DiversyFund vs Groundfloor 2026
One sells $10 claims tied to individual renovation loans that ordinarily repay inside 18 months. The other sold roughly 30,000 people equity in a multifamily REIT with no redemption plan, stopped distributing in 2021, and is now closed. This guide compares them on primary sources: Groundfloor's Regulation A+ offering circular and annual report, 1,934 extracted loan records, and DiversyFund's Regulation A annual reports, SEC orders and private placement memoranda.
Guide Thesis
Neither has a secondary market. Only one has a maturity.
A Groundfloor loan ordinarily matures in 6 to 18 months, though a default can extend it. A DiversyFund share has no redemption plan, no transfer venue, and no date at all.
Research by AltStreet · Primary-source review · Updated September 22, 2026 · Editorial policy
Most comparisons frame this as $10 against $500. The capital stack and the clock are what actually differ.
Groundfloor's loans carry a contractual maturity. DiversyFund's shares never had an exit at all.

The Core Decision
A claim on one loan's collections against equity with no exit.
Groundfloor asks you to underwrite one borrower on one house and pays you out of what it collects on that loan. Note the shape of the claim: the loan is secured by Groundfloor's lien on the property, but the security you buy is an unsecured, limited recourse obligation of Groundfloor itself. DiversyFund asked for none of that work and gave holders no mechanism to act on the outcome. For a non-accredited investor in 2026 the comparison is also academic on one side: Groundfloor takes $10, and DiversyFund's retail vehicles are closed.
Lowest Minimum
Groundfloor
$10 per individual LRO, open to non-accredited investors under Regulation A+. DiversyFund's retail vehicles are closed; its current products are accredited-only at minimums the site states as $100,000.
Has A Maturity
Groundfloor
The corresponding loans ordinarily run 6 to 18 months and the LRO terminates on repayment, though the circular warns a holder may have to hold for an indefinite period if the loan defaults. DiversyFund has never operated a redemption plan in any of its four vehicles.
Income Today
Groundfloor
LROs pay out of what Groundfloor collects on the loan; the filed note programs carried stated rates of 4.5% to 12.0% during 2025. DiversyFund's flagship stopped distributing after September 2021 and $1,100,471 declared in 2022 was still unpaid at December 31, 2025.
TL;DR
The comparison in two sentences
Groundfloor sells $10 Limited Recourse Obligations under Regulation A+, open to non-accredited investors: each corresponds to one renovation loan secured by Groundfloor's lien, pays out of what Groundfloor collects, has no secondary market, and ordinarily ends when the loan repays inside 6 to 18 months. DiversyFund's four retail vehicles took $83,444,368 from roughly 30,000 non-accredited investors at $10 a share, never operated a redemption plan of any kind, stopped distributing after September 2021, and are all now closed; what the company sells in 2026 is accredited-only at minimums it states as $100,000.
If you read nothing else: scroll to the head-to-head comparison sections →
Groundfloor suits
- → The lowest entry point in US real estate, $10 per loan, with no accreditation requirement
- → Short duration: the corresponding loans ordinarily repay in 6 to 18 months, without a redemption queue or a buyer
- → Someone who wants loan-level exposure tied to an underlying mortgage that sits ahead of borrower equity, while understanding that the investor's LRO is itself unsecured and limited recourse
- → Someone willing to sort a portfolio by address and borrower entity rather than trusting loan count
- → Tax-advantaged accounts, where 1099-OID ordinary interest is sheltered
DiversyFund suits
- → Nobody who is not accredited, because nothing is available to them
- → An accredited investor who has read the relevant memorandum in full, obtained the fee schedule in writing, and understands that the memorandum states no audit will be conducted
- → Researchers: the primary record is unusually complete, with eight years of Regulation A reports, two SEC administrative orders and a Regulation CF vehicle whose reporting has ended
74%
Groundfloor LROs in five states
Georgia 31.3%, Florida 24.9%, North Carolina 7.8%, Texas 7.3%, Tennessee 3.0%, across the 1,934 extracted records. Loan count is not geographic diversification.
14 LROs
One Charlotte property, two vintages
608 Ideal Way: 7 LROs in 2021 at 10%, 7 more in 2023 at 12%, same borrower, same address. Holding all 14 was one credit bet made twice.
Sept 2021
DiversyFund's last monthly distribution
28 consecutive months at a 5.00% annualized rate, then nothing. $1,100,471 declared in 2022 was still carried as unpaid at December 31, 2025.
Methodology, stated once up front: AltStreet indexed 2,741 LRO listings from Groundfloor's Project Qualification Amendments and extracted complete loan-level fields for 1,934 of them, representing 71% coverage of vintages 2020 to 2024. Every geographic, rate and borrower statistic on this page is computed on those 1,934 records. Figures described as current offerings come from the 19 LROs live in June 2026, and the borrower completion figures come from the 12 named borrowers behind those 19. The 2,741 figure is the size of the index, not a denominator for any percentage here.
Bottom Line Up Front
These are opposite sides of the capital stack, so in most comparisons the correct answer would be that both can be held together. Here it is not, because only one of them is available. Groundfloor takes $10 from a non-accredited investor today; all four DiversyFund retail vehicles are closed, and its current products require accreditation at minimums it states as $100,000.
For the roughly 30,000 people who already hold DiversyFund shares, the comparison is not actionable, and that is the most useful thing on this page. Moving requires selling, and there is nothing to sell into. Groundfloor addresses the specific problem DiversyFund created, because the corresponding loans have contractual maturities rather than an open-ended hold.
The mistake to avoid on each side is specific. On Groundfloor, do not assume twenty loans is twenty bets, and do not assume you hold the mortgage: check the addresses and the borrower names first, and read the LRO for what it is, an unsecured limited recourse claim on Groundfloor tied to one loan's collections. On DiversyFund, do not read the closed retail REITs and the current accredited offerings as the same business; they share a sponsor whose reported liabilities exceed its reported assets by $6,802,512.
Head to Head
DiversyFund vs Groundfloor, section by section
Owning the building against a claim on one loan's collections
DiversyFund vs Groundfloor: What You Actually Own
This is the difference that decides everything downstream, and the debt side is more limited than the shorthand suggests. DiversyFund raised capital into Regulation A REITs that bought and held multifamily projects: investors owned equity at $10 a share, the return was meant to be rent and appreciation with no contractual ceiling, and the position was junior to project debt. Groundfloor originates short-term renovation loans to small developers, and those loans are typically secured by a senior lien on the property. What the retail investor buys is one step removed: a Limited Recourse Obligation, which the offering circular describes as an unsecured special, limited obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. Holders have no security interest in the corresponding loan, in its proceeds, or in any asset of Groundfloor, its subsidiaries or the borrower, and the LRO is not an obligation of the borrower. Groundfloor holds the lien and pursues foreclosure; the investor's right is to a pro rata share of what Groundfloor actually collects. That is still a genuinely differentiated instrument, and arguably a more interesting one than the marketing shorthand implies, but it is not a secured lending position in the investor's hands.
| What the investor holds | Groundfloor: an unsecured Limited Recourse Obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. whose payments are tied to an identified borrower loan secured by Groundfloor's lien on the property. DiversyFund: common equity in a pooled REIT, junior to project debt; the flagship carried $47,514,872 of notes payable at December 31, 2025. |
|---|---|
| Who holds the lien | Groundfloor: Groundfloor Finance Inc. holds the senior lien on the property and pursues foreclosure. LRO holders have no security interest in the loan, its proceeds, or any asset of the company, its subsidiaries or the borrower. DiversyFund: not applicable; equity holders sit behind the project lenders. |
| Legal structure | Groundfloor: Regulation A+ qualified LROs issued by Groundfloor Finance Inc. (CIK 1588504), each loan qualified through a Project Qualification Amendment, with annual Form 1-K reporting. DiversyFund: three Regulation A Tier 2 REITs and one Regulation CF vehicle, with current offerings sold under Regulation D. |
| Return driver and ceiling | Groundfloor: the investor's pro rata share of loan payments Groundfloor actually receives, capped by the borrower's contract rate. DiversyFund: net operating income and property appreciation with no contractual ceiling, realized when buildings are sold. |
| If the issuer fails | Groundfloor: the circular states an LRO holder would have a general unsecured claim against the company that may or may not be limited in recovery to borrower payments on the corresponding loan. DiversyFund: the vehicles hold the properties directly; the sponsor's reported equity is negative $6,802,512. |
Verdict
These are different positions in the same capital stack, not competing versions of the same trade, and the Groundfloor side carries issuer risk on top of borrower risk. The relevant question is not which is better in the abstract but which one you can actually buy, and for a non-accredited investor in 2026 only Groundfloor answers that.
A contractual maturity against no maturity at all
DiversyFund vs Groundfloor: Liquidity and Holding Period
Neither platform offers a secondary market, and that shared fact hides the most important difference between them. Groundfloor has no venue to sell an LRO at any price, but the corresponding loans ordinarily mature in 6 to 18 months and the LRO terminates when the loan is repaid, so the position can unwind without needing a buyer or a manager's permission. That is an expected exit path rather than a guarantee: the offering circular warns that an investor may be required to hold for an indefinite period, and a default can extend the investment through foreclosure, workout or disposition well beyond the original term, with a cure window of up to two years. The effective period can also be shorter than the stated term, because the circular discloses that in most circumstances Groundfloor funds the loan first using its own credit facilities and then sells LROs to repay itself. DiversyFund has neither mechanism and no maturity. No redemption plan appears in any offering circular or annual report for any of the four vehicles, and AltStreet located no secondary market or transfer venue in any filing. The flagship's five-year term was extended twice to December 31, 2025, at which point it entered a winding up period it describes as 12 to 24 months or more.
| Exit mechanism | Groundfloor: none. No secondary market for LROs or the note programs. DiversyFund: none, in any of the four retail vehicles, at any point in their history. |
|---|---|
| Stated duration | Groundfloor: 6 to 18 months typical loan term; the LRO ordinarily terminates when the corresponding loan repays. DiversyFund: a five-year term extended twice, now a winding up period of 12 to 24 months or more, roughly eight years and counting. |
| How it can run longer | Groundfloor: a default can extend the investment through foreclosure, workout or disposition, with a cure window of up to two years, and the circular warns a holder may have to hold for an indefinite period. DiversyFund: there is no defined period to extend, because none was ever set for investor exit. |
| Worst realistic case | Groundfloor: the loan is not repaid, recovery runs 12 to 24 months or more, and because the LRO is unsecured and limited recourse any shortfall after Groundfloor's collections is the holder's. DiversyFund: the buildings sell for less than the debt and fees absorb the rest, and there was never a point at which you could have exited. |
Verdict
An asset with a contractual maturity is not the same as an asset you can sell, but for an investor who needs capital back it is a materially better position than one that offers neither. Groundfloor's failure mode is a defaulted loan working through a workout that can run past the stated term; DiversyFund's is an open-ended hold with no date attached.
A collections-dependent coupon against a distribution that stopped
DiversyFund vs Groundfloor: Income and Returns
Groundfloor produces interest, paid out of what it actually collects. Observed borrower contract rates across the 1,934 LRO records AltStreet extracted ran from 5.5% to 15.5%, averaging 12.26% on 2024-vintage loans against 9.92% in 2021 as the Fed hiking cycle passed through. Those are borrower contract rates, not investor returns: the LRO passes through the holder's pro rata share of loan payments received, so the realized figure is that rate less whatever is not collected. The rates are compensation for concentrated hard-money renovation credit risk plus the issuer risk of an unsecured claim, not evidence of a better investment. The note programs are separate instruments with their own filed rate ranges, set out below. DiversyFund is not currently producing income at all. Its flagship paid a monthly distribution at a 5.00% annualized rate for 28 consecutive months from June 2019 through September 2021, totaling $2,849,716, declared $4,982,436 in 2022 on the back of the only profitable year in its history, and has declared nothing since. Total declared across its life is $7,832,152 against $65,113,948 raised, or 12.0% of capital over seven years, much of it reinvested rather than paid in cash.
| Current income | Groundfloor: interest as the corresponding loan is repaid for LROs; stated rates of 6.0% to 12.0% on Groundfloor Notes and 4.5% to 10.5% on Stairs Notes during 2025. DiversyFund: none. The FY2025 annual report states the company made no distributions to investors during the year. |
|---|---|
| Observed loan rates | Groundfloor: borrower contract rates of 5.5% to 15.5%, averaging 12.26% on 2024 vintage and 9.92% in 2021, across the 1,934 extracted LRO records. DiversyFund: a 5.00% annualized distribution rate while it was paying, from June 2019 to September 2021. |
| What limits payment | Groundfloor: the company's obligation on an LRO is limited to the holder's pro rata share of loan payments it actually receives; a loan that stops performing stops paying. DiversyFund: the board simply stopped declaring; $1,100,471 declared in 2022 was still carried as dividends payable at December 31, 2025. |
| Can you compute a return | Groundfloor: at the loan level, from the contract rate and the repayment record, subject to collections. DiversyFund: no. No vehicle publishes a NAV per share or obtains an independent appraisal; AltStreet's arithmetic on reported equity and share counts implies roughly $4.12 to $7.37 of book equity per original $10 share for the three vehicles where it is calculable. |
Verdict
Compare a rate you can read in a loan document against a distribution history that ended four years ago. The correct comparison is not 12.26% against 5.00%; it is a collections-dependent coupon net of shortfalls against a REIT that stopped paying and still carries $1,100,471 of declared distributions as unpaid.
Credit risk you can underwrite against structural risk already realized
DiversyFund vs Groundfloor: Risk and Concentration
Groundfloor's risks are credit, concentration and structure, and the first two are measurable. Across the 1,934 LRO records AltStreet extracted, 74% sit in five Southeast states, with Georgia alone at 31.3% and Florida at 24.9%, because Groundfloor is Atlanta-headquartered and lends heavily in its home region. Single properties are routinely sliced into many LROs: 608 Ideal Way in Charlotte produced 7 LROs in 2021 at 10% and 7 more in 2023 at 12%, all to Charlotte Home Buyers LLC, so an investor holding all 14 held one credit relationship twice. Six borrowers each issued 10 or more loans, and Charlotte Home Buyers LLC alone accounts for $9.2 million across 20 LROs. Across the 19 offerings live in June 2026, borrower equity runs 0% to 30% with a median around 12%, and Groundfloor's own Skin-in-the-Game score rates most of those deals 2 out of 10. The structural risk sits on top: the LRO is unsecured and limited recourse, so the holder carries Groundfloor's performance as an issuer as well as the borrower's. DiversyFund's risks are structural too, and unlike Groundfloor's they have already materialized: DF Growth REIT II had its Regulation A exemption permanently suspended by settled SEC order, Value Add Growth REIT IV terminated after a compliance lapse and withdrew its replacement, Value Add Growth REIT III terminated its Regulation CF reporting obligation, and the sponsor's own balance sheet shows liabilities exceeding assets by $6,802,512.
| Geographic profile | Groundfloor: 74% of the 1,934 extracted LROs in five states, GA 31.3%, FL 24.9%, NC 7.8%, TX 7.3%, TN 3.0%. DiversyFund: ten multifamily positions held by the flagship at a cost of $59,679,847. |
|---|---|
| Hidden overlap | Groundfloor: 15 or more addresses carry five or more LRO slices; 608 Ideal Way produced 14 across two refinancing vintages to one borrower. DiversyFund: affiliated vehicles hold stakes in the same buildings, which is the only remaining visibility into REIT III now that its Regulation CF reporting has ended. |
| Borrower or sponsor quality | Groundfloor: across the 19 offerings live in June 2026, median borrower equity around 12%, rated 2 out of 10 on the platform's own Skin-in-the-Game score; across their 12 named borrowers, 103 prior loans funded, 36 repaid and 67 unresolved at that date. DiversyFund: sponsor revenue fell from $11,638,312 in 2022 to $94,760 in 2025, headcount from 14 to five, with reported equity of negative $6,802,512. |
| Regulatory record | Groundfloor: self-disclosed in the offering circular that $10.9 million of LROs sold to 12,468 retail purchasers were of dubious qualified status under a gap between offering qualification and the three-year continuous-offering rule; remediated. DiversyFund: Regulation A exemption permanently suspended at REIT II (Release 11204), a separate lapse and rescission at REIT IV, and periodic reports up to 342 days late. |
Verdict
Groundfloor asks you to underwrite credit risk you can see and check, and the work is real: sort a portfolio by address and by borrower entity before assuming twenty loans is twenty bets, and price the fact that your claim runs through Groundfloor rather than to the property. DiversyFund asked for none of that work and delivered outcomes an investor could not act on once they arrived.
Legacy DiversyFund vs DiversyFund today
Almost every published comparison of these two describes the middle column's predecessor: a $500 minimum, non-accredited Growth REIT. That product has been closed since 2024. The left column is what those pages describe, the middle is what the same company sells now, and the right is what Groundfloor offers today.
| Legacy DiversyFund (2016–2024) | DiversyFund today | Groundfloor today | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who can invest | Non-accredited, $500 minimum | Accredited only | Non-accredited, $10 per LRO |
| What you hold | A $10 common share in a pooled multifamily REIT | Fund units or notes sold under Regulation D | An unsecured Limited Recourse Obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc., corresponding to one identified loanOffering circular |
| Who holds the lien | The REIT owns the buildings; equity sits behind project debt1-K | Depends on the product; the secured notes are collateralized by litigation proceedsPPM | Groundfloor holds the senior lien on the property. LRO holders have no security interest in the loan, its proceeds or any company assetOffering circular |
| Duration | A five-year term extended twice; now winding up over 12 to 24 months or more | Fund and note terms set by the memorandum | 6 to 18 months typical; the LRO ordinarily terminates on repayment, and a default can extend it |
| Redemption | None, in any of the four vehicles, ever1-K | None. Units “are not expected to be freely transferable” | None, and no secondary market. Capital returns as the loan is repaid |
| Current income | 5.00% annualized monthly, June 2019 to September 2021, then nothing1-K | Target rates of 12% to 18% by class in the Distressed Income Fund memorandumPPM | LROs pay out of collections; the filed note programs carried stated rates of 4.5% to 12.0% during 2025FY2025 1-K |
| Reporting | Regulation A Form 1-K, filed up to 342 days late | Sponsor Reg CF reporting ended by Form C-TR on May 8, 2026C-TR | Regulation A+ qualification per loan, plus annual Form 1-K1-K |
Sources: DiversyFund vehicle Form 1-K and Form C-AR annual reports through FY2025 and the September 2026 private placement memoranda; Groundfloor's Regulation A+ offering circular of March 12, 2026 and its Form 1-K for FY2025. Full citations in AltStreet's DiversyFund review and Groundfloor review.
$10,000 in each, side by side
| Groundfloor | DiversyFund | |
|---|---|---|
| Can you actually do it | Yes. No accreditation required, and $10,000 is 1,000 times the individual LRO minimum. | No, unless you are accredited, and then $10,000 is below every stated minimum. The retail vehicles that took $500 are closed. |
| What you buy | Up to 1,000 separate $10 LROs, each an unsecured claim on Groundfloor tied to one identified loan, or one of the filed note programs. | Nothing currently on offer at this size. The closed REITs sold a $10 common share in a Regulation A vehicle that publishes no NAV per share. |
| Annual cost to you | No stated annual investor management fee. Groundfloor is compensated on the borrower side through origination of 2% to 6%, servicing of 0.5% to 2% and closing fees of $500 to $3,500. | The 2% fund-level fee was waived at DF Growth REIT. The economics were taken at the property: 6% to 8% of total project cost, capitalized into the building. |
| When you see the money again | As each corresponding loan is repaid, ordinarily 6 to 18 months, staggered across many loans. There is no way to sell early, and a default can push it well past the term. | When the underlying buildings are sold and proceeds work through the debt, the disposition fees and the sponsor's promote. There is no redemption plan. |
| Tax form in January | 1099-OID. Ordinary interest at your marginal rate, with no qualified-dividend or QBI treatment, and no K-1. | REIT distribution reporting while it was distributing. Nothing has been declared since 2022. |
| What actually goes wrong | A borrower stops paying, recovery runs 12 to 24 months or more, and because the LRO is unsecured and limited recourse any shortfall after Groundfloor's collections is yours. Or your twenty loans turn out to be five properties sliced twenty ways. | Distributions stop and stay stopped: $1,100,471 declared in 2022 was still unpaid at December 31, 2025, and there was never a point at which you could exit. |
Is Groundfloor debt or equity
Short answer
Debt, but not secured debt in the investor's hands. A Limited Recourse Obligation corresponds to one specific renovation loan on one identified property, and Groundfloor can foreclose on that property to recover principal. What the investor holds is an unsecured special, limited obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc.: the offering circular states that holders have no security interest in the corresponding loans or their proceeds, or in any assets of the company, its subsidiaries or the borrower, that the LROs are not secured by any collateral, and that payment is limited to the holder's pro rata share of loan payments actually received. DiversyFund sold the other side of the stack: a $10 common share in a Regulation A REIT, junior to the $47,514,872 of notes payable its flagship carried at the end of 2025. That is why a straight rate comparison between the two is misleading. A collections-dependent coupon on an unsecured claim and a residual equity interest are not the same instrument priced differently.
Groundfloor is a Regulation A+ issuer, which is a materially lighter regime than the Investment Company Act but a materially heavier one than the Regulation D exemption most accredited-only platforms use. Each loan is qualified individually through a Project Qualification Amendment, and the issuer files an annual Form 1-K. What that structure buys the investor is granularity no pooled fund offers: the address, the borrower entity, the after-repair value, the contract rate and the loan-to-value are all visible before committing $10.FY2025 1-K
What it does not buy is a lien. The offering circular is unusually direct about this, and it is worth setting out rather than paraphrasing loosely: the LROs are unsecured special, limited obligations of the company; holders do not have a security interest in the corresponding loans, in the proceeds of those loans, or in any assets of the company, its subsidiaries, the borrower or its principals; the LROs are not secured by any collateral and are not obligations of the borrowers; and the company's obligation to pay is limited to an amount equal to the holder's pro rata share of the loan payments it actually receives. In a bankruptcy of Groundfloor, the circular states a holder would have a general unsecured claim against the company that may or may not be limited in recovery to borrower payments on the corresponding loan.Offering circular
None of that makes the product worse than it looks so much as different from how it is usually described. The underlying mortgage does sit ahead of borrower equity, and Groundfloor does pursue foreclosure on the holder's economic behalf. But the investor carries Groundfloor's performance as an issuer in addition to the borrower's, and that second layer is the part the marketing shorthand leaves out.
One further detail deserves weight before assuming the stated loan term is the holding period. Per the offering circular, “in most circumstances” Groundfloor funds the underlying loan first using its own credit facilities and then sells LROs to repay itself. An investor is buying into a loan that has already closed and is partially seasoned, rather than committing capital to a pending one. That is operational reality rather than a defect, but it shortens the effective period without corresponding rate compensation, while a default can extend it well past the stated term.
DiversyFund's vehicles sat at the Regulation A tier too, which is exactly what made these two comparable in the first place, and their record shows what that tier does and does not guarantee. DF Growth REIT II had its Regulation A exemption permanently suspended by settled SEC order in June 2023, Value Add Growth REIT IV terminated after a compliance lapse and withdrew its replacement in February 2026, and Value Add Growth REIT III filed its final annual reportC-AR and terminated its Regulation CF reporting obligationC-TR on the same day in April 2025.
The note programs are a separate question
Groundfloor markets its fixed-term products under names like the Signature Note and a three-month note. Neither of those names, nor “Flywheel”, appears anywhere in the March 2026 offering circular or the FY2025 Form 1-K. What the filings describe are two distinct secured promissory note programs, issued against the assets of two different subsidiaries. Treating “Groundfloor Notes” as one marketing category obscures that, so the table below describes each as the filings do. Confirm which filed instrument a marketed product corresponds to before buying it.
| Instrument | Groundfloor Notes | Stairs Notes |
|---|---|---|
| How the filings describe it | Secured promissory notes, issued and secured by the assets of Groundfloor Real Estate 2 LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary | Secured promissory notes, issued and secured by the assets of Groundfloor Yield LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary, and also described as general obligations of the company |
| Collateral | First priority security interest in all the loan assets of Groundfloor Real Estate 2 LLC, subject to certain exceptions | First priority security interest in all the loan assets of Groundfloor Yield LLC, subject to certain exceptions |
| Stated rate, 2025 | 6.0% to 12.0% (2024: 1.0% to 11.5%) | 4.5% to 10.5% (2024: 4.0% to 10.25%) |
| Term | 30 days to 24 months | 30 days to 24 months |
| Principal outstanding at 12/31/2025 | $25,262,691 short term plus $17,097,769 long term | $88,367,928 short term, none long term |
| What the holder does not get | No claim on any individual underlying property; the security sits at the subsidiary level | Investors do not directly invest in loans held by the company; the security sits at the subsidiary level |
All figures from the Groundfloor Finance Inc. Form 1-K for FY2025, notes to the consolidated financial statements.FY2025 1-K Note that both note programs are secured at the subsidiary level, which is a stronger position than an LRO, whose holder has no security interest at all. That is the opposite of the usual assumption that the loan-specific product is the secured one.
If your DiversyFund money is locked up
It is not a lockup, because a lockup expires
There is no redemption plan in any of the four vehicles and never has been, no secondary market exists, and no filing AltStreet reviewed describes any transfer mechanism. There is no date on which the position becomes sellable. Moving to Groundfloor, or anywhere else, requires selling, and there is nothing to sell into. What you control is new money and your own information. Three things are worth doing.
- 1.Read the most recent Form 1-K for your vehicle, starting with the investments table, the liquidity discussion and the subsequent events note. DF Growth REIT's FY2025 report discloses a $2,500,000 loan taken in February 2026 at a fixed 12%.FY2025 1-K
- 2.Check the dividends payable line on the balance sheet. That is where the $1,100,471 declared in 2022 and never paid still sits, four years later.FY2025 1-K
- 3.Watch for Form 1-U filings. A sale of a significant asset must be reported there, and those sales are what will determine what a $10 share was worth. The one disposition on record, Cobble Hill in August 2024, returned about $5,287,240 against $6,519,548 invested.FY2025 1-K
If you hold Value Add Growth REIT III, note that it filed its final annual reportC-AR and terminated its Regulation CF reporting obligationC-TR on April 25, 2025. The only remaining visibility is indirect, through the affiliated vehicles that hold stakes in the same buildings.
The case against Groundfloor, stated properly
A comparison that only lists one side's problems is an advertisement. Groundfloor is the available option here, which makes stating its real weaknesses more important rather than less.
- You do not hold the lien.The instrument is an unsecured, limited recourse obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. Holders have no security interest in the corresponding loan, its proceeds, or any asset of the company or the borrower, and payment is capped at the holder's pro rata share of what Groundfloor actually collects. That is a second layer of risk on top of the borrower's, and it is the layer most retail descriptions omit.Offering circular
- The diversification is partly an illusion. AltStreet's extraction of 1,934 LRO records found 15 or more addresses carrying five or more separate LROs, through concurrent unit-slicing, fractional tranching of a single loan, and sequential refinancing of the same property years apart. At 608 Ideal Way in Charlotte, one borrower took 7 LROs in 2021 and 7 more in 2023. An investor holding all 14 believed they held 14 exposures and held one, twice.
- The geographic concentration is not prominent in consumer-facing marketing. 74% of the extracted LROs sit in five Southeast states, with Georgia at 31.3% and Florida at 24.9%. A correction concentrated in Sun Belt housing would impair a Groundfloor portfolio out of proportion to its loan count.
- Borrower equity is thin by the platform's own measure. Across the 19 offerings live in June 2026, borrower equity runs 0% to 30% with a median around 12%, and Groundfloor's own Skin-in-the-Game score rates most of those deals 2 out of 10. Across their 12 named borrowers, 103 prior Groundfloor loans had been funded, 36 repaid and 67 unresolved at that observation date, with 8 of the 12 showing no completed repayments. The filings do not break the 67 into still-active, extended and workout, so incomplete vintage seasoning accounts for an unknown share of the gap. This is platform-cycle completion on a young book, not a default rate.
- A maturity is an expected exit, not a guarantee. The offering circular warns that an investor may be required to hold an LRO for an indefinite period, and it permits a workout of up to two years. A default can extend the investment through foreclosure, workout or disposition, potentially well beyond the original term.
- It has its own regulatory disclosure.The offering circular discloses that $10.9 million of LROs sold to 12,468 retail purchasers were of dubious qualified status, because of a gap between offering qualification and the three-year continuous-offering rule. Groundfloor self-disclosed it and remediated it, and it belongs in any honest assessment of the platform's regulatory track record.
The distance between the two is still large, and it is about what an investor can do rather than about virtue. Groundfloor's worst case is a loan that is not repaid, disclosed before you commit $10, on a position with a stated term and a defined workout window, even if that window can run long. DiversyFund's worst case arrived while holders had no mechanism to respond to it.
The AltStreet Take
In most equity-against-debt comparisons the analytically correct answer is “both”, because the two sides of the capital stack diversify each other. This is the rare case where it is not, and the reason has nothing to do with quality. A non-accredited investor cannot buy DiversyFund at any price, because all four retail vehicles are closed, and an existing holder cannot sell it, because no redemption plan or transfer venue has ever existed.
Judged on its own terms rather than against a closed competitor, Groundfloor is a genuinely differentiated product, and the instrument is more structurally interesting than the marketing shorthand suggests. The $10 minimum and the loan-level visibility are things no pooled fund offers, and a contractual maturity is a real answer to the exact problem DiversyFund holders are living through. Against that, the investor holds an unsecured, limited recourse claim on Groundfloor rather than a lien on the house; 74% of the extracted loan book sits in five Southeast states; and median borrower equity is around 12% on deals the platform itself scores 2 out of 10. The higher headline rate is compensation for concentrated hard-money renovation credit risk plus that issuer layer, not evidence of a better investment.
Two findings should change behavior. Before assuming a Groundfloor portfolio is diversified, sort it by address and by borrower entity rather than by loan count. And before assuming a note is a note, check which filed instrument it is: the marketed product names do not appear in the filings, and the two programs that do are secured against two different subsidiaries. None of the DiversyFund record described here is a fraud finding. The SEC settled a narrow Regulation A matter with no fine and no finding of fraud and closed its investigation in August 2023 without recommending action against any entity or either founder.Release 11204 The shareholder suit was dismissed with prejudice in March 2026 with no class certified.FY2025 1-K The case against DiversyFund is about outcome, exit and duration, not about wrongdoing.
Frequently asked questions
Is Groundfloor better than DiversyFund?+
For anyone deciding where to put new money, the comparison resolves before you reach performance, because only one of the two will take it. Groundfloor is open to non-accredited investors at a $10 minimum under Regulation A+, with annual Form 1-K reporting and a 12-year operating history. All four DiversyFund retail vehicles are closed to new investment, and what the company markets in 2026 is accredited-only at minimums it states as $100,000. They are also not the same kind of investment, though the difference is not the one the marketing implies. DiversyFund sold equity in a pooled multifamily REIT. Groundfloor sells a Limited Recourse Obligation: an unsecured, special limited obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. whose payments are limited to the investor's pro rata share of what Groundfloor actually collects on one identified borrower loan. Groundfloor holds the lien on the property; the investor does not. Groundfloor's structural advantage here is not its rate and not a security interest, it is that the corresponding loan has a contractual maturity. DiversyFund's four vehicles never built a redemption plan at all.
What is the difference between Groundfloor and DiversyFund?+
They sit on opposite sides of the capital stack, but the investor's position on the debt side is more limited than it first appears. Groundfloor lends against real estate, and the loan it originates is typically secured by a senior lien on the property. What the retail investor buys is one step removed from that loan: a Limited Recourse Obligation, which the offering circular describes as an unsecured special, limited obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. Holders have no security interest in the corresponding loan, in its proceeds, or in any asset of Groundfloor, its subsidiaries or the borrower, and the LRO is not an obligation of the borrower. Payment is limited to the investor's pro rata share of loan payments Groundfloor actually receives. DiversyFund owned real estate: you held equity at $10 a share in a Regulation A REIT, your return was rent and appreciation with no contractual coupon, and there was no mechanism to get out at all. Three practical consequences follow. Access: Groundfloor takes $10 from anyone; DiversyFund's retail vehicles are closed and its current products are accredited-only. Duration: a Groundfloor loan has a contractual maturity, typically 6 to 18 months; DiversyFund extended its five-year term twice and is now in a winding up period it describes as 12 to 24 months or more. Tax: Groundfloor issues a 1099-OID for ordinary interest, and DiversyFund's REITs issued REIT distributions that largely stopped in 2021.
Is Groundfloor safer than DiversyFund?+
They fail in different ways, and neither is safe. Groundfloor's risks are credit, concentration and structure. These are hard-money loans on renovation projects; median borrower equity across the 19 current offerings is around 12% and Groundfloor's own Skin-in-the-Game score rates most of those deals 2 out of 10; and 74% of the LROs AltStreet extracted sit in five Southeast states, with Georgia alone at 31.3%. The structural piece is the one most easily missed: an LRO is unsecured and limited recourse. If the underlying loan is not repaid, the holder's claim is limited to what Groundfloor actually collects, and in a Groundfloor bankruptcy the offering circular states the holder would have a general unsecured claim against the company that may or may not be limited in recovery to borrower payments. DiversyFund's risks are structural too, but unlike Groundfloor's they have already materialized: distributions stopped in 2021 and $1,100,471 declared in 2022 was still unpaid at the end of 2025, one vehicle had its Regulation A exemption permanently suspended by settled SEC order, another terminated after a compliance lapse, a third terminated its Regulation CF reporting obligation, and the sponsor's own balance sheet shows liabilities exceeding assets by $6,802,512. The honest framing is that Groundfloor's risk is a loan that may not repay and an issuer standing between you and the collateral, and DiversyFund's is a position you cannot exit while you wait to find out what it was worth.
Which pays income sooner, Groundfloor or DiversyFund?+
Groundfloor, and it is not close in 2026. Groundfloor's LROs pay principal and interest as the corresponding loan is repaid, ordinarily within a 6 to 18 month term, and its note programs pay on stated schedules. DiversyFund's DF Growth REIT paid a monthly distribution at a 5.00% annualized rate for 28 consecutive months from June 2019 through September 2021, totaling $2,849,716, and then stopped. It declared $4,982,436 in 2022, funded by the only profitable year in its history, and $1,100,471 of that declaration was still carried as unpaid at December 31, 2025. Its FY2025 annual report states that during the year the company made no distributions to investors. No distribution is disclosed for any of the other three vehicles. Total declared across the flagship's life is $7,832,152 against $65,113,948 raised. The qualification on the Groundfloor side is that payment is not contractual in the ordinary sense: Groundfloor pays LRO holders only out of what it actually collects, so a loan that stops performing stops paying.
Does Groundfloor have better liquidity than DiversyFund?+
Yes, though not through the mechanism most people assume, and less absolutely than the platform's framing suggests. Groundfloor has no secondary market at all: there is no venue to sell an LRO to another investor at any price. What it has instead is short contractual duration. A 6 to 18 month loan ordinarily returns capital on repayment without needing a buyer, a redemption queue, or a manager's permission. That is an expected exit path rather than a guaranteed one; the offering circular warns in terms that an investor may be required to hold an LRO for an indefinite period, and a default can extend the investment through foreclosure, workout or disposition well beyond the original term. DiversyFund has neither mechanism and no maturity at all. No redemption plan appears in any offering circular or annual report for DF Growth REIT, DF Growth REIT II, Value Add Growth REIT III or Value Add Growth REIT IV, AltStreet located no secondary market or transfer venue in any filing, and the flagship's term was extended twice before it entered a winding up period of 12 to 24 months or more.
Is Groundfloor debt or equity?+
Debt, but not secured debt in the investor's hands, and the distinction is the single most important thing on this page. A Limited Recourse Obligation corresponds to one specific renovation loan on one identified property, and you can see the address, the borrower entity, the after-repair value, the contract rate and the loan-to-value before committing $10. What you hold, though, is an unsecured special, limited obligation of Groundfloor Finance Inc. The offering circular is explicit: holders of the LROs do not have a security interest in the corresponding loans or their proceeds, or in any assets of Groundfloor or its subsidiaries, or of any borrower; the LROs are not secured by any collateral; and they are not obligations of the borrowers. Groundfloor holds the senior lien and pursues foreclosure, and the investor's claim is to a pro rata share of what Groundfloor actually collects. The note programs are legally different again and are described separately below. DiversyFund sold the other side of the stack: a $10 common share in a Regulation A REIT, junior to the $47,514,872 of notes payable its flagship carried at the end of 2025.
Which platform has the shorter holding period?+
Groundfloor, by an order of magnitude, with an important caveat at each end. Groundfloor's renovation loans ordinarily run 6 to 18 months, and the LRO terminates when the corresponding loan is repaid. In practice the effective period is often shorter still, because the offering circular discloses that in most circumstances Groundfloor funds the underlying loan first using its own credit facilities and then sells LROs to repay itself, so an investor is buying into a loan that is already closed and partially seasoned, without corresponding rate compensation for that advance period. The caveat at the other end is that contractual maturity creates an expected exit path, not guaranteed repayment: a default can extend the investment through foreclosure, workout or disposition, and the circular warns that an investor may be required to hold for an indefinite period. DiversyFund's DF Growth REIT was sold with a five-year term that was extended twice to December 31, 2025, at which point it entered a winding up period it describes as 12 to 24 months or more, making the realistic holding period roughly eight years and still running with no distribution since 2022.
What happens if a Groundfloor loan defaults?+
Groundfloor, not the investor, holds the lien, so Groundfloor's remedy is to foreclose on the property and recover what the collateral yields, and the offering circular permits a workout period of up to two years before resolution. Recovery on a defaulted renovation loan commonly runs 12 to 24 months or longer, during which capital is tied up and earning nothing certain. The limit that matters is in the instrument's name. An LRO is an unsecured, limited recourse obligation: Groundfloor's obligation to pay is limited to the investor's pro rata share of what it actually collects on that loan, the holder has no security interest in the loan or the property, and if the collateral falls short the holder absorbs the loss. Two figures from AltStreet's extraction are worth weighing before assuming defaults are rare. Across the 12 named borrowers on the 19 LRO offerings live in June 2026, 103 prior Groundfloor loans had been funded and 36 repaid, with 8 of the 12 showing no completed repayments. The remaining 67 were unresolved at that observation date, meaning still active, extended or in workout; the filings do not break them out, so this is a measure of platform-cycle completion on a young book, not a default rate, and incomplete vintage seasoning accounts for an unknown share of it.
Can non-accredited investors use Groundfloor?+
Yes, and that is the central practical difference in this comparison. Groundfloor is qualified under Regulation A+, which permits sales to non-accredited investors, with a $10 minimum on individual LROs. Regulation A+ also carries obligations the lighter private exemptions do not: SEC qualification of each offering, ongoing offering circular updates, and annual Form 1-K disclosure. DiversyFund's retail vehicles were also Regulation A and also open to non-accredited investors, which is exactly what made them comparable, but all four are now closed. What DiversyFund sells in 2026 is sold under Regulation D to accredited investors only, at minimums its website states as $100,000 and its Distressed Income Fund memorandum sets at $1,000,000, $250,000 and $100,000 by class. A non-accredited investor comparing these two today has one option.
Which is better for passive income?+
Groundfloor, with two significant qualifications about what kind of income it is. Groundfloor produces interest: LROs pass through the investor's share of what Groundfloor collects on the corresponding loan, less any shortfall, and the note programs pay stated rates. It is reported on a 1099-OID as ordinary interest at your marginal rate, with no qualified-dividend or QBI treatment, which makes it comparatively better suited to a tax-advantaged account. It is also not passive in the sense investors usually mean: LROs mature constantly and capital has to be redeployed, and the diversification has to be constructed by checking addresses and borrower names rather than assumed from loan count. DiversyFund is not currently producing income at all. Its flagship paid a 5.00% annualized monthly distribution for 28 months through September 2021 and has declared nothing since 2022, with part of that final declaration still unpaid four years later.
What is the best alternative if my DiversyFund money is locked up?+
Start by understanding that it is not locked up in the sense of a lockup that expires. There is no redemption plan in any of the four DiversyFund vehicles and never has been, no secondary market exists, and no filing AltStreet reviewed describes any transfer mechanism, so there is no date on which the position becomes sellable. Moving to another platform requires selling, and there is nothing to sell into. What you actually control is new money, which can go anywhere, and your own information: read the Form 1-K for your vehicle each April and watch for Form 1-U filings, which is where a sale of a significant asset must be reported. For that new money, Groundfloor addresses the specific problem DiversyFund created, because the corresponding loans have contractual maturities rather than an open-ended hold, provided you accept that the LRO itself is unsecured and limited recourse. Fundrise is the closer structural replacement for pooled diversified real estate equity, at a $1,000 subscription minimum with a rationed quarterly repurchase program. Arrived and RealtyMogul are also open to comparison, and AltStreet reviews all four.
Full Platform Analysis: DiversyFund and Groundfloor
Each platform review is sourced from primary documents: Regulation A offering circulars and annual reports, SEC administrative orders, Project Qualification Amendments, extracted loan-level records, and private placement memoranda read in full. No marketing language, no affiliate framing.
DiversyFund Full Review
$83.4M from roughly 30,000 investors, four closed vehicles, the permanently suspended Regulation A exemption, and the two private placement memoranda behind the current offerings.
Groundfloor Full Review
1,934 extracted LRO records, the diversification illusion, 74% Southeast concentration, borrower completion rates, the loan advance program, and the note programs.
