transfer agent were all affiliates. When the group hit distress, the affiliate lender kept reporting a placid ~$7 NAV while its borrower base was foreclosed. Prefer structures where the lender, transfer agent, and manager are not the same economic family.
What this means
'No enforcement action' is not the same as 'fine'
What to do
As of AltStreet's 2026-08-20 scan, no SEC or state enforcement action against Landa was located, while four issuers sit years delinquent on audited reports and investors absorb near-total losses. Regulatory silence is not a safety signal; the filing record, litigation docket, and complaint volume are where the actual condition shows.
Decision Fit
Investor Fit
Who this works for, who it does not, and what level of patience and complexity tolerance the platform really demands.
Prospective New Investors
There is nothing to evaluate as an investment: no offerings, no deposits, no functioning platform. Any pitch, message, or site suggesting you can currently invest through Landa contradicts the platform's own footer and filing record and should be treated as a red flag in itself. Investors who wanted what Landa sold, low-minimum fractional rental exposure, should read this record as due-diligence education and evaluate operating alternatives on the specific failure axes documented here: property-level leverage, manager concentration, affiliate services, and where the reporting channel lives.
Existing Landa Shareholders
Fit is not a choice here: you hold what you hold. The productive posture is evidence assembly and monitoring: identify your series, read its 1-Us on EDGAR (the four CIKs in this review), preserve every record predating the April 2025 blackout, calibrate recovery expectations to the filed base rate (mostly $0.00; partial in a minority), file complaints with the SEC and your state regulator so the record accretes, and take the dissolution filings to a tax adviser. Holders in the contested Brooklyn series and disputed foreclosures have live litigation outcomes to track.
Investors in Landa Financing LLC (the 'Lend' NAV series)
The filed ~$7 NAV should not be assumed equivalent to realizable liquidation value: the fund's borrowers are sibling Landa series in documented foreclosure and dissolution, no filing addresses impairment, the fund sold loans at a discount for cash in November 2024, and the FY2025 audited report that would have tested the loan book was never filed. Financing holders should monitor CIK 1965132 directly and treat the NAV as an unvalidated management mark.
Diligence Analysts and Researchers
As a case study, the Landa record is unusually complete: a full Reg A filing arc from qualification through collapse, with the leverage trigger (December 2023 Kiavi refinancing), the structural warning signs (reserve-funded distributions, affiliate substitution), the failure sequence, and per-series terminal outcomes all in primary documents. The 258-filing 1-U ledger is the reference dataset for how per-property micro-offering structures behave when the manager fails.
Tradeoffs
Key Tradeoffs
The attraction of pre-IPO access is real, but every benefit comes bundled with a corresponding liquidity, transparency, or pricing cost.
Radical Access vs. Radical Fragility
The $5 minimum and per-house offerings genuinely opened real estate to people no other structure reached, and did it by making every position a concentrated bet on one thin-cash-flow house carrying hard-money-priced debt, with a total raise too small to fund any reserve that mattered. The access was real; so was the fragility, and the filings disclosed both for anyone who read them.
Series Segregation vs. Group Failure
The series-LLC architecture did what it says on the tin: each house's debts, foreclosure, and dissolution are being handled separately, and no series' investors are formally liable for another's. But segregation is protection against a neighbor's failure, not against your own manager's, and every series shared one manager, one lender-affiliate, one transfer agent, and one app. When the shared layer failed, segregation just meant 200+ small failures instead of one large one.
Disclosure That Survives vs. Disclosure That Reaches
Regulation A's reporting regime is why this collapse is documentable: the 1-Us kept coming even as the company hollowed out. But the disclosures reached EDGAR, not investors: the channel investors actually used went dark, distributions stopped by omission rather than announcement, and the audited layer stopped entirely. The regime preserved the record and still failed the audience it exists for.
'Not Shut Down' vs. Not Operating
Landa's formal continuity (no bankruptcy, no enforcement action located, filings ongoing, 'temporarily paused' messaging) preserves optionality for the company and its litigation posture. For investors it has meant the worst of both states: none of the finality and process of a bankruptcy (no trustee, no claims process, no creditors' committee for equity holders) and none of the function of an operating platform. The unwind is happening anyway, piecemeal, at foreclosure speed.
Avoid
Who This Is Not For
This section should be read as a filter, not an afterthought. If you need income, simplicity, or near-term access to capital, the structure is working against you.
Anyone Trying to Invest Money Today
The platform accepts no deposits and lists no offerings: its own footer says so. There is no current investment decision to get right or wrong; there is only the record.
Income Investors Evaluating the 'Monthly Dividend' Model
Landa's monthly dividends stopped in October 2024 and were, per the filings, partly reserve-funded even in 2022-23. The model's income promise failed structurally, not incidentally: rent minus 8% management fees minus 11.5% hard-money interest was negative for much of the book.
Holders Expecting the App's Last Balance To Be Real
The dissolution record, mostly $0.00 per share, supersedes whatever valuation the app displayed before April 2025. Share prices on a frozen internal market with no bids are not values.
Investors Reading 'No Enforcement Action' as Vindication
The absence of located enforcement (scan-scoped, 2026-08-20) coexists with three years of missed audited reports, a court-ordered management removal, hundreds of complaints, and near-total documented losses. Regulatory silence is a fact about regulators' dockets, not about investor outcomes.
Anyone Offered Landa Shares Privately
With the platform dark, the transfer agent affiliated and unreachable, and most series resolving to $0.00, any private offer to sell you Landa shares, or to 'help recover' your investment for a fee, should be treated as a probable recovery scam. Recovery-fraud targeting of collapsed-platform investors is a well-documented pattern.
Editorial View
AltStreet Perspective
The compressed version of the review: what matters, what marketing tends to obscure, and how we would frame the platform for a serious allocator.
Verdict
Landa is what it looks like when a real company builds a fragile structure and the structure fails: not a fraud finding (no regulator has acted, and the 2019-2020 SEC investigation closed without action), but a documented collapse in which the platform's three promises to retail investors (monthly income, liquidity, professional management) all failed, in that order, with the failure disclosed to EDGAR while the investors' own window went dark. The filings that remain read as a liquidation log: a court order removing the manager from 88 series, 17 houses lost in a day, a CEO wiring four-figure rescue loans at 0%, and dissolution after dissolution returning $0.00 to the people who put in $5 at a time. The facts do not need adjectives. What they need is to be findable, which is the purpose of this review.
Positioning
AltStreet reconstructed the collapse from all 258 Form 1-U filings across Landa's four Reg A issuers, the court dockets, and the company's own site, because no platform-side account of events exists. For existing shareholders, this review is a map to the primary record: your series' CIK, its dissolution filing if one exists, the two active court cases, and the complaint channels that make the record visible to regulators. For everyone else, it is a case study in the specific failure modes (micro-scale leverage, manager concentration, affiliate everything, single-channel reporting) to test any operating platform against.
The Bottom Line
A $5 real-estate app that is now a filing stream documenting its own liquidation: non-operational for 16+ months, substantially court-controlled, and returning $0.00 in most series dissolutions.
Action
Next Steps
If you still want to engage after reading the review, these are the practical next moves that reduce avoidable mistakes.
If you hold Landa shares: identify your series name(s) and search each issuer's EDGAR filing index (CIKs 1815103, 1875877, 1886606, 1965132) for 1-Us naming your series: dissolution filings state your per-share recovery.
Preserve every record predating April 2025: account confirmations, distribution notices, tax documents, and bank statements showing deposits. The app is not a source you can rely on recovering.
File complaints with the SEC (sec.gov/tcr), your state securities regulator, and the BBB. Individual complaints are currently the only investor-side record accreting; no class action existed as of the 2026-08-20 scan.
Track the two dockets: Viola Credit/L Finance v.
Landa Holdings, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Index No. 659157/2024 (Trellis/UniCourt), and Allison Lending v. Landa App 3, E.D.N.Y. No. 1:25-cv-01939 (PACER), especially if you hold Brooklyn or contested-foreclosure series.
Take dissolution 1-Us for your series to a tax adviser to evaluate capital-loss claims; for frozen-but-undissolved series, discuss the worthlessness timing question specifically.
Treat any unsolicited offer to buy your shares or 'recover your funds' for an upfront fee as a probable scam: collapsed-platform investors are standard recovery-fraud targets.
If you are evaluating operating fractional real estate platforms: test them against this record: property-level leverage and maturities, manager concentration, affiliate services (especially transfer agent and lender), and whether your ownership record and reporting exist anywhere outside the platform's own app.
Final Answer
What this means for your decision.
Finding
The platform is non-operational and cannot accept your money
Meaning
The app and website have been down since April 5, 2025 (16+ months as of this review) behind a message blaming the platform's 'servers provider.' The site footer states there are no active offerings and that deposits and secondary trading are 'temporarily paused.' There is nothing to buy, and existing investors cannot see their accounts.
Action
If you are researching Landa as a place to invest: it is not one, and this review's job is documentation, not a buy/avoid verdict. If you hold Landa shares, your information channel is now SEC EDGAR (the four issuer CIKs listed in this review), not the app.
Finding
A court removed Landa as manager of 88 property series in December 2024
Meaning
After Landa defaulted on $35 million-plus in bridge loans, lender L Finance LLC (with Viola Credit funds) sued in New York (Index No. 659157/2024) and obtained orders installing Anna Phillips as independent manager of 88 borrower series, with B. Riley Financial engaged for restructuring. Landa agreed in February 2025 to turn over control of 119 properties. Much of the portfolio's disposition is no longer in Landa's hands.
Action
Understand who controls the series you own. Dissolution 1-Us since December 2025 state that proceeds are distributed by 'the Independent Manager, Anna Phillips and B. Riley Advisory Services'. Read your series' specific filings on EDGAR to see whether it is lender-controlled, foreclosed, sold, or dissolved.
Finding
Series dissolutions have mostly returned $0.00 to investors
Meaning
The 1-U record shows sale proceeds overwhelmingly consumed by liabilities: 1741 Park Lane sold for $162,000 and investors received nothing; 593 Country Lane, 729 Winter Lane, and 7349 Exeter Court likewise returned $0.00. Among the dissolution outcomes AltStreet identified in the reviewed 1-U record, the only recoveries are partial: 996 Greenwood investors paid $24.20 per share and received a $1.39 per share dissolution distribution, an 89% loss counting lifetime dividends of $1.27 per share (about 95% on the dissolution payment alone), with the Summerwoods homes the rare roughly-break-even exceptions.
Action
Set expectations from the filed record, not the app's last displayed balance. If your series has been dissolved, the dissolution 1-U states your per-share recovery; if it has not, the pattern above is the base rate so far. Discuss capital-loss documentation with a tax adviser.
Finding
Audited reporting stopped while event reports continued
Meaning
Landa App LLC and Landa App 2 LLC last filed audited annual reports (Form 1-K) for fiscal 2022; Landa App 3 for fiscal 2023; Landa Financing for fiscal 2024, with its FY2025 report also past due as of 2026-08-20. Yet all four issuers kept filing Form 1-U event reports into September 2026. The delinquency is selective: the unaudited liquidation log continues while the audited accounts stopped.
Action
Treat every post-2022/2023 financial claim about these issuers as unaudited. The 1-Us are the only current disclosure, and they are themselves visibly degraded (misdated, mislabeled, error-ridden), consistent with a skeleton crew.
If you read nothing else
Landa was a real product with a real flaw at its center: $30,000-$60,000 micro-offerings on individual rental houses, levered with short-fuse hard-money and affiliate bridge debt, generating a few hundred dollars a month per house, until a December 2023 refinancing at 11.5% with 12-month maturities met 2024, the distributions stopped, the lender sued, the court took the keys, and the app went dark. No SEC or state enforcement action against Landa was located as of the 2026-08-20 scan, and the company is not formally bankrupt, but 'not shut down' here means a portfolio being foreclosed and dissolved series by series, mostly at $0.00 to investors, disclosed through error-ridden filings on a channel most retail investors will never read. This review exists so the record is readable.
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Deal Intelligence →Appendix
Sources, Disclosures, and Supporting Context
The lower section is structured like a report appendix: relationship context first, adjacent reading second, and evidence last.
Report Appendix
Disclosure
Relationship and compensation context
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Report Appendix
Disclosure
Relationship and compensation context
Report Appendix
Related Resources
Adjacent platform comparisons, frameworks, and category links
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Report Appendix
Related Resources
Adjacent platform comparisons, frameworks, and category links
Further Reading
Related Resources
Adjacent frameworks and reviews that help place the platform in a broader allocation or due-diligence context.
Fund Landscape
Similar Platform Reviews
- Arrived
The closest operating comparable: per-property Reg A rental-home shares at low minimums, the model Landa ran, with materially different leverage discipline. Read the two records together.
- Groundfloor
Retail real estate exposure from the lender's side of the table, with full loan-level performance history published, the disclosure standard Landa's investors never had.
- Fundrise
Diversified fund structures rather than single-house series, the design answer to the concentration risk that made every Landa series a standalone casualty.
Report Appendix
Related Coverage
AltStreet newsroom articles on Landa filings and disclosures
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Report Appendix
Related Coverage
AltStreet newsroom articles on Landa filings and disclosures
- Landa Lost Both Bids to Stop the Brooklyn Foreclosure, and the Court Named Three Kings County Cases Its Filings Do Not MentionNov 17, 2026
In Allison Lending v. Landa App 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939), the court denied Landa's restraining order in November 2025 and a magistrate judge recommended denying a second bid in February 2026, after the lender said it had bought the 1363 Hancock Street series at a UCC auction. Entries since September 2026 record an accepted offer of judgment, a substituted party and an application for a writ; those documents are not in the public archive and are reported by label only.
- Six Landa Home Sales Show $86,933 in Seller Proceeds, $11,360 Available for Final DistributionsOct 20, 2026
Landa App LLC and Landa App 2 LLC reported six single-family sales on October 20, 2026. Four series report no final liquidation distribution and two report $0.44 and $0.70 a share available; the filings do not reconcile the seller proceeds on the attached settlement statements with those amounts.
- Landa Forecloses Again, and This Time the Filing Does Not Say What Investors GetSep 18, 2026
Landa App 3 told the SEC on September 16 that 6696 Mableton Parkway in Georgia was sold at a foreclosure sale on September 1 after a bridge loan matured unpaid, and that the series will be dissolved with all units canceled. Unlike the dissolution it filed three months earlier, this one names no lender, states no sale price and discloses no distribution. It is at least the 44th Landa series to lose its property since January 2025.
- What Is SEC Form 1-U? Three Landa App 3 Filings on One Atlanta House, ExplainedSep 8, 2026
Form 1-U is the current report Regulation A Tier 2 issuers file within four business days of a specified event. Three 2026 filings by Landa App 3 LLC about one Atlanta property show why the form is read in sequence, not one at a time.
- A $95 Loan to Save a House: Landa's SEC Filings Chronicle the Endgame of a $5 Real Estate AppAug 20, 2026
Landa sold fractional shares of rental homes for as little as $5. Its app has been dark since April 2025 — but its SEC event reports keep publishing, and this summer they read like a liquidation ledger: emergency affiliate loans as small as $95 at 10% interest, a twelve-series sale wave in which most investors received nothing, and a foreclosure that turned $24.20 shares into a $1.39 payout.
Report Appendix
SEC Filers Behind Landa
The largest issuers linked to Landa on EDGAR, by total reported sold; each page carries the filing record and the related persons
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Report Appendix
SEC Filers Behind Landa
The largest issuers linked to Landa on EDGAR, by total reported sold; each page carries the filing record and the related persons
- Landa App LLC2020
- Landa App 2 LLC2021
- Landa App 3 LLC2022
- Landa Financing LLC2023
Report Appendix
Evidence & Methodology
67 cited passages on file; sources, scope, and how the review was assembled
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Report Appendix
Evidence & Methodology
67 cited passages on file; sources, scope, and how the review was assembled
Evidence on file
67 supporting passages on file for Landa and its offerings from 4 source documents, 6 discrepancies flagged. Each passage records the metric it supports, the value read from the document, the page, and the verbatim text where the document has it. Terminal subscribers read the passages; open them in the terminal.
- Cited passages
- 67
- Source documents
- 4
- Analyst verified
- 0
- Discrepancies flagged
- 6
ASReview Evidence
Methodology
Four primary sources. (1) SEC EDGAR census: 422 filings across Landa's four Regulation A issuers, Landa App LLC (CIK 1815103), Landa App 2 LLC (1875877), Landa App 3 LLC (1886606), Landa Financing LLC (1965132), ingested into AltStreet's database, with 39 as-filed financial-history rows extracted from 1-K/1-SA financial statements. (2) Complete Form 1-U ledger: all 258 current reports enumerated from the issuers' data.sec.gov submissions indexes (108 + 64 + 54 + 32); 75 primary documents read in full (every recent/material filing plus routine samples per issuer), the remaining ~183 routine filings (monthly dividend declarations, lease updates, master-series tables, title transfers) classified by filename pattern; zero fetch failures. (3) Legal/enforcement scan dated 2026-08-20: SEC enforcement, administrative-proceeding, and delinquent-filer coverage; state-regulator search; court dockets via Trellis and UniCourt (N.Y. Index No. 659157/2024) and case records for E.D.N.Y. No. 1:25-cv-01939; bankruptcy and class-action search; BBB and Trustpilot complaint records. (4) Site capture: 123 pages of landa.app scraped 2026-08-19, including business-model (fee schedule), about, terms, and legal pages. Measurement notes: recovery figures are as stated in unaudited dissolution 1-Us; the ~125-of-218 zero-cash-property figure is REPORTED from a third-party filings analysis and was not independently recomputed; the auditor going-concern language was verified directly on 2026-09-17 in the 2024 auditor-change Form 1-Us (accessions 0001815103-24-000004, 0001875877-24-000002, 0001886606-24-000043 and 0001886606-24-000046) and is quoted from them; the $724,000 account-drain figure is a disputed litigation allegation; and no audited financial statements exist for any issuer after FY2022 (App LLC/App 2), FY2023 (App 3), or FY2024 (Financing).
Scope
Filing-record, litigation, and site-state coverage of a non-operational platform. NOT covered: anything requiring platform access (account data, current share registers, on-platform cash balances; the app has been dark since April 5, 2025); audited financials for the collapse period (none exist: the issuers are delinquent); final litigation outcomes (both cases active); the manager Landa Holdings, Inc.'s own financial condition (not an SEC filer); and aggregate investor losses (no filing totals them; AltStreet's recovery table is assembled from individual dissolution 1-Us and is necessarily partial).
Key Findings
- *Legal/enforcement scan (2026-08-20): no filed SEC enforcement action, administrative proceeding, delinquent-filer order, state securities action, bankruptcy petition, or investor class action located against any Landa entity (scan-scoped negative: SEC enforcement/administrative coverage, EDGAR filing histories, docket and web search). Sole SEC enforcement contact: December 2019 subpoena, investigation closed November 2020 with no action recommended.
- *Form 1-U census: 258 filings across four issuers (Landa App LLC 108, App 2 64, App 3 54, Financing 32), spanning 2021-07-01 to 2026-07-23. Dividend cadence dies 2024-10-16 (App LLC/App 2) and 2024-09-05 (App 3); post-2024 filings are exclusively litigation, foreclosure, insider loans, and liquidation; inter-filing gaps stretch to 131-146 days in 2025-26.
- *Court-ordered management removal: Nov 26, 2024 TRO and Dec 12, 2024 order in Index No. 659157/2024 removed Landa Holdings as manager of 88 borrower series (87 GA + 1 FL) securing April 28, 2023 bridge loans from L Finance LLC; Feb 4, 2025 agreement ceded control of 119 properties; Anna Phillips independent manager, B. Riley Financial CRO (John Sordillo). Dissolution 1-Us from Dec 2025 confirm the Independent Manager and B. Riley Advisory Services distribute proceeds of seized-series dispositions.
- *Recovery ledger from dissolution 1-Us: 1246 Elgin Way sold $135,000 / investors $22,774.90 · 1741 Park Lane sold $162,000 / $0.00 · 593 Country Lane sold $87,000 / $0.00 · 729 Winter Lane sold $102,000 / $0.00 · 7349 Exeter Court sold $135,000 / $0.00 · 773 Villa Way sold $135,750 / $12,004.28 ($1.20/share) · 996 Greenwood foreclosure sale $252,444.16 / $1.39/share vs $24.20 offering ($11,094.46 total; 89% loss counting $1.27/share lifetime dividends, ~95% on capital alone) · 9439 Lakeview: $5.67 offering, $1.76 lifetime dividends, $0.00 at dissolution · best cases: Summerwoods homes at $3.65-$7.31/share vs ~$3.58-$4.76 offering prices · 2026 bulk dissolutions (7 series, then 12) mostly $0.00 · October 20, 2026 (six series sold August 20 to September 28 for $740,176.52): 8652 Ashley Way $4,376.10 ($0.44/share), 8653 Ashley Way $6,983.85 ($0.70/share), 8668 and 8667 Ashley Way, 157 Wells Road and 126 Wildwood Road $0.00; their settlement statements show $86,932.65 in seller proceeds at closing against $11,359.95 reported available for final distributions, a difference the filings do not itemize.
- *The leverage trigger: accession 0001815103-23-000035 (Dec 7, 2023): 15 series refinance with Kiavi at 11.5%, ~$122K-$171K each, all maturing 12/1/2024. Mass foreclosure of 17 homes July 1, 2025 (0001815103-25-000011) after the debt matured unpaid and buyer Roots terminated 10 PSAs the day before the sales; 800 Mills Drive foreclosed Aug 5, 2025 on the same pattern.
- *Insider rescue loans: June 2025 1-Us (0001815103-25-000010, 0001875877-25-000003) disclose CEO Yishai Cohen personally lending ~50 App LLC series and 7 App 2 series $3,000-$21,650 each at 0% on 30-day terms (~$500K and ~$112K total) 'to avoid events of default and pending foreclosure actions' after no third-party financing could be found.
- *Affiliate web formation: first affiliate refinance from Landa Financing at SOFR+3.5% and a property insurance lapse the Manager deemed 'no longer reasonable' (0001815103-24-000009, Mar 2024) · transfer agent switched from Securitize LLC to affiliated Landa Transfer Agent LLC (0001815103-24-000011, Apr 2024) · Airbnb pivot (Sep 2024) · auditor change from Morison Cogen to Stephano Slack (Oct 2024) · Financing sells 6 intercompany mortgages (face ~$671K) for $604,605.60 (Nov 2024) · 10% affiliate micro-loans of $3K-$10K per series continuing through July 2026.
- *Landa Financing NAV incongruity: filed NAV series $7.26 (9/30/24) → $6.71 (7/18/25) → $6.81 → $6.87 → $6.98 → $7.10 (6/30/26), a ~2% net round trip while the fund's borrower base (sibling Landa series) was being foreclosed and dissolved; no 1-U addresses loan-book impairment; FY2025 1-K delinquent.
- *Reporting delinquency (data.sec.gov, verified 2026-08-20): 1-K last filed: App LLC 2023-05-10 (FY2022), App 2 2023-05-03 (FY2022), App 3 2024-06-03 (FY2023), Financing 2025-05-01 (FY2024, FY2025 past due); 1-SA last filed 2025-01-03 / 2024-11-19 / 2024-10-01 / 2026-02-11 respectively; 1-Us continue at all four issuers through July 2026.
- *Platform blackout: 1-Us filed 2025-04-09 across all four issuers disclose the app/website down since April 5, 2025, blamed on the 'platform's servers provider,' warning 'investors may face difficulties viewing their accounts online.' CEO Cohen told TechCrunch (Apr 18, 2025) the company was 'actively working to restore full functionality'; TechCrunch confirmed the portal still down May 23, 2025; the site footer still reads 'temporarily paused' in the August 2026 capture. 347 BBB complaints in three years; May-July 2026 complainants report being locked out 'over a year' (user reports).
- *Contested seizures: Allison Lending v. Landa App 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939, filed 2025-04-08). Lender claims it seized the Brooklyn borrower series via UCC sale and recorded deeds transferring all three buildings to its own affiliate (0001886606-26-000001, Feb 2026); Landa denies signing the settlement stipulation and seeks vacatur. Landa also characterizes the March 3, 2026 foreclosure of 1007 Leeward Lane as wrongful (0001815103-26-000005, a filing that misdates the sale 'Marcg 3rd, 2026').
- *Disputed allegation (labeled): lenders' late-January 2025 filing alleged Landa drained ~$724,000 from property accounts in violation of the preliminary injunction and redirected tenant rents to new accounts (Bisnow, TechCrunch). Landa disputes the allegations through counsel; no court finding on the claim was located.
- *Filing-quality degradation as evidence: 'Marcg 3rd, 2026' date, wrong series names in loan tables, a 2025 filing signed with a 2024 date, mislabeled property rows, an internal inconsistency on the 996 Greenwood senior mortgage ($1.3M in 0001886606-24-000014 vs $1.07M in 0001886606-26-000003), and signatory shift from CEO Cohen to COO Sammiya Mujtaba (March 2026 onward). Cohen has made no located public statement since spring 2025.
AltStreet Data Layer
AltStreet EDGAR census + 258-filing 1-U ledger + legal scan (four issuer CIKs, 2026-08-20)
AltStreet's Landa dataset is a filing census and collapse ledger, not a performance record: 422 EDGAR filings across the four issuer CIKs ingested into the platform database, 39 as-filed financial-history rows extracted from the (pre-delinquency) 1-K/1-SA statements, and a complete 258-filing Form 1-U ledger. Investor recovery figures are transcribed from unaudited dissolution 1-Us. Because the issuers stopped filing audited reports, no audited financial data exists for FY2023 onward at the two largest issuers, and this dataset cannot state aggregate investor losses, only the per-series outcomes the filings disclose.
- Filings ingested: 422 across CIKs 1815103 / 1875877 / 1886606 / 1965132 · financial-history rows: 39 · Form 1-Us: 258 (108 + 64 + 54 + 32), 2021-07-01 → 2026-07-23
- As-filed scale: Landa App 3 FY2023 (its last audited year): net loss $896,287 per the 1-K; total assets $14,724,989 per the June 2024 offering-circular financials for the same period · Landa App LLC: total assets $5,729,647 per the Dec 2022 offering-circular financials (1-A POS); its FY2022 1-K reported revenue $655,485, net income $20,432 · App LLC's final, late-filed 1-SA (H1-2024, filed Jan 2025): revenue $1,086,116 against a net loss of $1,790,012, the last financial statement it ever filed
- Last dividend declarations: 2024-10-16 (App LLC, 0001815103-24-000023 · App 2, -000024) · 2024-09-05 (App 3, 0001886606-24-000036) · none since; no suspension notice ever filed
- 1-K delinquency: App LLC & App 2 last FY2022 (filed May 2023; 3 consecutive missed) · App 3 last FY2023 · Financing last FY2024, FY2025 past due, while 1-Us continue at all four issuers
- Court control: 88 series removed from Landa Dec 12, 2024 (TRO Nov 26) · 119 properties ceded Feb 4, 2025 · independent manager Anna Phillips + B. Riley CRO
- Foreclosures: 17 homes in one day (Jul 1, 2025) · 800 Mills (Aug 5, 2025) · three more Feb 3, 2026 after a rejected short sale · 996 Greenwood (Jun 2, 2026) · 1007 Leeward (Mar 3, 2026, contested as wrongful) · Brooklyn buildings deeded to lender affiliate (Feb 2026, contested)
- Recovery table (dissolution 1-Us): mostly $0.00/share · partials: $22,774.90 (1246 Elgin) · $1.20/share (773 Villa) · $1.39/share vs $24.20 offering (996 Greenwood, ~95% loss) · best: $3.65-$7.31/share Summerwoods vs ~$3.58-$4.76 offering
- Insider loans: CEO 0% loans of $3,000-$21,650 per series (~$500K App LLC + ~$112K App 2, Jun 2025) · Landa Financing micro-loans at 10% ($3K-$10K/series) through Jul 2026
- Financing NAV series: $7.26 (9/30/24) → $6.71 (7/18/25) → $7.10 (6/30/26), ~2% net move against a foreclosed borrower base; no impairment disclosure
- Legal scan (2026-08-20): no SEC/state enforcement, delinquent-filer order, bankruptcy, or class action located (scan-scoped) · 2019 SEC investigation closed 2020, no action · active: N.Y. 659157/2024 (open as of Feb 2026) + E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939
- Complaints: 347 BBB complaints in 3 years (user reports) · platform dark since 2025-04-05 · site footer 'temporarily paused' as of Aug 2026 capture
Source: SEC EDGAR (four issuer CIKs) + Trellis/UniCourt dockets + BBB complaint record + landa.app capture + AltStreet platform database, August 2026
Primary Source Pages
Comparable Platforms
- Arrived
The operating version of Landa's model (per-property Reg A rental shares) and the review to read for how the same structure looks with conservative leverage.
- Groundfloor
Retail real estate with published loan-level performance, the transparency benchmark against which Landa's app-only reporting failed.
- Fundrise
Diversified fund structures, the design that does not put an investor's entire position behind one house's hard-money loan.
FAQ
Frequently Asked Questions
High-intent search questions answered directly, without making users hunt through the full review.
Is Landa still in business? What happened to Landa?
Landa exists as a legal entity but has not functioned as an investment platform since early 2025. The sequence, from SEC filings and court records: monthly distributions stopped after October 16, 2024 (no suspension was ever announced; the declaration filings simply stopped); its bridge lender declared default October 29, 2024 and sued November 19 over $35 million-plus in defaulted loans (Viola Credit/L Finance v. Landa Holdings, N.Y. Index No. 659157/2024); a court removed Landa as manager of 88 property series on December 12, 2024, and Landa agreed in February 2025 to turn over control of 119 properties to an independent manager (Anna Phillips) with B. Riley Financial handling restructuring; the app and website went dark on April 5, 2025 (blamed on a server provider) and have not returned; and since mid-2025 the properties have been foreclosed or sold and the series dissolved, mostly returning $0.00 to investors. Landa has not filed for bankruptcy and continues filing SEC event reports, which now function as a liquidation log.
Is Landa legit or a scam?
Neither label fits cleanly, and precision matters here. Landa was a genuine SEC-reporting operation: real properties, qualified Regulation A offerings across four issuers, real (small) monthly distributions from 2021 to October 2024, and filings that disclose adverse events with specificity. No SEC or state enforcement action against any Landa entity was located as of AltStreet's 2026-08-20 scan, and a 2019 SEC investigation closed in 2020 with no action recommended. But 'not a scam' is not 'a good investment that hit bad luck': the structure levered thin-cash-flow houses with 11.5% hard-money debt and affiliate bridge loans, paid distributions partly from reserves while tenants were not paying (per its own filings), and failed on all three of its retail promises: income, liquidity, and management. Investors are absorbing near-total losses through a collapse that was structural, documented, and disclosed mostly after the fact.
My money is stuck in Landa. Can I get it back?
Honestly: the documented outcomes are poor, and no general recovery mechanism exists. For invested positions, recovery comes series by series: when your series' property is sold or foreclosed and the series dissolved, a Form 1-U states your per-share distribution, and in most documented cases that figure is $0.00 (partial recoveries like $1.20-$1.39 per share are the exceptions). For cash balances held on-platform when deposits and withdrawals froze, no filing addresses their status; BBB complainants through July 2026 report being unable to recover funds. Practical steps: find your series' filings on EDGAR (CIKs 1815103, 1875877, 1886606, 1965132); preserve all records predating April 2025; file complaints with the SEC (sec.gov/tcr) and your state securities regulator; track the two active court cases; and take dissolution filings to a tax adviser for loss documentation. Be alert to recovery scams: anyone charging an upfront fee to 'get your Landa money back' is almost certainly fraudulent.
Why did Landa stop paying dividends?
The filings never say directly (the declarations just stopped after October 16, 2024), but the record supplies the answer. Landa's houses generated thin cash flow (a few hundred dollars per series per month at best), and by 2022-23 its own filings disclose distributions funded from reserves while tenants were not paying, plus widespread vacancy footnotes. Above that cash flow sat debt: a December 2023 refinancing of 15 series with hard-money lender Kiavi at 11.5% interest maturing December 1, 2024, and bridge loans from L Finance LLC secured by 88 series' homes. The lender's default notice came October 29, 2024, thirteen days after the last dividend declaration. The distributions stopped because the cash was gone and the creditors were first in line; everything since (the lawsuit, the court orders, the foreclosures, the $0.00 dissolutions) is that priority playing out.
Who controls Landa's properties now?
It depends on the series. The 88 'borrower series' whose homes secured the defaulted bridge loans were removed from Landa's management by court order in December 2024, and under a February 2025 agreement Landa turned over control of 119 properties; those are administered by court-installed independent manager Anna Phillips with B. Riley Advisory Services (John Sordillo as chief restructuring officer), and dissolution filings confirm they, not Landa, distribute proceeds from those sales. Other properties have been taken by lenders directly: 17 homes went at foreclosure on July 1, 2025 alone, and in Brooklyn, lender Allison Lending claims it seized the App 3 borrower series itself through a UCC sale and recorded deeds to its own affiliate, a seizure Landa is contesting in federal court (E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939). The remainder are still Landa-managed and being sold or dissolved by the manager. Your series' own 1-U filings identify which regime applies.
What happens to my shares when a Landa series is dissolved?
The property is sold (voluntarily or at foreclosure), the proceeds pay the series' secured debt, arrears, and expenses first, and whatever remains, usually nothing, is distributed to shareholders, after which the series is dissolved and the shares cease to exist. The dissolution 1-U states the sale price and your per-share distribution. Documented examples: 1741 Park Lane sold for $162,000 and shareholders received $0.00; 996 Greenwood shareholders received $1.39 per share against a $24.20 offering price. A dissolution filing showing a final distribution (including $0.00) is also the cleanest documentation for claiming a capital loss on those shares. Retain it and consult a tax adviser about the timing.
Did the SEC take any action against Landa?
Not as of AltStreet's 2026-08-20 scan. The record contains one prior SEC contact: in December 2019 the SEC's Division of Enforcement subpoenaed the manager for documents about Landa Holdings and Landa Properties LLC, and in November 2020 it wrote that it had concluded the investigation and did not intend to recommend enforcement action, disclosed in Landa's own Form 1-A. Since then, no filed SEC enforcement action, administrative proceeding, or delinquent-filer order against any Landa entity was located, despite all four issuers being delinquent on audited annual reports (the two largest since FY2022), nor was any state securities action, bankruptcy, or investor class action. Note the phrasing: this is what a scan of enforcement coverage, EDGAR histories, and dockets found as of that date, not a certification that nothing is pending non-publicly. The active legal proceedings are private lender suits, not regulatory ones.
What were Landa's fees?
Per the fee schedule still posted at landa.app/business-model: a property management fee of up to 8% of gross rent (8% for single-family homes, 5% for multifamily), charged only while a property is leased; a one-time acquisition fee of up to 6% of the property purchase cost; and up to $2 per instant deposit or withdrawal. Beyond the posted schedule, the filings show additional affiliate economics: renovation notes owed by series to the Manager at 4.5%, and loans from affiliated Landa Financing to sibling series at SOFR+3.5% and later 10%. On houses renting for $800-$2,200 a month, the management fee alone consumed a meaningful share of the cash flow that was supposed to become investor distributions.
What is Landa Financing LLC and is it affected?
Landa Financing LLC ('Lend,' CIK 1965132) is the group's fourth Reg A issuer, a NAV-priced fund that made mortgage loans, increasingly to sibling Landa series as outside credit withdrew. It is affected in the most direct way possible: its borrowers are the same series that defaulted, took 0% rescue loans from the CEO, and were foreclosed. Yet its filed NAV moved only about 2% net across the collapse, $7.26 (9/30/24) to $6.71 (7/18/25) back to $7.10 (6/30/26), with no filing ever addressing loan-book impairment, a November 2024 sale of six intercompany mortgages at a discount for cash, and its FY2025 audited annual report now delinquent. AltStreet flags the NAV as an unvalidated management mark; Financing investors should read the fund's own 1-Us and treat the missing audit as the most informative fact.
What should investors learn from Landa's collapse?
Four transferable lessons. First, leverage placement: Landa's investors held equity behind property-level hard-money debt at 11.5% with 12-month maturities: when cash flow is thin, that structure hands the asset to the lender on schedule, and $5 minimums do not change the seniority stack. Second, distributions are not information: Landa paid monthly dividends partly from reserves while tenants weren't paying, per its own footnotes. Read where distributions come from. Third, affiliate concentration: manager, property manager, lender, and transfer agent in one family means no independent party holds any part of your investment's machinery when the family fails. Fourth, and most generalizable, reporting-channel risk: the app was the only place investors could see their accounts, and it has been dark for 16+ months, while the SEC filings on EDGAR survived. Before investing on any platform, know your issuer's CIK and confirm your position is reconstructable from records the platform does not control.
Update History
What's changed in this Landa review
New data, new findings, corrections, and confirmations as they emerge. Most recent updates appear first.
- New finding
E.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-01939 DOCKET READ (CourtListener, 80 entries through 2026-11-09): default entered 2025-07-23 (ECF 28); default-judgment motion 2025-08-13 (ECF 30); first appearance, answer, motion to stay and TRO application 2025-11-10 (ECF 34-36); TRO denied 2025-11-16 (ECF 37, Komitee, J.); preliminary injunction denied at hearing 2025-11-20 (minute entry per ECF 52); second TRO/PI motion 2026-01-23 (ECF 45); argument 2026-02-02; R&R recommending denial 2026-02-10 (ECF 52, Henry, M.J.), which states the payment default date as on or around 2024-11-01 and that Landa learned of the UCC sale in September 2025; second R&R 2026-02-26 (ECF 53, label only); settlement conferences 2026-02-11 and 02-27; notice of acceptance with offer of judgment 2026-09-23 (ECF 58); corporate disclosure statement, substitute attorney, substitute party 2026-10-28 (ECF 59-61); application for writ 2026-11-02 (ECF 63) and reassignment (ECF 64); responses in opposition to motion 2026-11-03 to 11-09 (ECF 65-70). Documents in RECAP: ECF 1, 37, 52 only. Three Kings County actions named in ECF 52: 514059/2025 (132 Cornelia), 507903/2025 (24 Ditmars), 541931/2025 (1363 Hancock fee title); not pulled. View section
