Streitwise REIT Asks Holders to Approve a $7.00-a-Share Sale to a CEO-Linked Buyer Without a Market Check or a Fairness Opinion
The proxy for a December 16 vote shows 1st stREIT Office's board relied on Newmark appraisals of $73.075 million for its four buildings, solicited no competing bids, obtained no fairness opinion and formed no special committee. CEO Jeffrey Karsh recused himself; the two directors who approved the deal are a Tryperion employee and a friend of Karsh who consults for Tryperion. The buyer is 99.95% owned by a trust named for Karsh, with his father as trustee.
Key facts
10- Form 1-U filed November 10, 2026 (accession 0001104659-26-125197) discloses an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated November 9, 2026 with TH Abide LLC; the proxy statement for a virtual special meeting on December 16, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. Pacific is Exhibit 6.1. Record date November 9, 2026; 1,798,167 shares outstanding and entitled to vote; approval requires a majority of all outstanding shares, so an abstention or a non-vote counts against; no dissenters' or appraisal rights.
- Each share converts into $7.00 in cash. TH Abide is 99.95% owned by the Jeffrey Karsh Trust UAD 11/9/2016, whose trustee is Bruce Karsh, Jeffrey Karsh's father, and 0.05% by Jeffrey Karsh, the company's CEO, CIO and a director and sole owner of Tryperion Holdings LLC, the sponsor and parent of the manager. The proxy states that Karsh 'is, in effect, on both sides of the transaction'.
- Process per the proxy: Karsh told the board after its March 16, 2026 meeting that he wanted to acquire the properties and was recused; on April 22 TH Abide proposed $74,200,000; on May 19 the non-recused directors countered at $80,000,000; on May 22 TH Abide raised its proposal to a total enterprise value of about $77,300,000. The proxy does not show how that figure becomes $7.00 a share.
- Newmark Valuation & Advisory, engaged July 2, delivered draft appraisals on July 31 totaling $69,775,000; after the board 'identif[ied] assumptions that the Board believed warranted reconsideration' and Newmark revised them, the final reports (August 25 for Laumeier II and IV, October 2 for the Allied and MJ Buildings) put the 'as is' market value of the four properties at $73,075,000 as of July 1, 2026. The proxy says these are gross property values, not an equity value or a per-share value, and that the implied per-share value from them is below $7.00 without stating it.
- The board conducted no market check and solicited no competing bids, obtained no fairness opinion (reasons given: the transaction is under $100 million, an opinion would cost money that would reduce stockholder proceeds, and the appraisal was an adequate foundation), and did not form a special committee (reasons given: Karsh was recused and had separate counsel, the board is small, and finding unaffiliated directors was 'highly unlikely' and costly).
- The two directors who deliberated and approved: Greg Rollman, employed by Tryperion, which Karsh controls, and Justin Fromm, a personal friend of Karsh who has worked for Tryperion as a consultant through his own real estate consulting business. The proxy lists both relationships among the factors weighing against the merger.
- Reasons the board gives: a three-property, 400,205-square-foot portfolio (Laumeier II and IV in St. Louis; the Allied and MJ Buildings in Carmel, Indiana); limited ability to raise capital under Regulation A; structural office headwinds; several million dollars of expected tenant-improvement and leasing costs at the MJ and Allied buildings; and a redemption backlog: as of June 30, 2026, 913,237 shares (40.3% of shares issued) had been submitted for redemption and 458,643 (20.3%) redeemed, with a 5.0% annual cap that could take 'several years' to clear.
- The last manager-calculated NAV was $6.96 per share at March 31, 2026; the board says NAV is 'broadly consistent with GAAP fair value' after the share-price reduction that followed the sale of the Panera-tenanted property, but that Newmark-supported pricing is the more reliable measure. $7.00 is $0.04 above that NAV and about 31% below the $10.15 NAV of December 31, 2021 in AltStreet's series.
- Consequences for insiders per the proxy: the limited partners' OP Units, including Karsh-related holders', remain outstanding and are not converted; the management agreement and its 2.00%-of-NAV annual asset management fee end at closing; directors and officers keep indemnification and insurance. Friends and family of Karsh hold voting shares; the proxy does not say how many.
- Other terms: lender consent to the change of control required, no financing condition, a $125,000 termination fee either way in specified circumstances, expense reimbursement capped at $75,000, outside date May 10, 2027 extendable once by 30 days. For tax purposes the merger is treated as a taxable sale of all assets followed by a liquidating distribution.
1st stREIT Office Inc., the non-traded Regulation A REIT sold under the Streitwise brand, has asked its stockholders to approve a $7.00-a-share cash sale of the company to TH Abide LLC, a buyer owned by its chief executive, Jeffrey Karsh, and a trust that bears his name and is administered by his father. The proxy statement, filed November 10, 2026 as an exhibit to a Form 1-U, sets a virtual special meeting for December 16 and discloses how the price was reached: two rounds of proposals between Karsh and the board's two other directors, an appraisal of the four buildings by Newmark Valuation & Advisory at $73.075 million, and a decision not to seek other buyers, not to obtain a fairness opinion and not to form a special committee.
The board recommends a vote for the merger and lists the gaps itself. Among the factors weighing against the deal, the proxy records that the board 'did not conduct a formal market check or solicit competing bids, meaning there can be no assurance that the Merger Consideration represents the highest price obtainable in a fully competitive process, and did not obtain a fairness opinion from an investment banking firm', and that the two directors who approved it have ties to Karsh's firm.
How the price was set
Per the proxy, Karsh told the other directors after the board's March 16, 2026 meeting that he wanted to acquire the properties. He was recused from every later deliberation and required to retain his own counsel. On April 22 TH Abide proposed to buy the company for $74,200,000. The non-recused directors, Justin Fromm and Greg Rollman, rejected that as inadequate and countered on May 19 at $80,000,000. On May 22 TH Abide came back at a total enterprise value of about $77,300,000, and the board decided to proceed with diligence. The proxy does not show the arithmetic from that enterprise value, through the mortgage debt and the operating partnership units held by others, to $7.00 a share.
The board engaged Newmark on July 2 after reviewing bids from several vendors, noting that Tryperion and Karsh had dealt with Newmark before and judging that immaterial. Newmark's draft appraisals of July 31 totaled $69,775,000. The board 'reviewed and discussed the draft appraisals with Newmark, including identifying assumptions that the Board believed warranted reconsideration', and after Newmark revised certain assumptions the final reports, delivered August 25 for the two St. Louis buildings and October 2 for the two Carmel, Indiana buildings, put the 'as is' market value of the leased fee interests at $73,075,000 as of July 1, 2026. The proxy stresses that this is a gross property value, 'not the equity value of the Company or a value per share', and states, without giving the number, that the per-share value implied by the appraisal is less than $7.00.
Having that appraisal, the two directors decided a broader sale process was unnecessary, citing the limited pool of buyers for an externally managed non-traded REIT, the cost and delay of a marketing process, and the risk that Karsh's offer would be withdrawn during one. The merger agreement was negotiated over about 18 weeks, approved by the two directors on November 6 and signed November 9.
Who approved it
The proxy describes the two approving directors' relationships in its own words. Rollman 'is employed by Tryperion, which is controlled by Jeffrey Karsh'. Fromm 'is a personal friend of Jeffrey Karsh and has worked with Tryperion in his capacity as owner of his own real estate consulting business'. Neither has an economic interest in TH Abide. The board considered forming a special committee of independent directors and decided against it, reasoning that Karsh's recusal and separate counsel were sufficient protection, that the board is small, and that it 'was highly unlikely that the Company could find one or more new individuals, with no prior affiliations to the Karsh family, Tryperion or the Company, willing to join the Board'.
On the fairness opinion, the proxy gives three reasons for not obtaining one: the transaction is under $100 million, 'significantly smaller than transactions that customarily engage investment banking firms'; the cost 'would directly reduce the proceeds available for distribution to stockholders'; and the Newmark appraisal was an adequate foundation. It then acknowledges what an opinion would have added, comparable-company and transaction analyses, discounted cash flow and premiums paid, and that 'stockholders do not have the benefit of that additional assessment'.
What stockholders get and what insiders keep
Each share of common stock becomes $7.00 in cash. The limited partners' units in 1st stREIT Office Operating Partnership LP, including those held by Karsh-related holders, remain outstanding and are not converted; TH Abide succeeds the company as general partner and the partnership keeps the four buildings. The management agreement with SW Manager, LLC, a Tryperion subsidiary, terminates at closing along with its asset management fee of 2.00% a year of the operating partnership's NAV, which the proxy frames as the buyer acquiring full control rather than as a loss to Tryperion. Directors and officers keep indemnification and six years of insurance coverage. The proxy records that 'the Karsh family collectively holds a dominant beneficial economic interest in the entity being sold', and that friends and family of Karsh hold shares entitled to vote, without saying how many.
The vote requires a majority of all 1,798,167 shares outstanding on the November 9 record date, so a stockholder who does nothing has voted no. There are no dissenters' or appraisal rights under Maryland law: a holder who votes against and loses receives $7.00. The transaction is treated for tax as a sale of all the company's assets followed by a liquidating distribution, so the cash is taxable against each holder's basis.
The board's reasons
The proxy's case for selling rests on scale and liquidity. The company owns 400,205 rentable square feet in three properties, Laumeier II and IV in St. Louis and the Allied and MJ Buildings in Carmel, Indiana, a concentration the board calls 'materially below what the Company originally envisioned'. Capital raising under Regulation A was 'significantly impacted' by the pandemic and the structural decline in office demand, 'particularly pronounced in the St. Louis market', and the current offering is restricted to existing investors. Lease renewals at the MJ and Allied buildings are expected to require 'several million dollars' of tenant improvements and leasing commissions that could force the suspension of redemptions and distributions.
The redemption backlog is the sharpest figure. As of June 30, 2026, 913,237 shares, 40.3% of all shares issued, had been submitted for redemption, and 458,643, 20.3% of shares issued, had been redeemed; at the plan's annual cap of 5.0% of weighted average shares, the company says clearing the queue 'may take several quarters, and potentially several years'. The board presents the $7.00 cash price as the way out of that queue for every holder at once.
On value, the board sets the price against its own NAV of $6.96 per share at March 31, 2026, a figure the manager calculates, and says that after the share-price reduction that followed the sale of the Panera-tenanted property it believes NAV is 'broadly consistent with GAAP fair value', while treating the Newmark-supported price as the more reliable measure. In AltStreet's series the NAV peaked at $10.15 at December 31, 2021, so $7.00 is $0.04 above the last mark and about 31% below the peak.
Background
Control of the manager consolidated in Karsh before the buyout. Per the company's Form 1-K for fiscal 2023, on May 31, 2022 the manager's interests held by Tryperion Partners, LLC, the original sponsor, were assigned to Tryperion Holdings LLC, wholly owned by Jeffrey Karsh, which replaced Partners as sponsor. The proxy describes Tryperion as having invested in and managed over $2 billion of assets since 2013. AltStreet's review of Streitwise, updated November 12, 2026, covers the fee structure, the redemption program and the NAV history.
Why it matters
This is a going-private sale to management in which the issuer's own proxy supplies the critique: the price was negotiated between the buyer and two directors with ties to the buyer's firm, tested against one appraisal whose draft the board asked the appraiser to revisit, and never exposed to another bidder or an outside opinion. The proxy argues each omission was proportionate to a company this size and in this position, and it may be; a $7.00 price above a NAV that the board says approximates GAAP fair value is not on its face a low one. What a stockholder cannot do from the document is check the arithmetic, because the proxy gives the appraisal total and the enterprise value but not the bridge to the per-share figure. The alternative the proxy describes is remaining in a redemption queue that is 40% of the company and capped at 5% a year.
What the filing does not show
The proxy does not give the implied per-share value from the Newmark appraisal, the mortgage balances or the operating partnership ownership split that connect $73.075 million of property to $7.00 a share, the number of shares held by Karsh's friends and family, the assumptions Newmark revised between draft and final, or the terms of the lender consents. It reports a signed agreement and a scheduled vote, not a completed merger. Nothing in it attributes the sale to distress, and none is asserted here; the board's stated reasons are the ones set out above.
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